ioîTied 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


.F 


321 
R35pE 

1B90 


G     000  005  214     2 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION 


BY    TH.    RI  BOT 


li'''X  >\ 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


•  -^ 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION 


WORKS  BY  THE   SAME  AUTHOR. 


AUTHORISED  TRANSLATIONS. 


The  Diseases  of  the  Will. 

Pages,  134.     Cloth,  75  cents.     Paper,  25  cents. 

The  Diseases  of  Personality. 

Second,  Revised  Edition.    Pages,  163.     Cloth, 
75  cents.     Paper,  25  cents. 

The  Psychology  of  Attention. 

Third    Edition,     Pages,  121.     Cloth,  75  cents. 
Paper,  25  cents. 

The  Evolution  of  General  Ideas. 
Translated  by  Frances  A.  Welby. 
Pages,  231.     Cloth,  $1.25  (5s). 


Eu II  Set,  Cloth,  net,  $2.7^. 


The  Open  Court  Publishing  Company, 
CHICAGO,  ILL. 


THE 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION 


TH.  RIBOT 


PROFESSOR  OF  COMPARATIVE  .»ND  EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY 
IN  THE  COLLEGE  DE  FRANCE 


AUTHORISED  TRANSLATION 

(fifth,  REVISED   EDITION) 


CHICAGO 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

(LONDON:  17  Johnson's  Court,  Fleet  St.,  E.  C.) 

1903 


TRANSLATION  COPYRIGHTED 


THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 
1890. 


Biomedical 
Library 


635328 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTORY. 

PAGE 

Purpose  of  the  book:  study  of  the  mechanism  of  Attention       .        i 

Division  of  the  subject .        2 

Definition  of  Attention ,       6 

CHAPTER  I. 

SPONTANEOUS  OR  NATURAL  ATTENTION. 

Always  caused  by  emotional,  or  affective,  states  :  basal  facts  .       6 
Its  physical  manifestations  :  vaso-motor  phenomena,  respira- 
tory phenomena,  and  general  motor  phenomena,  or  phe- 
nomena of  expression 11 

The  supposed  effects  of  Attention  are  its  indispensable  factors, 

its  constitutive  elements 19 

Attention  is  only  the  subjective  aspect  of  the  physical  mani- 
festations expressing  it 21 

Concerning  Surprise 23 

Origin  of   Spontaneous  Attention ,    its   connection   with    the 

necessary  conditions  of  life 26 

CHAPTER  II. 

VOLUNTARY  OR  ARTIFICIAL  ATTENTION. 

Its  formation  :  is  an  artificial  product 29 

The  three  principal  periods  of  its  genesis  :  actions  of  simple 

feelings,  of  complex  feelings,  and  of  habit 33 

It  is  a  perfectioned  apparatus,  a  result  of  civilization      ...  36 

The  mechanism  of  Voluntary  Attention 39 

The  rôle  of  actions  of  inhibition   in   physiology  :    facts  and 

theories 40 

Attention  acts  only  upon  muscles  and  through  muscles  ...  45 


viii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Motor  elements  in  perceptions,  emotions,  images,  and  general 

ideas 46 

The  meaning  of  "voluntarily  to  direct  one's  attention  towards 

an  object" 56 

Of  the  feeling  of  effort  in  general 59 

Of  effort  in  Attention  :  effort  in  Attention  results  from  con- 
comitant muscular  contractions,  and  its  point  of  departure 

is  peripheral .60 

Experimental  researches  upon  Voluntary  Attention    ....     66 
Expectant  Attention  :  what  it  consists  in  ;  its  motor  and  intel- 
lectual aspects 68 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTENTION. 

Distraction 72 

Classification  of  pathological  forms 74 

1.  Hypertrophy  of  Attention  :    transition  from   the  normal 

state  to  the  morbid  state 76 

Hypochondria 77 

Fixed  ideas  :  their  varieties 78 

Resemblances  and  non-resemblances  to  Attention  ...  84 
Ecstasy  :  its  varieties  and  different  degrees  ;  the  state  of 

perfect  monoideism 88 

2.  Atrophy  of  Attention  :  maniacs 96 

The  state  of  exhaustion  :  weakening  of  Attention  and  en- 

feeblement  of  the  power  of  motion  go  hand  in  hand     .     97 

Attention  in  sleep  and  in  hypnosis 100 

Attention  in  idiots 103 

CONCLUSION. 

Attention  dependent  upon  emotional  states 105 

Emotional  life  reducible  to  needs,  tendencies,  and  desires, 
whether  accompanied  or  not  accompanied  with  conscious- 
ness       106 

These  states  always  imply  a  motor  innervation  in  some  degree 

or  other no 

On  the  most  general  physical  condition  of  Attention  .     .     .     .112 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


Psychologists  have  given  much  study  to  the  effects 
of  attention,  but  very  little  to  its  mechanism.  The 
latter  point  is  the  only  one  that  I  propose  to  investi- 
gate in  the  following  work.  Yet  even  within  these 
limits  the  question  is  important,  for.it  is,  as  we  shall 
later  see,  the  counterpart,  the  necessary  complement 
of  the  theory  of  association.  If  the  present  treatise 
contributes,  be  it  ever  so  little,  to  point  out  clearly  this 
want  of  contemporaneous  psychology,  and  to  induce 
others  to  supply  it,  it  will  have  accomplished  its  pur- 
pose. 

Without  attempting  at  present  to  define  or  to 
characterize  attention,  I  shall  take  for  granted  that 
every  one  sufficiently  understands  what  the  term  means. 
It  is  a  matter  of  much  greater  difficulty  to  know  at 
what  point  attention  begins,  and  where  it  ends  ;  for  it 
embraces  all  degrees  from  the  transient  instant  ac- 
corded to  the  buzzing  of  a  fly,  to  the  state  of  complete 
absorption.  It  will  be  conformable  to  the  rule  of  a 
sound  method  only  to  study  cases  that  are  marked  and 
typical  ;  that  is  to  say,  those  which  present  at  least 
one  of  the  following  two  characteristics  :  intensity  and 
duration.  When  both  these  coincide,  attention  is  at 
its  maximum.  Duration  alone  reaches  the  same  result 
through  accumulation  :  as,  for  instance,  when  one  de- 


2  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 

ciphers  a  word  or  a  figure  by  the  light  of  several  elec- 
trical sparks.  Intensity  alone  is  equally  efficacious: 
thus  a  woman  will  take  in,  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye, 
the  complete  toilet  of  a  rival.  The  feeble  forms  of 
attention  can  teach  us  nothing  :  at  all  events,  it  is  not 
from  these  that  we  must  begin  our  study.  Before  we 
have  yet  traced  the  broad  outlines  of  our  work,  it 
would  be  idle  to  note  the  more  delicate  aspects,  and 
to  waste  time  with  subtile  differences.  The  purpose 
of  this  series  of  essays  is  to  establish  and  prove  the 
following  propositions  : 

There  are  two  well-defined  forms  of  attention  :  the 
one  spontaneous,  natural  ;  the  other  voluntary,  arti- 
ficial. The  former — neglected  by  most  psychologists — 
is  the  true,  primitive,  and  fundamental  form  of  atten- 
tion. The  second — the  only  one  studied  by  most  psy- 
chologists— is  but  an  imitation,  a  result  of  education, 
of  training,  and  of  impulsion.  Precarious  and  vacillating 
in  nature,  it  derives  its  whole  being  from  spontaneous 
attention,  and  finds  only  in  the  latter  a  point  of  sup- 
port. It  is  merely  an  apparatus  formed  by  cultivation, 
and  a  product  of  civilization. 

Attention,  in  these  two  forms,  is  not  an  indetermi- 
nate activity,  a  kind  of  ''pure  act"  of  spirit,  acting  by 
mysterious  and  undiscoverable  means.  Its  mechan- 
ism is  essentially  inotor^  that  is,  it  always  acts  upon 
the  muscles,  and  through  the  muscles,  mainly  under 
the  form  of  inhibition  ;  and  as  epigraph  of  this  study 
we  might  choose  the  words  of  Maudsley,  that  ''the 
person  who  is  unable  to  control  his  own  muscles,  is  inca- 
pable of  attention."  Attention,  under  these  two  forms, 
is  an  exceptional,  abnormal  state,  which  cannot  last  a 
long  time,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  in  contradiction 
to  the  basic  condition  of  psychic  life  ;  namely,  change. 


INTRODUCTORY.  3 

Attention  is  a  state  that  is  fixed.  If  it  is  prolonged 
beyond  a  reasonable  time,  particularly  under  unfavor- 
able conditions,  everybody  knows  from  individual  ex- 
perience, that  there  results  a  constantly  increasing 
cloudiness  of  the  mind,  finally  a  kind  of  intellectual 
vacuity,  frequently  accompanied  by  vertigo.  These 
light,  transient  perturbations  denote  the  radical  an- 
tagonism of  attention  and  the  normal  psychical  life. 
The  progress  toward  unity  of  consciousness,  which  is 
the  very  basis  of  attention,  manifests  itself  still  "better 
in  clearly  morbid  cases,  which  we  shall  study  later 
under  their  chronic  form,  namely,  the  'fixed  idea,'  and 
in  their  acute  form,  which  is  ecstasy. 

Already  from  this  point,  without  passing  beyond 
generalities,  we  are  able  by  the  aid  of  this  clearly 
marked  characteristic— the  tendency  toward  unity  of 
consciousness — to  reach  a  definition  of  attention.  If  we 
take  any  adult  person,  in  good  health,  and  of  average 
intelligence,  the  ordinary  mechanism  of  his  mental 
life  will  consist  in  a  perpetual  coming  and  going  of  in- 
ward events,  in  a  marching  by  of  sensations,  feelings, 
ideas,  and  images,  which  associate  with,  or  repel,  each 
other  according  to  certain  laws.  Properly  speaking, 
it  is  not,  as  frequently  has  been  said,  a  chain,  a  series, 
but  it  is  rather  an  irradiation  in  various  directions, 
and  through  various  strata  ;  a  mobile  aggregate  which 
is  being  incessantly  formed,  unformed,  and  re-formed. 
Every  one  knows  that  this  mechanism  has  been  care- 
fully studied  in  our  day,  and  that  the  theory  of  asso- 
ciation forms  one  of  the  solidest  acquisitions  of  modern 
psychology.  Not,  indeed,  that  everything  has  been 
done  ;  for,  in  our  opinion,  the  part  sustained  by  the 
emotional  states  has  not  been  sufficiently  taken  into  ac- 
count as  the  latent  cause  of  a  great  number  of  associa- 


4  PSYCHOLOG Y  OF  A TTENTION. 

tions.  More  than  once  it  happens  that  an  idea  evokes 
another,  not  by  virtue  of  a  resemblance  which  would 
be  common  to  them  in  their  character  as  ideas,  but 
because  there  is  a  common  emotional  fact  which  envel- 
ops* and  unites  them.  There  would  thus  remain  the 
task  of  reducing  the  laws  of  association  to  physiolog- 
ical laws,  and  the  psychological  mechanism  to  the  ce- 
rebral mechanism  that  supports  it  ;  but  we  are  still 
very  far  from  this  ideal  point. 

The  normal  condition  is  plurality  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness, or — according  to  the  expression  employed 
by  certain  authors  —  polyideism.  Attention  is  the 
momentary  inhibition,  to  the  exclusive  benefit  of  a 
single  state,  of  this  perpetual  progression  :  it  is  a 
monoideism.  But  it  is  necessary  clearly  to  determine, 
in  what  sense  we  use  this  term.  Is  attention  a  reduc- 
tion to  a  sole  and  single  state  of  consciousness?  No  ; 
for  inward  observation  teaches  us,  that  it  is  only  a 
relative  monoideism  ;  that  is,  it  supposes  the  existence 
of  a  master-idea,  drawing  to  itself  all  that  relates  to 
it,  and  nothing  else,  allowing  associations  to  produce 
themselves  only  within  very  narrow  limits,  and  on 
condition  that  they  converge  toward  a  common  point. 
It  drains  for  its  own  use — at  least  in  the  proportion 
possible — the  entire  cerebral  activity. 

Do  there  really  exist  cases  of  absolute  monoideism, 
in  which  consciousness  is  reduced  to  a  sole  and  single 
state  entirely  occupying  it,  and  in  which  the  mechanism 
of  association  is  totally  arrested  ?  In  our  opinion,  this 
we  meet  in  only  a  few,  very  rare  cases  of  ecstasy, 
which  we  shall  analyze  later  on  ;  still  it  is  for  a  fleeting 
instant  only,  because  consciousness  disappears  when 

*See  good  instances  in  J.  Sully  :  "  Illusions,"  Chap.  VII. 


INTR  OD  UCTOR  V.  5 

placed  beyond  the  conditions  that  are  rigorously 
necessary  to  its  existence. 

Attention  (we  here  once  more  and  for  the  last  time 
recall  the  fact,  that  we  shall  only  study  the  clearest 
cases)  consists  accordingly  in  the  substitution  of  a  rel- 
ative unity  of  consciousness  for  the  plurality  of  states, 
for  the  change  which  constitutes  the  rule.  Yet  this 
does  not  suffice  to  define  attention.  A  very  bad  tooth- 
ache, a  nephritic  colic,  or  intense  enjoyment  produce 
a  momentary  unity  of  consciousness,  which  we  do  not 
confuse  with  attention  proper.  Attention  has  an  ob- 
ject ;  it  is  not  a  purely  subjective  modification  :  it  is  a 
cognition,  an  intellectual  state.  This  is  an  additional 
characteristic  to  be  noted. 

This  is  not  all.  To  distinguish  it  from  certain 
states  which  approach  it,  and  which  will  be  studied 
in  the  course  of  our  work  (for  example,  fixed  ideas), 
we  must  take  account  of  the  adaptation  that  always 
accompanies  it,  and  which,  as  we  shall  attempt  to 
establish,  in  a  great  measure  constitutes  its  charac- 
ter. In  what  does  this  adaptation  consist  ?  For  the 
present,  let  us  limit  ourselves  to  an  entirely  superficial 
view. 

In  cases  of  spontaneous  attention,  the  whole  body 
converges  toward  its  object,  the  eyes,  ears,  and  some- 
times the  arms  ;  all  motions-  are  arrested.  Our  per- 
sonality is  captured,  that  is,  all  the  tendencies  of  the 
individual,  all  his  available  energy  aim  at  the  same 
point.  The  physical  and  external  adaptation  is  a  sign  of 
psychic  and  inward  adaptation.  Convergence  is  a  re- 
duction to  unity  substituting  itself  for  that  diffusion  of 
movements  and  attitudes  which  characterizes  the 
normal  state. 

In  cases  of  voluntary  attention  adaptation  is  most 


6  PSYCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION, 

frequently  incomplete,  intermittent,  without  solidity. 
The  movements  are  inhibited,  yet  to  reappear  from 
time  to  time.  The  organism  converges,  but  in  a 
languid,  reluctant  sort  of  way.  Intermissions  of  phys- 
ical adaptation  are  a  sign  of  intermissions  of  mental 
adaptation.  The  personality  has  been  only  partly 
won,  and  at  intermittent  moments. 

I  must  ask  the  reader  to  pardon  the  circumstance 
that  these  brief  remarks  are  somewhat  obscure  and 
insufficient.  Details  and  proofs  will  come  later.  It 
was  merely  a  question  of  paving  the  way  for  a  defi- 
nition of  attention  which,  I  believe,  I  can  present  in 
the  following  form  :  ''  It  is  an  intellectual  monoideism, 
accompanied  by  spontaneous  or  artificial  adaptation  of 
the  individual."  Or,  if  we  prefer  another  formula  : 
"Attention  consists  in  an  intellectual  state,  exclusive 
or  predominant,  with  spontaneous  or  artificial  adap- 
tation of  the  individual." 

But  let  us  now  leave  the  foregoing  generalities,  in 
order  to  study,  in  their  mechanism,  the  several  forms 
of  attention. 

CHAPTER  I. 
SPONTANEOUS   ATTENTION. 


I. 

Spontaneous  attention  is  the  only  existing  form  of 
attention  until  education  and  artificial  means  have 
been  employed.  There  exists  no  other  kind  in  most 
animals  and  in  young  children.  It  is  a  gift  of  nature, 
but  very  unequally  distributed  among  individuals. 
Still,  whether  strong  or  weak,  everywhere  and  always 
it  is  caused  by  emotional  states.  This  rule  is  absolute, 
without  exception.     Man,  like  animals,  lends  his  at- 


SPONTANEOUS  ATTENTION  7 

tention  spontaneously  only  to  what  concerns  and  in- 
terests him  ;  to  what  produces  in  him  an  agreeable,  dis- 
agreeable, or  mixed  state.  As  pleasure  and  pain  are 
only  signs  that  certain  of  our  tendencies  are  being  sat- 
isfied or  crossed  ;  and  as  our  tendencies  are  what  is 
deepest  in  us  ;  as  they  express  the  very  depths  of  our 
personality,  of  our  character  ;  it  follows  that  spontane- 
ous attention  has  its  roots  in  the  very  basis  of  our  being. 
The  nature  of  spontaneous  attention  in  any  person  re- 
veals his  character,  or,  at  least,  his  fundamental  ten- 
dencies. It  tells  us,  whether  a  person  is  frivolous, 
vulgar,  narrow,  open,  or  deep.  The  janitor's  wife  will 
spontaneously  lend  her  whole  attention  to  the  gossip 
of  her  neighbors  ;  the  painter  to  a  beautiful  sunset,  in 
which  the  peasant  only  sees  the  approach  of  night  ; 
the  geologist  to  the  stones  he  chances  to  find,  in  which 
the  uninitiated  only  see  worthless  pebbles.  Let  the 
reader  look  into  himself  and  around  him  ;  the  exam- 
ples are  so  easily  found,  that  it  is  useless  to  dwell 
longer  upon  them. 

It  might  be  a  subject  of  wonder  that  so  evident  and 
striking  a  truth  (for  spontaneous  attention  without  an 
anterior  emotional  state  would  be  an  effect  without  a 
cause)  should  not  long  ago  have  been  recognized  as  a 
common  acquisition  of  psychology,  if  indeed  the  ma- 
jority of  psychologists  had  not  obstinately  persevered 
in  the  exclusive  study  of  the  higher  forms  of  attention, 
that  is  to  say,  in  beginning  at  the  end.*  It  is  highly 
necessary,  on  the  contrary,  to  dwell  upon  its  primitive 


*The  psychologists  who  have  clearly  seen  the  importance  of  the  emo- 
tional states  in  attention,  are  so, few,  that  I  am  only  able  to  quote  Maudsley, 
"Physiology  of  Mind,"  Chap.  V  ;  Lewes,  "Problems  of  Life  and  Mind," 
Vol.  in,  p.  184;  Carpenter,  "Mental  Physiology,"  Chap.  Ill;  Horwicz.  '' Psy- 
chologische  Analysen,"  Chap.  I,  and  a  few  of  Herbart's  disciples,  particularly 
Volkmar,  "  Lehrbuck  der  Psychologie,"  Vol.  II,  Sec.  114. 


8  PS YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

form  :  without  the  latter  nothing  is  intelligible,  nothing 
explainable,  everything  is  vague,  and  we  should  re- 
main without  the  guiding  thread  of  our  study.  Ac- 
cordingly, we  shall  not  hesitate  to  multiply  the  number 
of  our  proofs. 

Any  man  or  animal,  hypothetically  incapable  of 
experiencing  either  pleasure  or  pain,  would  be  inca- 
pable of  attention.  There  could  only  exist  for  him 
certain  states  more  intense  than  certain  other  ones, 
which  is  an  entirely  different  matter.  It  is  accordingly 
impossible  to  maintain,  in  the  same  sense  as  Condillac, 
that  if  amid  a  multitude  of  sensations,  there  is  one 
that  predominates  by  its  intensity,  it  is  therewith 
** transformed  into  attention."  It  is  not  intensity  alone 
that  acts,  but,  above  all,  our  adaptation,  that  is  to  say, 
our  tendencies,  as  they  happen  to  be  crossed  or  sat- 
isfied. Intensity  is  but  an  element,  and  oftentimes 
the  least  important.  Thus  we  may  observe  how  spon- 
taneous attention  is  natural  and  devoid  of  effort.  The 
idler,  who  loafs  around  in  the  street,  will  stare  with 
gaping  mouth  at  a  procession  or  passing  masquerade, 
and  preserve  perfect  imperturbability  so  long  as  the 
procession  lasts.  If  at  any  time  effort  appears,  it  is  a 
sign  that  attention  changes  in  character,  that  it  be- 
comes voluntary,  artificial. 

/  In  the  biographies  of  great  men,  traits  abound, 
'  which  prove,  that  spontaneous  attention  entirely  de- 
pends upon  emotional  states.  These  traits  are  the 
best,  because  they  show  us  the  phenomenon  in  all  its 
force.  Instances  of  great  attention  are  always  caused 
and  sustained  by  great  passions.  Fourier,  says  Arago, 
remained  turbulent  and  incapable  of  application  until 
his  thirteenth  year  :  he  was  then  initiated  into  the 
elements  of  mathematics,  and  forthwith  became  a  dif- 


SPONTA  NE  OUS  A  TTENTION.  9 

ferent  man.  Malebranche,  by  chance,  reluctantly  takes 
up  Descartes's  treatise  ^^ de  PHoînme''  \  the  perusal  of 
it  <^ caused  such  a  violent  beating  of  the  heart  that 
from  hour  to  hour  he  was  compelled  to  lay  the  book 
aside,  and  break  off  its  perusal,  in  order  to  breathe 
freely''  ;  and  he  becomes  a  Cartesian.  It  is  useless  to 
speak  of  Newton,  and  many  others.  Some  perhaps 
will  say  :  Such  traits  are  the  marks  of  a  dawning  voca- 
tion. But  what  indeed  is  a  vocation  but  attention, 
discovering  its  way,  its  true  bearings  for  the  rest  of 
life  ?  No  finer  instances  of  spontaneous  attention 
could  be  given,  for  this  form  does  not  last  for  only  a 
few  minutes  or  an  hour,  but  forever. 

Let  us  examine  a  different  aspect  of  the  question. 
Is  the  state  of  attention  continuous?  Yes,  apparently 
so  ;  but  in  reality  it  is  intermittent.  ''Strictly  speak- 
ing, what  is  often  called  attending  to  one  thing  is  the 
following  of  a  scries  of  connected  impressions  or  ideas, 
with  an  ever  renewed  and  deepening  interest.  For  ex- 
ample, when  we  witness  a  dramatic  representation .... 
And  even  a  prolonged  attention  to  a  small  material  ob- 
ject, as  a  coin,  or  a  flower,  involves  a  continual  tran- 
sition of  mind  from  one  aspect  to  another,  one  set  of 
suggestions  to  another.  Hence  it  would  be  more  cor- 
rectly described  as  making  the  object  the  centre  of  at- 
tention, the  point  from  which  it  sets  out  and  to  which 
it  continually  reverts."* 

Researches  in  psycho-physics,  of  which  we  shall 
speak  later  (Chap.  II,  Sec.  4),  show  that  attention  is 
subject  to  the  law  of  rhythm.  Stanley  Hall,  while  study- 
ing with  great  care  the  gradual  changes  of  pressure  pro- 
duced upon  the  tips  of  the  fingers,  has  estabhshed  the 
fact,  that  the  perception  of  continuity  seems  impos- 

*  J.  Sully,  Outlines  of  Psychology.     Chap.  IV. 


I o  FS YCHOL OGY  OF  A  TTENTION. 

sible,  and  that  the  subject  cannot  have  the  feeHng  of 
continuous  augmentation  or  decrease. 

Attention  chooses  between  different  degrees  of 
pressure,  in  order  to  compare  them.  Certain  errors 
in  the  notation  of  astronomical  phenomena  are  also 
due  to  these  oscillations  of  attention.* 

Maudsley  and  Lewes  have  compared  attention  to 
a  reflex  motion  ;  it  would  be  more  proper  to  say,  a 
series  of  reflexes.  Any  physical  excitation  produces 
a  movement.  Similarly  a  stimulation  coming  from  the 
object  produces  an  incessantly  repeated  adaptation. 
Deep  and  tenacious  cases  of  spontaneous  attention 
have  all  the  characteristics  of  unassuaged  passion, 
which  unceasingly  re-commences  in  the  effort  to  satisfy 
itself.  The  dipsomaniac,  before  a  filled  glass,  will 
swallow  its  contents  ;  and  if  some  malignant  fairy,  as 
soon  as  it  was  emptied,  refilled  it,  he  would  never 
stop.  Erotic  passion  acts  in  like  manner.  Vicq 
d'Azyr  maintained  that  monkeys  could  not  be  trained, 
because  they  cannot  be  made  attentive  (which  in  the 
first  place,  is  not  true).  To  this  Gall  retorted  :  Show 
a  monkey  its  female,  and  you  will  find  out  whether  it 
is  capable  of  attention.  When  confronting  any  scien- 
tific problem,  the  Newtonian  mind  acts  in  the  same 
manner  ;  it  falls  a  prey  to  a  perpetual  irritation,  which 
holds  it  in  its  power  without  cessation  or  rest.  No 
fact  is  clearer,  more  incontestable,  more  easily  verified 
than  this,  namely,  that  spontaneous  attention  depends 
upon  emotional  states,  such  as  desires,  satisfaction, 
discontent,  jealousy,  etc.;  its  intensity  and  its  duration 
depend  upon  their  intensity  and  their  duration. 

Let  us  here  note  a  fact  of  considerable  importance 

*'  American  Journal  of  Psychology,"  1887,  No.  i.  "  Philosophische  Stu- 
dien,"  1888,  Vol.  V,  p.  56,  and  following. 


SPONTANE  OUS  A  TTENTION  1 1 

in  the  mechanism  of  attention.  This  real  intermission 
in  an  apparent  continuity  alone  renders  possible  any 
long  attention.  If  we  keep  one  of  our  eyes  fixed  upon 
any  single  point,  after  a  while  our  vision  becomes 
confused  \  a  cloud  is  formed  between  the  object  and 
ourselves,  and  finally  we  see  nothing  at  all.  If  we  lay 
our  hand  flat  upon  a  table,  motionless,  and  without 
pressure  (for  pressure  itself  is  a  movement),  by  slow 
degrees  the  sensation  wears  off,  and  finally  disappears. 
The  reason  is,  that  there  is  no  perception  without 
movement,  be  it  ever  so  weak.  Every  sensorial  organ 
is  at  the  same  time  both  sensitive  and  motor.  As 
soon  as  absolute  immobility  eliminates  one  of  the  two 
elements  (motility),  the  function  of  the  other  after  a 
while  is  rendered  null.  In  a  word,  movement  is  the 
condition  of  the  change,  which  is  one  of  the  conditions 
of  consciousness.  These  well-known  facts,  of  common 
experience,  make  us  understand  the  necessity  of  these 
intermissions  in  attention,  often  imperceptible  to  con- 
sciousness, because  they  are  very  brief,  and  of  a  very 
delicate  order. 


The  physical  manifestations  of  attention  are  nu- 
merous and  of  very  great  importance.  We  shall  mi- 
nutely pass  them  in  review,  while  forewarning  the 
reader,  that  we  consider  them  less  as  effects  of  this 
state  of  mind,  than  as  its  necessary  conditions — fre- 
quently even  as  its  constitutive  elements.  This  study, 
accordingly,  far  from  being  subordinate  to  our  pur- 
pose, is  really  an  investigation  of  capital  importance. 
To  obtain  an  approximately  clear  idea  of  the  mech- 
anism of  attention,  we  shall  not  have  to  look  anywhere 
else.     It  is,  in  fact,  only  an  attitude  of  the  mind,  a 


1 2  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

purely  formal  state  ;  if  we  divest  it  of  all  the  physical 
concomitants  that  determine  and  give  it  substance,  we 
remain  in  the  presence  of  a  pure  abstraction,  a  phan- 
tom. And  so  the  psychologists  that  have  only  spoken 
of  attention  from  inward  observation,  have  remained 
silent  concerning  its  mechanism,  and  have  limited 
themselves  to  extolling  its  power. 

It  is  always  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  the  follow- 
ing fundamental  principle  :  Every  intellectual  state\ 
is  accompanied  by  definite  physical  manifestations. 
Thought  is  not, — as  many  from  tradition  still  admit, — i 
an  event  taking  place  in  a  purely  super-sensual,  ethe- 
real, inaccessible  world.  We  shall  repeat  with  Set- 
chenoff,  "No  thought  without  expression  ";  that  is, 
thought  is  a  word  or  an  act  in  a  nascent  state,  that  is 
to  say,  a  commencement  of  muscular  activity.  The 
sensorial  forms  of  attention  so  clearly  testify  to  this 
principle  that  it  cannot  be  questioned.  The  same 
applies  to  that  internal,  hidden  process,  called  reflec- 
tion, of  which  we  shall  speak  later. 

The  physical  concomitants  of  attention  can  be  re- 
ferred to  three  groups  :  vaso-motor  phenomena,  re- 
spiratory phenomena,  and  motor  phenomena,  or  phe- 
nomena of  expression.  They  all  denote  a  state  of  con- 
vergence of  the  organism  and  of  concentration  of  labor. 

I.  Let  us  suppose  that  twenty  persons  fix  their  at- 
tention for  five  or  ten  minutes  upon  their  little  finger. 
In  such  case  something  like  the  following  will  happen. 
Some  will  be  unconscious  of  any  sensation  whatever  ; 
others  will  experience  certain  distinct  sensations,  as 
suffering,  pain,  arterial  pulsations  ;  the  majority  will 
feel  a  faint  impression  of  heaviness  and  a  crawling 
sensation.  This  simple  experiment  raises  the  following 
questions  :    Do  there   not   always  exist  in  the  several 


SPONTANEOUS  ATTENTION,  13 

parts  of  the  body  sensations,  due  to  incessant  modifi- 
cations of  the  tissues — modifications  which  pass  by  un- 
perceived  unless  attention  is  fixed  upon  the  same  ? 
Can  the  act  of  attention  increase  the  vascular  activity 
of  the  sensorial  ganglia,  and  there  produce  subjec- 
tive sensations  ?  Finally,  can  the  sympathetic  centres 
be  aroused,  can  the  vaso-motor  nerves  be  so  influenced 
as  to  produce  certain  transitory  vascular  modifica- 
tions in  the  finger  with  which  the  sensation  is  con- 
nected ? 

The  first  supposition  seems  probable  only  to  a  very 
slight  degree.  Indeed,  it  is  always  possible  to  expe- 
rience a  sensation  in  the  finger,  if  we  set  about  atten- 
tively to  seek  for  this  sensation. 

But,  we  think  that  the  two  other  suppositions  are 
perfectly  well  grounded.  The  sensation  experienced 
is  perhaps  partially  subjective  ;  but  in  our  opinion,  the 
finger,  upon  which  thought  is  concentrated  for  a  suffi- 
cient space  of  time,  is  really  the  seat  of  a  sensation. 
The  vascular  modifications  that  take  place,  are  felt  in 
the  form  of  arterial  pulsations,  heaviness,  etc.* 

It  is  highly  probable,  and  almost  universally  ad- 
mitted, that  attention,  even  when  not  directed  toward 
any  region  of  our  body,  is  accompanied  by  local  hyper- 
haemia  of  certain  parts  of  the  brain.  The  vascu- 
larization of  the  parts  concerned,  increases  in  conse- 
quence of  greater  functional  activity.  This  local  hy- 
perhaemia  is  caused  by  a  dilatation  of  the  arteries, 
which  itself  is  caused  by  the  action  of  the  vaso-motor 
nerves  upon  the  muscular  integuments  of  the  arteries. 
The  vaso-motor  nerves  depend  on  the  great  sympa- 
thetic nerve,  which  is  independent  of  the  action  of  the 
will,  but  which  is  subjected  to  all  the  influences  of  the 

*Hack  Tuke,  "  Mind  and  Body,"  p.  2, 


14  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

emotional  states.  The  experiments  of  Mosso,  among 
others,  show  that  the  slightest  and  most  transient 
emotion  causes  an  afflux  of  blood  to  the  brain.  ''  There 
is,"  says  Maudsley,  ''  a  more  active  circulation  of  blood 
through  the  brain  during  function  than  when  it  is 
in  repose.  We  may  fairly  conclude,  then,  that  the 
effect  of  attention  to  a  current  of  thought  is  to  quicken 
the  circulation  in  the  nervous  substrata  which  minister 
to  it  ;  not  otherwise  than  as  when  some  earnest 
thought  has  taken  hold  of  the  mind,  it  keeps  up  an 
active  circulation  in  the  brain,  and  will  not  let  us  go  to 
sleep."*  After  a  spell  of  protracted  attention  we  may 
also  notice  the  redness  (sometimes  the  pallor)  of  the 
face. 
/  /  II.  Therespiratory  modifications  which  accompany 
'  attention  resemble  the  motor  phenomena  proper,  and 
enter  partly  into  the  feeling  of  effort.  The  rhythm  of 
respiration  changes,  slackens,  and  sometimes  under- 
goes a  temporary  stoppage.  "To  acquire  the  power 
of  attention,"  says  Lewes,  ''is  to  learn  to  make 
our  mental  adjustments  alternate  with  the  rhythmic 
movements  of  respiration.  It  is  a  felicitous  expression, 
that  in  the  French  language,  which  designates  a  clever 
but  superficial  thinker,  as  one  incapable  of  any  work 
de  longue  haleine — of  long  breath."")*  The  yawning 
which  follows  a  protracted  effort  of  attention  is  prob- 
ably the  effect  of  the  slackening  of  respiration.  Often, 
in  like  instances,  we  produce  a  prolonged  inhalation, 
in  order  to  renew  abundantl}^  the  air  within  our  lungs. 
The  sigh — another  respiratory  symptom — as  several 
authors  have  pointed   out,  is  common  to  attention,   to 

*  Maudsley  :  "  Physiology  of  Mind."     Gley  :  Sur  fêtai  du  pouls  carotidien 
pendant  le  travail  intellectuel. 

t  Consult  Lewes,  loc.  cit.,  p.  i88. 


SPONTANE OUS  A  TTENTION.  1 5 

physical,  and  moral  pain  :  its  object  is  to  oxygenize 
the  blood  that  has  been  narcotized  by  the  voluntary 
or  involuntary  stoppage  of  respiration. 

All  these  facts  are  so  many  proofs  in  support  of  what 
has  been  said  before,  that  attention  is  an  exceptional, 
abnormal  fact,  which  cannot  last  a  long  time. 

III.  The  movements  of  the  body,  which  are  said  to 
express  attention,  are  also  of  paramount  importance. 
In  this  chapter  we  can  only  enter  into  a  partial  study 
of  the  same  ;  the  remainder  will  be  more  properly 
studied  under  the  title  of  voluntary  attention:*  but 
here,  for  the  first  time,  we  shall  proceed  to  investigate 
the  motor  mechanism  of  attention. 

In  the  first  place  let  us  examine  the  facts.  They 
have  not  been  seriously  studied  before  our  own  time. 
Formerly  only  artists  and  a  few  physiognomists — 
both  at  all  times  too  partial  to  their  own  fancies — had 
concerned  themselves  about  them. 

Duchenne,  of  Boulogne, — a  pioneer  in  this  as  in 
various  other  fields, — conceived  the  idea  of  substi- 
tuting the  experimental  method  for  the  pure  observ- 
ation practiced  by  his  predecessors,  Ch.  Bell,  Gratiolet, 
etc.  By  the  aid  of  electricity  he  provoked  the  isolated 
contraction  of  a  facial  muscle  of  a  man  affected  with 
anaesthesia,  and  by  means  of  photography  he  obtained 
the  results  of  the  experiment.  According  to  the  theor}' 
which  he  had  set  forth  in  his  Mécanisme  de  la  physio- 
nomie huîuaine  (1862),  a  slight  contraction  of  a  single 
muscle  is  often  sufficient  to  express  an  emotion  ;  every 
emotional  state  produces  a  single  local  modification. 
Thus,  according  to  him,  the  occipito-frontalis  is  the  mus- 
cle of  attention  ;  the  orbicularis  superior  of  the  eye-lids, 
the  muscle  of  reflection  ;  the  pyramidal,  the  muscle  of 

*  See  Chap.  II,  infra. 


1 6  PS YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION, 

menace;  the  zygomaticus  major,  the  muscle  of  laughter  ; 
the  eye-brow-muscle,  the  muscle  of  grief  ;  the  triangular 
of  the  lips,  the  muscle  of  contempt  ;  and  so  on.  Still, 
Duchenne  limited  himself  to  stating  merely  the  facts  ;  in 
this  following  the  example  of  J.  Miiller,  who  declared 
that  the  expression  of  the  emotions  is  a  completely  in- 
explicable fact.  Darwin  went  still  further.  Making 
use  of  the  comparative  method,  and  relying  upon 
laborious  researches,  he  investigated  the  origin  of  the 
different  mechanisms  of  expression  ;  he  tried  hard  to 
establish  why  the  contraction  of  a  certain  given  muscle 
of  the  face,  is  necessarily  associated  with  a  certain 
given  state  of  mind. 

In  the  absence  of  these  minute  investigations  all 
attempts  to  explain  the  mechanism  of  attention  would 
have  been  premature.  How,  indeed,  is  it  possible  to 
explain  a  mechanism,  the  wheel-work  of  which  is  un- 
known to  us?  Let  us  see,  in  a  summary  way,  what 
we  know  concerning  attention  in  its  two  forms  ;  as 
applied  to  external  objects  (attention  proper),  or  to 
internal  events  (reflection). 

Attention  (in  order  to  mark  it  more  precisel}^,  we 
shall  call  it  sensorial)  contracts  the  occipitio-frontalis. 
This  muscle,  which  occupies  the  whole  region  of  the 
forehead,  has  its  mobile  point  of  insertion  in  the  under 
surface  of  the  skin  of  the  eye-brow  and  its  fixed  point 
of  insertion  at  the  back  part  of  the  skull.  In  con- 
tracting, it  draws  to  itself  the  eyebrow,  lifts  it,  and 
produces  a  few  transversal  wrinkles  on  the  forehead; 
consequently  the  eye  is  wide  open  and  well  illuminated. 
In  extreme  cases  the  mouth  opens  wide.  In  children 
and  in  many  adults  close  attention  produces  a  protru- 
sion of  the  lips,  a  kind  of  pouting.  Preyer  has  at- 
tempted to  explain  this  facial   play  by  hereditary  in- 


SPONTANE  O  US  A  TTENTJON  1 7 

fluence.  ''AU  animais,"  he  says,  ''first  direct  their 
attention  to  the  search  for  food.  The  objects  that  their 
lips,  their  feelers,  their  proboscis,  and  their  tongue  can 
reach,  are  those  with  reference  to  which  their  first  in- 
vestigations are  made.  All  examination  of,  and  all 
search  for,  food,  consequently,  is  accompanied  by  a 
preponderating  activity  of  the  mouth  and  of  its  ap- 
pendants. In  suckling,  the  mouth  of  the  infant  pro- 
trudes forward."  In  this  manner  an  association  would 
be  formed  between  the  first  movements  of  the  mouth 
and  the  activity  of  attention. 

The  act  of  reflection  is  expressed  in  another,  and 
almost  contrary  manner.  It  acts  on  the  superior  or- 
bicular muscle  of  the  eye-lids  and  lowers  the  eye-brow. 
As  a  consequence,  small  vertical  folds  are  formed  in 
the  space  between  the  eye-brows  :  the  eye  is  veiled  or 
completely  closed,  or  it  looks  within.  This  wrinkling 
of  the  eye-brows  imparts  to  the  face  an  expression  of 
intellectual  energy.  The  mouth  is  closed,  as  if  to  sus- 
tain an  effort. 

Attention  adapts  itself  to  what  is  without,  reflec- 
tion to  what  is  within.  Darwin  explains  by  an  analogy 
the  mode  in  which  reflection  expresses  itself.  It  is 
the  attitude  of  difficult  vision,  transferred  from  exter- 
nal objects  to  internal  events  that  are  difficult  to 
grasp.*  Hitherto  we  have  only  spoken  of  the  move- 
ments of  the  face  ;  but  there  are,  besides  these,  those 
of  the  entire  body — of  the  head,  trunk,  and  limbs.  It  is 
impossible  to  describe  them  in  detail,  because  they 
vary  with  each  animal  species. f     In  general  a  state  of 

*For  details  see:  Darwin,  "Expression  of  the  Emotions,"  Chap.  X; 
Prayer,  "The  Mind  of  the  Child,"  p.  250,  et  seqq.  ;  Mantegazza,  "■  La  physio- 
nomie,'" Chap.  XVI. 

t  An  excellent  study  o^  the  expression  of  attention  in  animals  will  be  found 
in  Ricardi,  '^  Saggio  di  studi  e  di  osservazioni  interna  all'  attenzione  nelV 
uomo  e  negli  animali.''     Modena,  1877,  (second  part,  p.  1-17). 


1 8  PS YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

immobility  sets  in,  adaptation  of  eyes,  ears,  and  of 
touch,  as  the  case  may  happen  :  in  a  word,  there  is  a 
tendency  toward  unity  of  action — convergence.  Con- 
centration of  consciousness  and  concentration  of  move- 
ments, diffusion  of  ideas  and  diffusion  of  movements 
go  together.  Let  us  recall  the  observations  and  cal- 
culations of  Galton  upon  this  subject.  He  observed 
an  audience  of  fifty  persons,  listening  to  a  long  and 
tiresome  lecture.  The  number  of  movements  clearly 
discernible  in  the  audience  was  very  uniform  :  forty- 
five  a  minute,  or,  say  an  average  of  one  movement 
for  each  person.  Several  times,  the  attention  of 
the  audience  having  been  aroused,  the  number  of 
movements  decreased  by  one- half  ;  besides  they  were 
less  extended,  less  prolonged,  shorter  and  more  rapid. 
I  may  incidentally  anticipate  an  objection.  Every- 
body knows  that  attention,  at  least,  in  its  reflected 
form,  is  at  times  accompanied  by  movements.  Many 
people  seem  to  find  that  walking  to  and  fro  helps 
them  out  of  perplexity  ;  others  strike  their  forehead, 
scratch  their  head,  rub  their  eyes,  move  their  arms 
and  legs  about  in  an  incessant,  rhythmical  fashion. 
This,  indeed,  is  an  expenditure,  not  an  economy  of 
motion.  But  it  is  a  profitable  expenditure.  The  move- 
ments thus  produced  are  not  simple  mechanical  phe- 
nomena, acting  upon  our  external  surroundings;  they 
act  also  through  the  muscular  sense  upon  the  brain, 
which  receives  them  as  it  receives  all  other  sensorial 
impressions,  to  the  increase  of  the  brain's  activity. 
A  rapid  walk,  a  race,  will  also  quicken  the  flow  of  ideas 
and  words  ;  they  produce,  as  Bain  says,  a  sort  of  me- 
chanical intoxication.  The  experimental  researches 
of  M.  Féré,  which  we  cannot  quote  here,*  furnish  nu- 

*  See  his  book,  "  Sensation  and  Movement." 


SPONTANE  OUS  A  TTENTION  1 9 

mérous  instances  of  the  dynamogenetic  action  of  move- 
ments. We  stretch  out  our  arms  and  legs  to  begin 
work  ;  that  is,  we  arouse  the  motor  centres.  Passive 
movements  impressed  upon  paralyzed  members,  have 
in  certain  cases,  been  able,  by  reviving  motor  im- 
ages, to  restore  lost  activity.  And  it  is  to  be  observed, 
that  the  result  of  these  movements  is  to  increase 
mental  activity,  and  not  to  concentrate  the  attention; 
they  simply  provide  it  with  subject-matter.  It  is  a 
preliminary  operation  only. 

We  must  now  determine  the  real  part  sustained  by 
the  movements  in  attention.  Up  to  this  point  we  have 
limited  ourselves  to  describing  them — at  least  the  prin- 
cipal ones  ;  we  are  now  prepared  to  put  the  question 
in  its  clearest  and  simplest  terms  : 

Are  the  movements  of  the  face,  the  body,  and  the 
limbs,  and  the  respiratory  modifications  that  accom- 
pany attention,  simply  effects,  outward  marks,  as  is 
usually  supposed  ?  Or,  are  they,  on  the  contrary, 
the  necessary  conditions,  the  constituent  elements,  the 
indispensable  factors  of  attention  ?  Without  hesitation 
we  accept  the  second  thesis.  Totally  suppress  move- 
ments, and  you  totally  suppress  attention. 

Although  for  the  time  being  we  are  in  a  position 
only  partially  to  establish  the  point  maintained  (the 
study  of  voluntary  attention,  reserved  for  an  other 
chapter,  will  show  it  to  us  in  a  new  aspect),  still  since 
we  are  now  touchmg  upon  the  essential  feature  of  the 
mechanism  of  attention,  it  seems  proper  to  dwell 
awhile  upon  the  subject. 

The  fundamental  rôle  of  the  movements  in  atten- 
tion is,  to  maintain  the  appropriate  state  of  conscious- 
ness and  to  reinforce  it.  But  as  this  is  a  question  of 
mechanism,    it    will    be   preferable    to    approach    the 


20  J'S  ]  'CHOZ  OG  y  UF  A  TTEXTION. 

problem  from  its  physiological  side,  by  an  inquiry  into 
what  takes  place  in  the  brain,  in  its  double  capacity  of 
intellectual  and  motor  organ. 

1.  As  an  intellectual  organ  the  brain  serves  as  sub- 
stratum to  perceptions  (in  sensorial  attention),  images, 
and  ideas  (in  reflection).  By  hypothesis,  the  nervous 
elements  that  act  will  furnish,  on  an  average,  a 
superior  work. 

Attention  certainly  causes  an  intense  innervation, 
as  proved  by  the  numerous  experiments  of  psychom- 
etry,  in  which  it  plays  a  part.  ''An  active  idea,"  says 
Maudsley,  ''is  accompanied  by  a  molecular  change  in 
the  nervous  elements,  which  is  propagated  either  along 
the  sensory  nerve  to  its  periphery,  or,  if  not  so  far,  at 
any  rate  to  the  sensory  ganglion,  the  sensibility  of 
which  is  thereby  increased.  The  result  of  this  propa- 
gation of  molecular  action  to  the  ganglion  is  that  the 
different  muscles  in  connection  with  the  affected  sense 
are  put  into  a  certain  tension  b}^  reflex  action,  and 
thereby  increase  the  feeling  of  attention,  in  accordance 
with  the  law  that  associated  feelings  strengthen  one 
another."*  Attention,  according  to  Hartmann,  "con- 
sists in  material  vibrations  of  the  nerves,"  in  a  nerve- 
current,  which,  traversing  the  sensible  nerves,  pro- 
ceeds from  centre  to  periphery,  f  But  there  is  another 
element  of  equal  importance. 

2.  As  a  motor  organ  the  brain  plays  a  complex 
rôle.  In  the  first  place,  it  inaugurates  the  movements 
that  accompany  perceptions,  images,  or  ideas  ;  after- 
wards, these  movements,  which  frequently  are  intense, 
return  to  the  brain  by  way  of  the  muscular  sense  as 
sensations    of    movements;    the    latter    increase    the 

*Loc.  cit..  p.  313. 

^Philosophie  de  V inconscient,  trad.  Nolen,  Vol.  I,  p.  145;  Vol.  II,  p.  65 


SPONTANEOUS  ATTENTION.  21 

quantity  of  available  energy,  which  on  the  one  hand 
serves  to  maintain  or  to  reinforce  consciousness,  and, 
on  the  other,  returns  to  its  original  starting-point  in 
the  form  of  a  fresh  movement. 

In  this  manner  there  is  a  constant  going  and  com- 
ing from  centre  to  periphery,  from  periphery  to  centre, 
and  from  the  strengthened  centre  again  to  periphery, 
etc.  The  intensity  of  consciousness  is  but  the  sub- 
jective expression  of  this  complicated  work.  But  to 
suppose  that  this  state  could  last  without  these  or- 
ganic conditions,  is  an  untenable  hypothesis,  com- 
pletely in  disaccord  with  all  that  experience  teaches 
us.  The  naive  spectator  at  the  Opera,  who  is 
bored  at  the  unintelligibility  of  the  music,  is  all  atten- 
tion when  a  sudden  change  of  scenery  occurs  ;  that  is, 
when  the  visual  impression  has  produced  an  instan- 
taneous adaptation  of  the  eyes  and  the  whole  body. 
Without  this  organic  convergence  the  impression 
would  rapidly  vanish.  "The  difference  between  at- 
tention and  voluntary  movement,"  says  Wundt,  ''con- 
sists essentially  in  the  preponderant  reaction  upon  the 
sensitive  parts  (the  original  source  of  the  performance). 
In  voluntary  movement,  the  main  direction  of  the 
central  excitation  is  toward  the  muscles  ;  in  attention, 
the  muscles  only  act  in  conjunction  with  subordinate, 
sympathetic  movements  "  ;  *  or,  in  other  terms,  a  reflec- 
tion of  movements  is  produced.  Finally,  in  the  words 
of  Maudsley,  we  may  declare  the  mechanism  of  atten- 
tion to  be:  ''first,  the  excitation  of  the  proper  idea- 
tional track  either  by  external  presentation  or  internal 
representation  ;  secondly,  the  intensification  of  its  en- 
ergy by  the   increment  of  stimulus  resulting  from  the 

*  Physiologische  Psychologie,  pp.  723-724  of  the  first  edition.  This  passage 
is  not  found  in  the  following  editions. 


22  /"S} XHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

proper  motor  innervation  ;  thirdly,  a  further  intensifi- 
cation of  energy  by  the  subsequent  reaction  of  the 
more  active  perceptive  centre  upon  the  motor  factor — 
the  interplay  of  sensory  and  motor  factors  augment- 
ing the  activity  up  to  a  certain  limit. '"^ 

If,  accordingly,  we  compare  the  ordinary  state  with 
the  state  of  attention,  we  find  in  the  former  weak  rep- 
resentations, and  but  few  movements  ;  but  in  the 
latter,  a  vivid  representation,  energetic,  and  conver- 
gent movements,  and  moreover  repercussion  of  the 
movements  produced.  It  matters  little,  whether  this 
last  addition  be  conscious  or  not  :  consciousness  does 
not  perform  the  operation  ;  it  simply  profits  by  it. 

It  may  perhaps  be  interposed  that,  admitting  this 
reaction  of  the  movements  upon  the  brain,  still  there 
is  nothing  to  prove  that  the  movements  are  originally 
the  simple  effect  of  attention.  There  are  three  hypoth- 
eses possible,  namely  :  either,  attention  (the  state  of 
consciousness)  is  the  cause  of  the  movements,  or  it  is 
the  effect  of  the  same,  or  it  is  first  the  cause  and  after- 
wards the  effect  of  the  movements. 

Still,  I  do  not  wish  to  choose  between  these  three 
hypotheses  which  have  a  purely  logical  and  dialectic 
import,  but  rather  to  put  the  question  otherwise.  In 
the  above-stated  form  the  problem  is  thoroughly  im- 
pregnated— without  appearing  to  be  so — with  that 
traditional  dualism,  of  which  psychology  finds  it  so 
difficult  to  rid  itself  ;  and  the  problem  is  reduced,  in 
effect,  to  the  question,  whether  in  attention  the  soul  first 
acts  upon  the  body  or  the  body  upon  the  soul.  This 
enigma  is  not  for  me  to  solve.  To  the  eye  of  physio- 
logical psychology  there  exist  only  internal  states,  differ- 
ing among  each  other  as  well  by  their  peculiar  qualities 

*  Loc.  cit.,  p.  316. 


SPONTANEOUS  ATTENTION.  23 

as  by  their  physical  concomitants.  If  the  intellectual 
state  produced  is  weak,  brief,  without  perceptible  ex- 
pression, then  it  is  not  attention.  If  it  is  strong,  stable, 
well-defined,  and  marked  by  the  before-mentioned 
physical  modifications,  then  it  is  attention.  The  point 
here  maintained  is,  that  attention  does  not  exist  in 
abstracto,  as  a  purely  inward  event  :  it  is  a  concrete 
state,  a  psycho-physiological  complex.  Take  our  spec- 
tator at  the  opera.  Abstract  from  him  the  adaptation 
of  eyes,  head,  body,  limbs,  changes  of  respiration  and 
cerebral  circulation,  etc.,  and  the  conscious  or  un- 
conscious reaction  of  all  these  phenomena  upon  the 
brain  ;  and  that  which  is  left  of  the  original  whole, 
thus  despoiled  and  emptied,  is  no  longer  attention.  If 
anything  remain,  it  is  an  ephemeral  state  of  conscious- 
ness, the  shadow  of  that  which  has  been.  We  hope 
that  this  example,  however  far-fetched  it  may  seem, 
will  better  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  this  point 
than  long  disquisitions.  The  motor  manifestations 
are  neither  effects  nor  causes,  but  elements  ;  together 
with  the  state  of  consciousness,  which  constitutes 
their  subjective  side,  they  are  attention. 

The  reader,  however,  is  not  to  regard  this  as  any- 
thing more  than  a  rough  outline,  or  provisional  view, 
that  will  be  completed  later  on.  Thus,  we  have  not 
spoken  of  the  feeling  of  effort,  because  it  is  very  rare  in 
spontaneous  attention,  if  met  with  at  all.  But  the 
part  sustained  by  the  movements  is  sufficiently  im- 
portant to  justify  repeated  investigations  of  the  subject. 


The  state  of  surprise  or  astonishment  is  spontaneous 
attention  augmented  ;  a  few  words  with  reference  to  it 
are  now  in  order.     Although  of  frequent  occurrence  in 


24  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  TTENTION. 

every-day  life,  it  has  been  forgotten  by  psychology.  I 
find,  however,  in  the  Traitée  des  passio?is  of  Descartes 
(Part  II,  Art.  70)  the  following  definition  :  "  Admiration 
is  a  sudden  surprise  of  the  soul,  which  causes  it  to  con- 
sider with  attention  those  objects  that  to  it  appear  un- 
frequent  and  extraordinary.  Thus,  in  the  first  place, 
it  is  caused  by  the  impression  in  our  brain  represent- 
ing the  object  as  rare,  and  consequently  as  worthy  of 
exceptional  consideration  ;  and  in  the  second  place  by 
the  movement  of  our  thoughts,  which  by  virtue  of  that 
impression  are  disposed  to  tend  with  great  force  to- 
ward the  locality  of  the  brain  in  which  the  impression 
rests,  in  order  to  strengthen  and  preserve  it  there  ;  as 
the}''  are  also  disposed,  through  that  impression,  to  pass 
from  thence  into  the  muscles  that  serve  to  maintain 
the  sensor}^  organs  in  the  same  position  in  which  they 
are,  in  order  that,  if  originally  formed  by  the  organs  of 
sense,  the  impression  ma}-  be  further  prolonged  by  their 
support.  "  It  will  repay  us,  well  to  ponder  this  passage. 
If  we  carefully  peruse  it,  we  shall  find  that  due  allow- 
ance being  made  for  slight  differences  of  language, 
nearly  all  the  elements  which  we  have  endeavored  to 
point  out  in  the  mechanism  of  spontaneous  attention, 
are  therein  clearly  enumerated  ;  namely  : — the  augmen- 
tation of  nervous  influx  in  consequence  of  the  impres- 
sion ;  its  partial  conduction  toward  the  muscles  ;  the 
action  of  these  muscles  in  order  "to  support"  and 
"to  strengthen."  Incidentally  we  may  remark,  that 
Descartes's  method  of  treatment  is  that  of  physiolog- 
ical psychology  and  not  that  of  spiritualistic  psychol- 
ogy, which  quite  improperly  lays  claim  to  him. 

Surprise,  and  in  a  higher  degree  astonishment,  is  a 
shock  produced  by  that  which  is  new  and  unexpected  ; 
as  if,  for  example,  a  person  who  travels  little  and  whom 


SPONTANEOUS  ATTENTION.  25 

I  believe  to  be  at  home,  some  five  or  six  hundred 
miles  away,  suddenly  enters  my  room. 

From  the  mental  standpoint,  there  is  little  to  be 
said  of  it.  It  belongs  to  the  group  of  Emotions,  and 
in  its  strong  form,  it  is  a  commotion.  Properly  speak- 
ing, it  is  not  so  much  a  state,  as  an  intermediate  con- 
dition between  two  states,  an  abrupt  rupture,  a  gap, 
an  hiatus.  At  the  moment  of  the  shock  the  pre- 
vious polyideism  abruptly  ends,  because  the  new  state 
rushes  in,  like  a  giant,  into  the  struggle  for  life  going 
on  among  the  states  of  consciousness.  By  degrees  the 
new  state  finds  its  place,  is  put  into  connection  with 
others,  and  equilibrium  tends  to  be  re-established  ;  but 
surprise  having  passed  away,  the  state  that  follows 
it  is  attention,  that  is,  an  adjusted  monoideism — 
adaptation  having  had  time  to  take  place.  The  in- 
tellectual element  regains  the  upper  hand  over  the 
emotional  element.  It  is  highly  probable,  that  in  the 
state  of  surprise  we  have  imperfect  knowledge  because 
we  have  too  much  sensation. 

From  the  physical  side  the  symptoms  are  an  ex- 
aggeration of  spontaneous  attention.  "Attention,"  as 
we  have  seen,  '*is  shown  by  the  eyebrows  being 
slightly  raised  ;  and  as  this  state  increases  into  sur- 
prise, they  are  raised  to   a  much  greater  extent,  with 

the  eyes   and  rnouth  widely  open The  degree 

to  which  the  eyes  and  mouth  are  opened  corresponds 
with  the  degree  of  surprise  felt."*  This  raising  of  the 
eye-brows  is  an  instinctive  act  ;  because  it  is  also  met 
with  in  individuals  born  blind  :  it  allows  the  eyes  to 
be  opened  very   rapidly.      As  to   the   opening   of   the 


*  Darwin   'The  Expression  of  the  Emotions'  (Chap.  XII).     The  probable 
origin  of  these  diverse  movements  is  discussed  there. 


26  PS YCH OLOG Y  OF  A TTENTION. 

mouth,  it  permits  a  vigorous  and  deep  inspiration,  which 
we  are  always  wont  to  make  before  any  great  effort. 

We  have  said,  that  surprise  is  spontaneous  atten- 
tion augmented.  I  believe  that  this  assertion  is  per- 
fectly allowable.  This  state  best  exemplifies  the  emo- 
tional causes  of  spontaneous  attention  ;  for,  from  the 
latter  there  is  an  insensible  gradation  to  surprise,  to 
astonishment,  to  stupefaction,  and  finally  to  fright  and 
to  terror,  which  are  emotional  states  of  a  very  high 
degree  of  intensity. 

Brought  back  now  to  the  point  from  which  we 
started,  we  are  thus  able  to  see,  that  the  origin  of 
attention  is  very  humble,  and  that  its  primitive  forms 
have  actually  been  bound  up  with  the  most  exacting 
conditions  of  animal  life.  Attention,  from  the  first, 
had  but  a  biological  value.  The  habit  of  psychologists 
to  restrict  themselves  to  voluntary  attention  and  even 
then  to  its  higher  manifestations,  concealed  its  origin. 

We  may  assert  ^'  a  priori  "  that  if  attention  is  caused 
by  emotional  states,  which  in  their  turn  are  caused  by 
tendencies,  needs,  and  appetites,  it  is  in  its  last  an- 
alysis inseparably  bound  up  with  that  which  lies  deep- 
est in  the  individual — the  instinct  of  self-preservation. 

A  rapid  examination  of  the  facts  will  enable  us 
better  to  see  that  the  power  of  being  attentive  in  the 
struggle  for  life  has  been  an  advantage  of  the  foremost 
order  ;  but  we  must  leave  man  and  descend  lower  still — 
indeed,  very  low — in  the  scale  of  animal  life.  I  leave 
aside  completely  the  rudimentary  forms  of  psychic 
life,  which  only  too  easily  afford  a  pretext  for  con- 
jectures and  aberrations.  In  order  that  attention  can 
be  evoked,  a  few  developed  senses  at  least  will  be  re- 
quisite, a  few  clear  perceptions,  and  a  competent  motor 
apparatus.      Riccardi,    in     his    previously    mentioned 


SPONTANE  OUS  A  TTENTION.  2 7 

work,  finds  the  first  clear  expression  of  attention  in 
Arthropoda. 

Any  animal  so  organized  that  the  impressions  of  the 
external  world  were  all  of  equal  significance  to  it,  in 
whose  consciousness  all  impressions  stood  upon  the 
same  level,  without  any  single  one  predominating  or 
inducing  an  appropriate  motor  adaptation — were  ex- 
ceedingly ill-equipped  for  its  own  preservation.  I 
shall  overlook  the  extreme  case,  in  which  predomi- 
nance and  adaptation  would  favor  detrimental  impres- 
sions ;  for  an  animal  thus  constituted  must  perish, 
being  an  illogical  organism — a  kind  of  incorporate  con- 
tradiction. The  usual  case  remains,  viz.  :  the  predom- 
inance of  useful  sensations,  that  is,  of  those  connected 
with  nutrition,  self-defence,  and  the  propagation  of  the 
species.  The  impressions  of  prey  to  be  caught,  of  an 
enemy  to  be  avoided,  and  from  time  to  time,  of  a  female 
to  be  fecundated,  become  settled  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  animal  with  their  adapted  movements. 
Attention,  thus,  is  at  the  service  of  and  dependent 
upon  necessities;  always  connected  with  the  sense 
most  perfectly  developed,  the  sense  of  touch,  of  sight, 
of  hearing,  of  smelling,  according  to  the  species. 
Here  attention  is  seen  in  all  its  simplicity,  and  here  it 
affords  the  most  instruction.  It  was  necessary  to  de- 
scend to  these  rudimentary  forms,  in  order  to  grasp 
the  reason  of  its  power  : — attention  is  a  condition  of 
life  ;  and  it  will  preserve  this  identical  character  in  its 
hfgher  forms,  where,  ceasing  to  be  a  factor  of  adapta- 
tion in  a  purely  physical  environment  it  becomes,  as 
we  shall  see,  a  factor  of  adaptation  in  the  social  envi- 
ronment. In  all  the  forms  of  attention,  from  the  lowest 
to  the  highest,  there  is  unity  of  composition. 

And  besides,  among  the  highest-class  animals  even, 


28  J'S} TIfOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

attention  loses  its  limited  and  material  character.  The 
great  majority  of  animal  species  are  confined  within 
the  narrow  circle  of  feeding,  propagating,  sleeping  ; 
in  this  their  entire  activity  is  expended.  The  most 
intelligent  have  a  superfluous  activity,  which  is  ex- 
pended in  the  form  of  play — a  manifestation  which  is 
so  important,  that  several  authors  have  made  play  the 
original  source  of  art.  To  this  need  of  luxury  there 
also  corresponds  an  attention  for  luxury.  Dogs,  that 
their  masters  amuse  in  a  certain  manner,  become  at- 
tentive when  they  see  the  latter  making  preparations 
for  the  same  game  ;  and  a  close  observer  of  children, 
Sikorski,  has  shown  that  their  activity  and  attentici? 
are  mainly  developed  through  play.* 

*  Revue  Philosophique,  April,  1885. 


CHAPTER  IT. 
VOLUNTARY  ATTENTION. 

Voluntary  or  artificial  attention  is  a  product  of 
art,  of  education,,  of  direction,  and  of  training.  It  is 
grafted,  as  it  were,  upon  spontaneous  or  natural  at- 
tention, and  finds  in  the  latter  its  conditions  of  ex- 
istence, as  the  graft  does  in  the  stock,  into  which  it 
has  been  inserted.  In  spontaneous  attention  the  ob- 
ject acts  by  its  intrinsic  power;  in  voluntary  attention 
the  subject  acts  through  extrinsic,  that  is,  through 
superadded  powers.  In  voluntary  attention  the  aim 
is  no  longer  set  by  hazard  or  circumstances  ;  it  is 
willed,  chosen,  accepted  or,  at  least,  submitted  to  ;  it 
is  mainly  a  question  of  adapting  ourselves  to  it,  and  of 
finding  the  proper  means  for  maintaining  the  state  ;  and 
hence  voluntary  attention  is  always  accompanied  by  a 
certain  feeling  of  effort.  The  maximum  of  spontaneous 
attention  and  the  maximum  of  voluntary  attention  are 
totally  antithetic  ;  the  one  running  in  the  direction  of 
the  strongest  attraction,  the  other  in  the  direction  of 
the  greatest  resistance.  They  constitute  the  two  polar 
limits  between  which  all  possible  degrees  are  found, 
with  a  definite  point  at  which,  in  theory  at  least,  the 
two  forms  meet. 

Although  voluntary  attention  is  almost  the  only 
form  that  psychologists  have  studied,  and  though  to 
the  majority  it  constitutes  all  of  attention,  its  mechan- 


30  J' S YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

ism,  nevertheless,  has  not  been  any  better  understood. 
In  attempting  to  arrive  at  some  comprehension  of  it, 
we  first  propose  to  investigate  how  voluntary  attention 
is  formed,  to  inquire  into  its  genesis  ;  then  we  shall 
study  the  feeling  of  effort  by  which  it  is  accompanied, 
and  finally  the  phenomena  of  arrested  motion  or  inhi- 
bition, which,  in  our  opinion,  play  a  principal  part  in 
the  mechanism  of  attention. 


The  process  through  which  voluntary  attention  is 
formed,  may  be  reduced  to  the  following  single  for- 
mula: To  render  attractive,  by  artifice,  what  is  not  so 
by  nature  ;  to  give  an  artificial  interest  to  things  that 
have  not  a  natural  interest.  I  use  the  word  ''interest  " 
in  the  ordinary  sense,  as  equivalent  to  the  périphrase  : 
anything  that  keeps  the  mind  on  the  alert.  But  the  mind 
is  only  kept  alert  by  the  agreeable,  disagreeable,  or 
mixed  action  of  objects  upon  it,  that  is,  by  emotional 
states.  With  this  difference  however,  that  here  the  feel- 
ings that  sustain  attention,  are  acquired,  superadded, 
not  spontaneous,  as  in  its  primitive  manifestations. 
The  whole  question,  accordingly,  is  reduced  to  the 
finding  of  effective  motives;  if  the  latter  be  wanting, 
voluntary  attention  does  not  appear. 

Such  is  the  process  in  general  ;  in  practice,  how- 
ever, it  becomes  infinitely  diversified. 

In  order  properly  to  understand  the  genesis  of  vol- 
untary attention,  the  best  way  will  be  to  study  chil- 
dren and  the  higher  animals.  The  simplest  examples 
will  prove  the  most  instructive. 

During  the   earliest  period  of   its  life   the  child  is 


VOL  UNTAR  Y  A  TTENTIOJV.  3 1 

only  capable  of  spontaneous  attention.  It  fixes  its 
gaze  only  upon  shining  objects,  and  upon  the  faces  of 
its  mother  or  nurse.  Toward  the  end  of  the  third 
month  it  explores  its  field  of  vision,  by  degrees  allow- 
ing its  eyes  to  rest  upon  objects  less  and  less  interest- 
ing (Preyer).  The  same  takes  place  in  regard  to  the 
other  senses;  there  is  a  slow  transition  from  that  which 
is  of  greatest  concern  to  that  which  is  of  least  concern. 
The  fixing  of  the  gaze,  which  later  becomes  intense 
attention,  is  outwardly  expressed  by  the  more  marked 
contraction  of  various  muscles.  Attention  in  the  in- 
fant is  accompanied  by  a  certain  emotional  state,  which 
Preyer  calls  '  the  emotion  of  astonishment.  '  At  its  high- 
est point,  this  state  produces  a  temporary  immobility 
of  the  muscles.  According  to  Dr.  Sikorski,  ''aston- 
ishment, or  rather  the  emotion  that  accompanies  the 
psychic  process  of  attention,  is  chiefly  characterized 
by  the  momentary  suspension  of  respiration — a  strik- 
ing phenomenon  indeed,  after  being  accustomed  to 
the  rapid  respiration  of  children."*  It  is  almost  im- 
possible to  tell,  at  what  period  the  first  appearance  of 
will  takes  place.  Preyer  claims  to  have  noticed  in- 
dications of  will  toward  the  fifth  month,  but  in  its 
impulsive  form  ;  as  a  power  of  inhibition  it  appears 
much  later. 

So  long  as  the  psychic  life  thus  remains  in  the  ten- 
tative epoch,  attention,  that  is,  the  transfer  of  the 
mind  from  one  object  to  another,  is  determined  only 
by  the  objects'  power  of  attraction.  The  birth  of  vol- 
untary attention,  the  power  of  fastening  the  mind  upon 
non-attractive  objects,  can  only  be  accomplished  by 
force,  under  the  influence   of   education,  whether  de- 

*  Sikorski  .  Le  Développement  psychique  de  V Enfant.  {Revue  Philoso- 
phique, April,  1885.) 


3 2  PS YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

rived  from  men  or  things  external.  Education,  de- 
rived from  men,  is,  of  course,  the  most  easily  demon- 
strable, but  it  is  not  the  only  kind. 

A  child  refuses  to  learn  how  to  read  ;  it  is  incapable 
of  keeping  its  mind  fixed  upon  letters  that  have  no  at- 
traction for  it  ;  but  it  will  gaze  with  eagerness  upon 
pictures  in  a  book.  "What  do  those  pictures  mean?" 
Its  father  answers  :  "When  you  know  how  to  read,  the 
book  will  tell  you."  After  a  few  talks  of  this  kind 
the  child  finally  gives  up  ;  at  first  it  sets  about  the 
task  lazily,  but  afterwards  it  becomes  accustomed  to  its 
work,  and  finally  evinces  an  eagerness  that  needs  to 
be  checked.  In  this  we  have  an  instance  of  the  gen- 
esis of  voluntary  attention.  It  was  necessary  to  graft 
upon  a  desire  natural  and  direct,  a  desire  artificial 
and  indirect.  Reading  is  an  operation  that  does  not 
possess  an  immediate  attraction,  but  as  a  means  to  an 
end  it  has  an  attraction — a  kind  of  borrowed  attrac- 
tion— and  that  is  sufficient  :  the  child  has  been  caught 
in  a  wheel-work,  as  it  were,  and  the  first  step  has  been 
accomplished.  The  following  is  another  example  from 
B.  Perez.*  "A  child  six  years  old,  habitually  very 
inattentive,  went  to  the  piano  one  day,  of  its  own  ac- 
cord, to  repeat  an  air  that  pleased  its  mother;  and  it 
remained  there  for  over  an  hour.  The  same  child,  at 
the  age  of  seven,  seeing  its  brother  engaged  about  some 
of  his  holiday-duties,  entered  and  seated  itself  in  its 
father's  stud3^  '  What  are  you  doing  ?  '  asked  the 
nurse,  astonished  at  finding  the  child  there.  '  I  am 
doing  a  page  of  German  \  it  is  not  very  amusing  ;  but 
I  wish  to  give  Mamma  a  pleasant  surprise.'  "  Here  we 
have  another  case  of  the  genesis  of  voluntary  atten- 
tion, this   time  grafted    upon   a   S3'mpathetic,  and    not 

*B.  Perez  :  L' Enfant  de  trois  à  sept  ans,  p.  loS. 


VOL  UN  TAR  y  A  TTENTION.  33 

upon  a  purely  selfish  feeling  as  in  the  former  example. 
The  piano  and  the  German  lesson  did  not  spontane- 
ously evoke  attention  ;  they  awaken  and  maintain  it 
through  the  medium  of  a  borrowed  force. 

In  every  instance  of  the  origination  of  voluntary 
attention  this  mechanism  is  invariably  found  to  be  the 
same, — but  in  endless  variations,  resulting  in  success, 
half-success,  or  failure  :  ever  grasping  natural  motives, 
diverting  them  from  their  direct  purpose,  using  them, 
if  possible,  as  means  for  another  end.  Art  bends  nature 
to  its  purposes,  and  for  this  reason  I  call  this  form  of 
attention,  artificial. 

Without  assuming  to  enumerate  all  the  different 
motives  that  artifice  puts  into  play,  in  order  to  call 
forth  and  to  consolidate  voluntary  attention,  that  is, — 
to  repeat  once  more  my  former  statement, — in  order 
to  impart  to  the  purpose  in  view  a  power  of  action 
that  it  naturally  does  not  possess,  I  shall  now  indi- 
cate three  periods  in  point  of  time  into  which  volun- 
tary attention  falls. 

In  the  first  period,  the  educator  acts  only  upon 
simple  feelings.  He  employs  fear  in  all  its  forms, 
egotistic  tendencies,  the  attraction  of  rewards,  tender 
and  sympathetic  emotions,  as  well  as  our  innate  cu- 
riosity, which  seems  to  be  the  appetite  of  intelligence, 
and  which  to  a  certain  degree — no  matter  how  weak — 
is  found  in  everybody. 

During  the  second  period,  artificial  attention  is 
aroused  and  maintained  by  means  of  feelings  of  sec- 
ondary formation,  such  as  love  of  self,  emulation,  am- 
bition, interest  in  a  practical  line,  duty,  etc. 

The  third  period  is  that  of  organization  ;  attention 
is  aroused  and  sustained  by  habit.  The  pupil  in  the 
class-room,  the  workman  in  his  shop,  the  clerk  at  his 


34  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION, 

office,  the  tradesman  behind  his  counter,  all  would,  as 
a  rule,  prefer  to  be  somewhere  else  ;  but  egotism,  am- 
bition, and  interest  have  created  by  repetition  a  fixed 
and  lasting  habit.  Acquired  attention  has  thus  become 
a  second  nature,  and  the  artificial  process  is  complete. 
The  mere  fact  of  being  placed  in  a  certain  attitude, 
amidst  certain  surroundings,  brings  with  it  all  the 
rest  ;  attention  is  produced  and  sustained  less  through 
present  causes  than  through  an  accumulation  of  prior 
causes  ;  habitual  motives  having  acquired  the  force  of 
natural  motives.  Individuals  refractory  to  education 
and  discipline,  never  attain  to  this  third  period  ;  in 
such  people  voluntary  attention  is  seldom  produced, 
or  only  intermittently,  and  cannot  become  a  habit. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  show  in  detail  that  also  in  an- 
imals the  transition  from  spontaneous  attention  to  vol- 
untary attention  is  similarly  effected  under  the  influ- 
ence of  education,  and  of  training  ;  but  here  the 
educator  only  has  at  his  disposal  limited  means  of 
action,  very  simple  in  character.  He  acts  upon  the 
animal  through  fear,  privation  of  food,  violence,  kind- 
ness, caresses,  and  in  this  manner  he  succeeds  in 
making  the  animal  contract  certain  habits,  and  through 
artifice  become  attentive.  Among  animals,  as  among 
men,  there  are  teachable  and  refractory  individuals. 
^'A  man,"  says  Darwin,*  '^  who  trains  monkeys  to  act 
in  plays,  used  to  purchase  common  kinds  from  the 
Zoological  Society,  at  the  price  of  ^5  for  each  ;  but 
he  offered  to  give  double  the  price,  if  he  might  keep 
three  or  four  of  them  for  a  few  days  in  order  to  select 
one.  When  asked  how  he  could  possibly  learn  so 
soon  whether  a  particular  monkey  would  turn  out  a 
good  actor,  he  answered  that  it  all  depended  on  their 

*  "  Descent  of  Man,"  Vol.  I 


VOL  UNTAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  35 

power  of  attention.  If,  when  he  was  talking  and  ex- 
plaining anything  to  a  monkey  its  attention  was  easily 
distracted,  as  by  a  fly  on  the  wall,  or  other  trifling  ob- 
ject, the  case  was  hopeless.  If  he  tried  by  punish- 
ment to  make  an  inattentive  monkey  act,  it  turned 
sulky.  On  the  other  hand,  a  monkey  which  carefully 
attended  to  him  could  always  be  trained." 

Accordingly,  at  the  root  of  attention  we  find  only 
emotional  states,  attractive  or  repulsive  tendencies.  In 
the  spontaneous  form  these  are  the  only  causes.  In 
the  voluntary  form,  it  is  the  same  ;  yet  with  this  differ- 
ence, that  here  the  feelings  are  of  a  nature  more 
complex  and  of  slow  formation,  derived  through  ex- 
perience from  primitive  tendencies.  If,  while  volun- 
tary attention  is  still  in  its  period  of  genesis,  before  it 
has  been  organized  and  fixed  by  habit,  you  take  away 
from  the  school-boy  all  love  of  self,  all  emulation,  all 
fear  of  punishment,  leave  a  fortune  to  the  tradesman 
or  the  workman,  grant  a  competence  to  the  clerk 
from  the  very  outset  of  his  career,  all  their  atten- 
tion to  their  distasteful  employments  will  at  once  be 
scattered  to  the  wind,  for  there  is  nothing  left  to 
evoke  and  sustain  it.  I  confess  that  this  genesis  of 
attention  is  very  intricate;  but  it  is  conformable  to 
facts.  According  to  most  psychologists  it  would  seem, 
that  voluntary  attention — which,  although  only  a  de- 
rivative and  acquired  form,  is  yet  the  only  one  that 
they  regard — enters  without  an  antecedent  founda- 
tion. "Voluntary  attention  is  subject  to  the  superior 
authority  of  the  Ego.  I  give  or  withdraw  it,  as  I 
please  ;  by  alternate  turns  I  direct  it  toward  different 
points.  I  concentrate  it  upon  each  point,  as  long  as 
my  will  can  sustain  its  eflort.  "*     If  this  be  not  a  purely 

*  Diet.  9cient.  phi  I.,  ae  edit..  Art.  ''Attention,'" 


36  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTE2\TION. 

conventional  and  fanciful  description,  if  the  author  de- 
rives it  from  his  own  personal  experience,  I  should 
not  withhold  my  genuine  admiration.  But  in  truth,  we 
should  be  destitute  of  all  genius  of  observation,  or 
blinded  by  prejudice,  if  we  did  not  perceive  that 
voluntary  attention,  in  its  durable  form,  is  really  a 
difficult  state  to  sustain,  and  that  actually  many  do  not 
attain  to  it. 

But  if,  as  we  have  attempted  to  show,  the  higher 
form  of  attention  is  the  work  of  the  education  that  we 
have  received  from  our  parents,  teachers,  and  surround- 
ings, as  well  as  the  education  which  later  we  have  our- 
selves acquired  in  imitating  that  which  we  earlier  ex- 
perienced, this  explanation,  nevertheless,  only  forces 
the  difficulty  further  back  ;  for  our  teachers  have  only 
acted  upon  us,  as  others  had  previously  acted  upon 
them,  and  so  on  back  through  the  generations.  This, 
accordingly,  does  not  explain  the  primordial  genesis 
.  ^^  of  voluntary  attention. 
^  ^  How  then  does  voluntary  attention  originate  ?     It 

originates  of  necessity,  under  the  pressure  of  need,  and 
with  the  progress  of  intelligence.  //  is  an  instrument 
that  has  been  pe7'fected — a  product  of  civilization.  The 
same  progressive  movement  that  in  the  order  of  moral 
events  has  caused  the  individual  to  pass  from  the 
control  of  instincts  to  that  of  interest  and  duty;  in  the 
social  order,  from  primitive  savagery  to  the  state  of 
organization;  in  the  political  order,  from  almost  ab- 
solute individualism  to  the  constitution  of  a  govern- 
ment :  this  same  onward  movement,  in  the  intellectual 
world,  has  also  effected  the  transition  from  sponta- 
neous attention  to  the  dominance  of  voluntary  atten- 
tion.   The  latter  is  both  effect  and  cause  of  civilization. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  it  was  pointed  out  that, 


VOL  UN  TA  A'  Y  A  TTENTION.  3  7 

in  the  state  of  nature  the  power  of  spontaneous  atten- 
tion, both  for  animals  and  men,  is  a  factor  of  the  fore- 
most order  in  the  struggle  for  life.  In  the  course  of 
man's  development  from  the  savage  state,  so  soon  as 
(through  whatever  actual  causes,  such  as  lack  of  game, 
density  of  population,  sterility  of  soil,  or  more  warlike 
neighboring  tribes)  there  was  only  left  the  alternative 
of  perishing  or  of  accommodating  oneself  to  more  com- 
plex conditions  of  life, — in  other  words,  to  go  to  work, — - 
voluntary  attention  also  became  a  foremost  factor  in 
this  new  form  of  the  struggle  for  existence.  So  soon 
as  man  had  become  capable  of  devoting  himself  to  any 
task  that  possessed  no  immediate  attraction,  but  ac- 
cepted as  only  means  of  livelihood,  voluntary  attention 
put  in  an  appearance  in  the  world.  It  originated,  ac- 
cordingly, under  the  pressure  of  necessity,  and  of  the 
education  imparted  by  things  external. 

It  is  easily  shown  that  before  civilization  voluntary 
attention  did  not  exist,  or  appeared  only  by  flashes 
and  then  of  short  duration.  The  laziness  of  sav^ages 
is  well-known  ;  travelers  and  ethnologists  are  all  agreed 
on  this  point,  and  the  proofs  and  instances  are  so 
numerous  that  it  would  be  idle  to  quote  authorities. 
The  savage  has  a  passion  for  hunting,  war,  and  gam- 
bling ;  for  the  unforeseen,  the  unknown,  and  the  haz- 
ardous in  all  its  forms  ;  but  sustained  effort  he  ignores 
or  contemns.  Love  of  work  is  a  sentiment  of  purely 
secondary  formation,  that  goes  hand  in  hand  with 
civilization.  And  we  may  note,  now,  that  work  is  the 
concrete,  the  most  manifest  form  of  attention. 

Continuous  work  is  repugnant  even  to  half-civilized 
tribes.  Darwin  asked  certain  Gauchos  who  were 
addicted  to  drink,  gambling,  and  theft,  why  they  did 
not  work.      One  of  them    answered:  "The  days  are 


38  FS^ THOL OGY  OF  A  TTEXTION. 

too  long."*  ''The  life  of  the  primitive  man,"  says 
Herbert  Spencer,f  "is  passed  mainly  in  the  pursuit 
of  beasts,  birds,  and  fish,  which  yields  him  a  gratify- 
ing excitement  ;  but  though  to  the  civilized  man  the 
chase  gives  gratification,  this  is  neither  so  persistent 
nor  so  general Conversely,  the  power  of  con- 
tinued application,  which  in  the  primitive  man  is  very 
small,  has  among  ourselves  become  considerable.  It 
is  true  that  most  are  coerced  into  industry  by  neces- 
sity, but  there  are  sprinkled  throughout  society  men 
to  whom  active  occupation  is  a  need — men  who  are 
restless  when  away  from  business  and  miserable  when 
they  eventually  give  it  up  ;  men  to  whom  this  or  that 
line  of  investigation  is  so  attractive  that  they  devote 
themselves  to  it  day  after  day,  year  after  year,  hardly 
giving  themselves  the  rest  necessary  for  health." 

But,  as  in  order  to  live  at  all,  even  as  savages,  it  is 
necessary  from  time  to  time  to  perform  some  kind  of 
drudgery,  such  labor,  as  is  well  known,  usually  de- 
volves upon  women,  who,  while  their  husbands  sleep, 
work  from  fear  of  being  beaten.  It  is  accordingly  pos- 
sible— although  at  first  it  may  seem  a  paradox — that 
voluntary  attention  first  originated  in  woman. 

Even  among  nations  enjoying  the  advantages  of 
long  centuries  of  civilization,  there  exists  a  complete 
class  of  beings  that  are  incapable  of  protracted  work, 
— vagabonds,  professional  thieves,  and  prostitutes. 
The  Italian  criminologists  of  the  new  school,  whether 
rightly  or  wrongly,  look  upon  these  as  cases  of  atavism. 
The  majority  of  civilized  nations,  however,  have  suffi- 
ciently adapted  themselves  to  the  exigencies  of  social 
life  ;  and  they  all  are  to  a  certain  degree  capable  of 

*  "  Voyage  of  a  Naturalist." 
t  "  Data  of  Ethics,"  Chap.  X. 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  39 

voluntary  attention.  But  the  number  of  those,  of 
whom  Spencer  speaks,  to  whom  voluntary  attention 
is  an  urgent  necessity — is  very  small  indeed  ;  and  few 
and  far  between  are  those  who  profess  and  practice 
the  stantem  oportet  mori.  Voluntary  attention  is  a 
sociological  phenomenon.  When  we  consider  it  as 
such,  we  shall  better  understand  both  its  genesis  and 
its  infirmity. 

The  fact,  we  may  say,  has  now  been  established, 
that  voluntary  attention  is  an  adaptation  to  the  con- 
ditions of  a  higher  social  life  ;  that  it  is  a  discipline  and 
a  habit,  an  imitation  of  natural  attention,  which  latter 
serves,  at  the  same  time,  as  its  point  of  departure  and 
point  of  support. 


Up  to  this  point  we  have  only  examined,  in  our  in- 
vestigation of  the  mechanism  of  attention,  the  external 
impulsion  arising  from  stimuli  and  surroundings  which 
causes  it  to  pass  from  one  form  to  an  other.  We  now 
come  upon  a  much  more  obscure  question,  namely, 
the  study  of  the  internal  mechanism  through  which  a 
state  of  consciousness  is  laboriously  maintained,  in 
the  face  of  the  psychological  struggle  for  life  which  in- 
cessantly tends  to  make  it  disappear.  The  relative 
monoideism  we  have  had  to  deal  with,  which  consists 
in  the  preponderance  of  a  certain  number  of  internal 
states,  adjusted  towards  the  same  purpose  and  ex- 
cluding all  others,  needs,  in  the  case  of  spontaneous 
attention,  no  explanation.  There  a  state  (or  a  group  of 
states)  predominates  in  the  consciousness,  because  it 
happens  to  be  by  far  the  stronger  ;  and  it  is  by  far  the 


40  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  TTENTION. 

stronger,  because,  as  we  have  seen,  all  the  tendencies 
of  the  individual  conspire  in  its  favor.  The  very  con- 
trary happens  in  the  case  of  voluntary  attention,  espe- 
cially in  its  highest  artificial  forms.  What,  accord- 
ingly, is  the  mechanism  b}'  which  this  state  is  main- 
tained ? 

It  is  not  requisite  to  investigate  how  the  state  of 
voluntary  attention  is  produced  in  daily  life.  Like  every 
other  state  of  consciousness,  it  arises  at  the  bidding  of 
circumstances.  But  the  feature  that  distinguishes  it 
from  other  states,  is,  that  it  is  prolonged  and  main- 
tained. If  a  school-boy  with  but  little  taste  for  mathe- 
matics, recollects  that  he  has  a  certain  problem  to 
solve,  this  is  a  simple  state  of  consciousness  ;  but  if 
he  sets  about  the  task  and  persists,  it  is  a  state  of 
voluntary  attention.  In  order  to  leave  no  ambiguity 
concerning  this  point,  I  repeat  that  the  whole  problem 
consists  in  this  very  power  of  inhibition,  of  retention. 

But  how  can  we  produce  an  arrested  condition  of 
this  sort,  an  inhibition  ?  We  enter,  with  this  query, 
upon  a  question  but  little  known  in  physiology,  and 
almost  unexplored  in  psychology.  Experience  con- 
stantly proves,  that  in  many  cases  we  have  the  power 
to  inhibit  the  movements  of  various  parts  of  our  body. 
But  how  is  the  equivalent  of  this  inhibition  produced 
in  the  mental  order  of  things  ?  If  the  physiological 
mechanism  of  inhibition  were  better  known,  we  should 
probably  be  able  to  answer  with  more  clearness.  We 
accordingly  ask  the  reader  to  regard  the  following  re- 
marks as  an  attempt  replete  with  faults  and  omissions. 

The  fundamental  property  of  the  nervous  system 
consists  in  the  transformation  of  a  primitive  excitation 
into  a  movement.  This  is  reflex  action,  the  type  of 
nervous    activity.      But    we    also   know,    that   certain 


VOL  UNTAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  41 

excitations  may  impede,  slacken,  or  suppress  a  move- 
ment. The  best  known,  and  oldest-studied,  case  is 
that  of  the  suspension  of  the  movements  of  the  heart 
through  irritation  of  the  pneumogastric  nerve.  Since 
the  discovery  of  this  fact,  made  by  the  brothers  Weber 
in  1845,  physiologists  have  devoted  much  attention  to 
the  study  of  cases  in  which  the  excitation  of  a  nerve 
prevents  a  movement  or  a  secretion.  Pfluger  has 
shown,  that  the  splanchnic  nerve  has  an  inhibitory 
action  upon  the  small  intestine.  Since  that  date  it 
has  moreover  been  established,  that  the  movements  of 
the  stomach  and  of  the  entire  intestinal  canal  are  simi- 
larly subject  to  inhibition.  CI.  Bernard  has  referred 
to  the  same  cause  the  action  of  the  vaso-dilator 
nerves.  Finally,  this  power  of  inhibition  belongs  not 
only  to  the  spinal  cord  and  medulla  ;  it  also  exists  in 
the  brain.  Setchenoff  at  first  maintained  that  the 
central  brain  {optic  thalamus^  exerts  an  inhibitory  in- 
fluence upon  the  lower  parts  of  the  cerebro-spinal 
axis.  Many  authors  in  recent  times  have  referred  the 
phenomena  of  hypnotism  to  a  cortical  inhibition.  Fin- 
ally, according  to  Brown-Séquard,  ''inhibition  is  a 
power  possessed  by  almost  all  parts  of  the  central  nerv- 
ous system  and  a  considerable  portion  of  the  periph- 
eral nervous  system." 

To  explain  this  '*  negative  reflex,"  different  theories 
have  been  invented,  which  it  would  be  useless  to 
set  forth  here.*  Let  us  note,  however,  that  in  his 
''  Functions  of  the  Brain,"  Ferrier  was  the  first  who 
referred  attention  to  an  action  of  the  moderating  cen- 
tres which  he  places  in  the  frontal  lobes.      The  recol- 


*  For  the  history  of  this  problem  down  to  the  year  1879,  see  Hermann, 
Handbuch  der  Physiologie,  Vol.  II,  part.  II,  p.  33,  et  seqq.  For  the  more  recent 
theories,  S.  Lourie,  I/atti  e  le  teorie  dell'inibizione,  in  8vo.     Milano,  1888. 


42  FS YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

lection  of  an  idea,  he  says,  depends  on  the  motor 
element  that  enters  into  its  composition.  Attention 
depends  on  the  restriction  of  the  movement  :  there  is 
repression  of  the  external  diffusion,  and  augmentation 
of  the  internal  diffusion.  The  excitation  of  the  motor 
centres,  protected  against  external  diffusion,  expends 
its  force  internally  ;  repressed  excitation  of  a  motor 
centre  occurs.  Ferrier's  reasons  for  localizing  the 
moderating  centres  in  the  frontal-lobes,  are  as  follows: 
Intelligence  is  proportionate  to  the  development  of 
attention  ;  and  it  is  also  proportionate  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  frontal  lobes.  Irritation  of  these  lobes 
does  not  provoke  any  motor  manifestation  ;  they  are, 
accordingly,  directive  agencies,  and  expend  their 
energy  in  producing  changes  in  the  centres  of  actual 
motor  execution.  Removal  of  them  does  not  induce 
motor  paralysis,  but  merely  mental  degeneration,  re- 
sulting in  loss  of  attention.  The  frontal  lobes  are  im- 
perfectly developed  in  idiots,  whose  power  of  attention 
is  very  weak.  The  frontal  regions  in  animals  become 
by  degrees  weaker,  in  proportion  as  the  level  of  intelli- 
gence descends.  We  may  add,  that  injuries  to  the 
frontal  lobes  will  greatly  lessen  and  frequently  quite  de- 
stroy the  power  of  control.*  The  author  declares, 
that  '^as  to  the  physiological  basis  of  this  faculty  of 
control,  theoretical  views  only  can  be  entertained." 

Although  the  theory,  that  phenomena  of  inhibition 
take  place  in  special  organs,  has  become  almost  clas- 
sical ;  still,  in  recent  times,  several  authors,  basing  their 
assertion  upon  experimental  grounds,  have  maintained 

*  For  the  facts  we  may  refer  the  reader  to  our  Diseases  of  the  Will, 
Chicago,  1894,  Quite  recently  an  American  neurologist,  Alexander  Starr, 
in  23  cases  of  lesion  of  the  frontal  lobes,  found  in  one  half  of  his  patients  the 
following  mental  troubles  :  loss  of  the  faculty  of  control,  change  of  character, 
incapacity  of  fixing  attention.     "  Brain,"  Jan.  1886,  p.  570. 


VOL  UNTAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  43 

that  *' motor  actions  and  actions  of  inhibition  have 
their  seat  in  the  same  elements."*  ''Every  time  a 
nerve  is  excited,"  says  M.  Beaunis,  ''there  are  pro- 
duced in  the  nerve  two  kinds  of  modifications  in  oppo- 
site directions.  If  it  be  a  motor  nerve,  there  will  be 
set  up  in  the  nerve  an  activity,  revealed  by  a  twitch- 
ing of  the  muscle  ;  but  beside  this  phenomenon,  which 
is  the  most  apparent  and  the  one  most  studied,  there 
is  also  produced  a  contrary  state,  which  will  tend 
to  impede  the  shock,  or  to  prevent  its  appearance. 
Thus,  at  the  same  time,  in  this  nerve,  there  will  be 
motor  action  and  inhibitory  action,  "f  The  motor 
process  puts  in  an  appearance  sooner  than  the  inhibi- 
tory process,  and  lasts  a  shorter  time.  The  first  excita- 
tion causes  a  maximum  shock;  but  with  the  second 
excitation  the  inhibitory  action,  tending  to  be  produced, 
diminishes  its  amplitude.  In  one  of  Wundt's  experi- 
ments, "when  a  nerve  is  excited  by  a  constant  current, 
there  is  produced  at  the  anode  an  inhibitory  wave, 
which  is  recognized  by  the  lessened  excitability  of  the 
nerve,  and  which  is  slowly  propagated  from  both  sides 
of  the  anode  :  simultaneously,  there  is  produced  at  the 
cathode  a  wave  of  excitation,  that,  with  still  greater 
swiftness  and  intensity,  is  propagated  along  from  both 
sides  of  the  cathode.  An  excited  nerve,  accordingly, 
is  traversed  at  the  same  time  by  a  wave  of  inhibition, 
and  by  a  wave  of  excitation,  and  its  excitability  is  but 
the  algebraic  resultant  of  these  two  contrary  actions." 
On  this   hypothesis,  then,  every  excitation  would 

*Wundt,  Untersuchungen  zur  Mechanik  der  Nerven  und  Nervencentren, 
1871,  1876,  and  Physiologische  Psychologie,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  IV.  Beaunis,  Recherches 
expérimentales  sur  les  conditions  de  l'activité  cérébrale  et  sur  la  physiologie  du 
nerf.  Paris,  1884.  M.  Beaunis  has  dwelt,  more  than  any  other  physiologist, 
upon  the  importance  for  psychology  of  inhibitory  actions. 

top.  Cit.,  p.  97. 


44  ^S} THOL OGY  OF  A TTEXTION. 

determine  in  the  nervous  substance  two  modifications, 
the  one  positive  and  the  other  negative  :  a  tendency 
to  activity  on  the  one  side,  and  a  tendency  to  the  in- 
hibition of  this  activity  on  the  other  side  ;  the  final 
effect  is  nothing  more  than  the  resultant  of  these  con- 
trary actions,  so  that  at  one  time  impulsion  and  at  an- 
other stoppage  will  prevail. 

We  have  now  very  succinctly  set  forth  nearly  all 
that  physiology  teaches  us  concerning  the  mechanism 
of  inhibition,  and  we  shall  have  occasion  to  make  use 
of  it.  We  may  revert  now  to  the  psychological  phase 
of  the  problem. 

The  power  of  voluntary  inhibition,  whatever  may 
be  its  modus  operandi,  is  a  secondary  formation.  It 
appears  relatively  late,  as  do  all  manifestations  of  a 
higher  order.  Volition  in  its  positive,  impulsive  form — 
the  volition  which  accomplishes  something — is  the  first 
in  order  of  time.  Volition  in  its  negative  form,  which 
hinders  something,  appears  later  ;  according  to  Preyer,  * 
toward  the  tenth  month,  in  the  very  humble  form  of 
inhibition  of  natural  evacuations. 

But  how  is  inhibition  accomplished?  This  ques- 
tion cannot  be  answered  satisfactorily.  However,  let 
us  observe,  that  in  this  regard  our  position  is  exactly  the 
same  as  when  we  are  confronted  with  the  opposite 
question  :  How  do  we  produce  a  movement?  In  posi- 
tive volition,  the  "I  will"  is  usually  followed  by  a 
movement  ;  that  is  to  say,  there  is  a  setting  into  activ- 
ity, in  the  brain,  of  motor  images  or  appropriate 
motor  residua  ;  a  transmission  of  the  nervous  influx 
through  the  corona  radiata  to  the  corpora  striata,  to 
the  inferior  stratum  of  the  cerebral  peduncle,  to  the 
medulla,  and  then  after  decussation  to  the  spinal  cord, 

*  "The  Mind  of  the  Child." 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  45 

to  the  nerves, and  finally  to  the  muscles.  In  negative  vo- 
lition, the  ''  I  will  "  is  usuall}^  followed  by  an  inhibition. 
Here  the  anatomical  and  physiological  conditions  of  the 
transmission  are  less  accuratel}^  known  ;  upon  the  pre- 
viously expounded  hypothesis  they  would  not  be  dif- 
ferent from  the  preceding  case.  But  in  both  cases 
consciousness  directly  knows  only  two  things  :  the  fact 
of  departure,  and  the  fact  of  arrival  ;  the  "I  will  "  and 
the  act  produced  or  inhibited.  All  the  intermediate 
states  escape  it,  and  consciousness  only  knows  them 
through  knowledge  acquired,  and  indirectly.  Thus 
situated  as  regards  the  sum  of  our  present  knowledge, 
we  must  limit  ourselves  to  stating,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
that  just  as  we  possess  the  power  of  beginning,  con- 
tinuing, and  increasing  a  movement,  we  also  are  able 
to  suppress,  to  interrupt,  and  to  diminish  any  move- 
ment. 

These  general  considerations  bring  us,  at  least, 
to  one  positive  result;  namely,  that  every  act  of  voli- 
tion, whether  impulsive  or  inhibitory,  ^^  acts  only  upon 
7nuscles  a7id  through  muscles''  ;  that  any  other  concep- 
tion is  vague,  incomprehensible,  and  chimerical;  that 
consequently,  if,  as  we  maintain,  the  mechanism  of 
attention  is  motor,  then  in  all  cases  of  attention  there 
must  necessarily  be  a  play  of  muscular  elements,  real 
or  nascent  movements,  upon  which  the  power  of  inhi- 
bition acts.  We  exercise  no  action  (impellent  or  in- 
hibitory) upon  any  other  than  voluntary  muscles  ;  such 
is  our  only  and  positive  conception  of  will.  Of  two 
things,  accordingly,  one  at  least  must  be  hit  upon  : 
either  to  find  muscular  elements  in  all  manifestations 
of  voluntary  attention,  or  else  to  abandon  all  explana- 
tion of  its  mechanism,  and  to  limit  ourselves  to  say- 
ing that  it  exists. 


46  PSYCHOL OGY  OF  A TTEXTION. 

Attention  voluntarily  addresses  itself  to  perceptions, 
images,  and  ideals  ;  or  to  speak  more  precisely,  and  to 
avoid  all  metaphor,  the  state  of  monoideism  can  be 
voluntarily  maintained  by  a  group  of  perceptions,  im- 
ages, or  ideas,  adapted  to  a  purpose  fixed  upon  in 
advance.  In  these  three  cases  we  have  to  determine 
the  motor  elements  that  are  met  with. 

I.  As  regards  perceptions,  there  are  no  difficulties. 
All  our  organs  of  perception  are  at  the  same  time  sen- 
sorial and  motor.  To  perceive  with  our  eyes,  ears, 
hands,  feet,  tongue,  nostrils,  movements  are  needed. 
The  more  mobile  the  parts  of  our  body,  the  more  ex- 
quisite is  their  sensibility  ;  the  less  perfect  their  motile 
power,  the  more  obtuse  their  sensibility.  Nor  is  this 
all;  without  motor  elements,  perception  is  impossible. 
We  will  call  to  mind  a  previous  statement  that  if  the 
eye  be  kept  fixed  upon  a  given  object  without  moving, 
perception  after  a  while  grows  dim,  and  then  disap- 
pears. Rest  the  tips  of  the  fingers  upon  a  table  with- 
out pressing,  and  the  contact  at  the  end  of  a  few  min- 
utes will  no  longer  be  felt.  But  a  motion  of  the  eye, 
or  of  the  finger,  be  it  ever  so  light,  will  re-arouse 
perception.  Consciousness  is  only  possible  through 
change  :  change  is  not  possible  save  through  move- 
ment. It  would  be  easy  to  expatiate  at  great  length 
upon  this  subject  ;  for  although  the  facts  are  very  mani- 
fest and  of  common  experience,  psychology  has  never- 
theless so  neglected  the  rôle  sustained  by  move- 
ments, that  it  actually  forgot  at  last  that  they  are  the 
fundamental  condition  of  cognition  in  that  they  are 
the  instrument  of  the  fundamental  law  of  conscious- 
ness, which  is  relativity,  change.  Enough  has  now 
been  said  to  warrant  the  unconditional  statement,  that 
where  there  is  no  movement  there  is  no  perception. 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  47 

The  rôle  of  movement  in  sensorial  attention  is  not 
subject  to  the  slightest  doubt.  The  watch-maker  who 
is  minutely  studying  the  wheel-work  of  a  watch, 
adapts  his  eyes,  hands,  and  body; all  other  movements 
are  suppressed.  In  laboratory  experiments,  instituted 
to  study  voluntary  attention,  this  state  of  concentra- 
tion through  inhibition  of  movements,  frequently  at- 
tains an  extraordinary  height;  we  shall  speak  of  it 
further  on.  But  we  may  refer  again  to  Galton's 
observations,  reported  in  the  preceding  chapter,  upon 
movements  produced  in  a  fatigued  audience. 

Attention,  accordingly,  means  concentration  and 
inhibition  of  movements.  Distraction  means  diffusion 
of  movements. 

Voluntary  attention,  thus,  may  also  act  upon  the 
expression  of  emotions  ;  as  where  we  have  strong 
motives  for  not  outwardly  betraying  a  feeling  and 
possess  a  power  of  inhibition  capable  of  preventing 
such  expression.  But  it  only  acts  upon  muscles — upon 
muscles   alone.      Everything  else  escapes  its  control. 

So  far  we  have  treated  the  problem  from  the  point 
easiest  of  approach.  We  now  come  to  that  purely  in- 
ternal form,  called  ^^  reflexion.'"  Images  and  ideas 
constitute  its  subject  matter.  In  these  two  groups  of 
psychic  states,  accordingly,  we  must  now  find  the 
motor  elements. 

2.  ''It  does  not  seem  plain,  at  first,"  wrote  Bain, 
as  early  as  the  year  1855,  ''that  the  retention  of  an 
idea,  an  image,  in  the  mind  is  the  work  of  our  volun- 
tary muscles.  What  are  the  movements  produced, 
when  I  conceive  to  myself  a  circle,  or  think  of  St. 
Paul's?  We  can  answer  this  question  only  by  sup- 
posing that  the  mental  image  occupies  in  the  brain 
and  the  other  parts  of  the  nervous  system  the  same 


48  /"S YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

place  as  the  original  sensation.  As  there  is  a  muscular 
element  in  our  sensations,  particularly  in  those  of  the 
highest  order — in  touch,  sight,  and  hearing — this  ele- 
ment must,  in  some  way  or  other,  find  its  place  in  ideal 
sensation — in  recollection."  Since  the  time  that  this 
passage  was  written,  the  question  of  the  nature  of 
images  has  been  closely  and  profitably  studied,  and 
solved  exactly  as  therein  indicated.*  Whereas,  to 
the  earlier  psychologists,  an  image  or  idea  was  a  kind 
of  phantom,  without  definite  seat,  existing  "within 
the  soul,"  differing  from  perception  not  in  degree  but 
in  nature,  resembling  it  ''  at  most  only  as  a  portrait 
resembles  its  original  ;  "  to  physiological  psychology, 
on  the  contrary,  there  is  between  perception  and 
image  identity  of  nature,  identity  of  seat,  and  only  a 
difference  of  degree.  The  image  is  not  a  photograph 
but  a  revivai  of  the  sensorial  and  motor  elements 
that  have  built  up  the  perception.  In  proportion  as 
its  intensity  increases,  it  approaches  more  and  more 
to  the  condition  of  its  origination,  and  so  tends  to  be- 
come an  hallucination. 

Keeping  closely  to  the  motor  elements  of  images 
(being  the  only  ones  that  interest  us),  it  is  clear,  that 
since  there  is  no  perception  without  movements,  the 
latter,  after  they  have  been  produced,  leave  behind 
in  the  brain  motor  residua  (motor  images,  motor  in- 
tuitions), exactly  as  the  impressions  upon  the  ret- 
ina or  skin  leave  behind  sensorial  impressions.  If 
the  motor  apparatus  did  not  possess  a  memory  of  its 
own,  images,  or  residua,  no  movement  could  be  learned 
and  made  habitual.      Everything  would    always   have 

*  Consult  Taine,  De  V Intelligence,  Vol.  II  ;  Gallon,  "  Inquiry  into  Human 
Faculty,"  etc.,  pp.  83-114  ;  Charcot,  Leçons  sur  les  maladies  du  système  nerveux. 
Vol.  III  ;  Binet,  Psychologie  du  raisonnement.  Chap.  II  ;  Ballet,  Le  Langage  in- 
térieur et  les  diverses  fo'^'mcs  de  l'ap/iasie. 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  49 

to  begin  over  again.      However,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
fortify   this   by  argument.      Innumerable  experiments 
prove    that  movement   is  inherent  in   the  image  and    / 
contained  in  it.      Chevreul's  famous  experiment  with    ' 
the    pendulum  may  be  regarded  as  typical.      Is  it  ne- 
cessary to  cite  more  ?  how  there  are  people  who  plunge 
head  foremost  into   yawning   chasms,    through  fear  of 
falling  into  them  ?  people   who   cut   themselves  with 
razors,  through   the  very  fear  of  cutting  themselves? 
or  the  case  of  ''thought-reading,"  which  is  but  a  read- 
ing of  muscular  states?  and  so  many  other  facts  that 
are  reputed  extraordinary  simply  because  people   are 
ignorant  of  the   elementary  psychological   fact,    that     I 
every   image   contains   a  tendency   towards    motion  ?    / 
Of  course,  the  motor  element  does  not  always  possess 
these  enormous  proportions,  but  it  exists  at  least  in  a 
nascent  state  ;  just  as  the  sensorial  image  does  not  al- 
ways possess  hallucinatory  vividness,  but  exists  simply 
in  outline  in  the  consciousness. 

3.  If  it  is  easy  enough  to  establish  the  existence 
of  motor  elements  in  images,  the  question  of  general 
ideas  or  concepts,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  difficult. 
Physiological  psychology,  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
has  greatly  neglected  ideology,  and  the  latter  study  is 
in  great  need  of  revision  from  the  standpoint  of  ac- 
quired experimental  data.  The  study  of  perceptions 
and  images  has  paved  the  way  for  this  task.  But  it 
is  not  my  intention  to  treat  incidentally  so  great  a 
question.  My  purpose  merely  is,  as  a  means  of  find- 
ing our  true  bearings,  to  group  general  ideas  into  the 
following  three  great  categories  : 

a)  Those  which  result  from  the  fusion  of  '  '  similar  ' 
images,  without  the  aid  of  words  ; 


50  rs  }  XHOL  O  G  Y  OF  A  TTEXTION. 

b)  Those  which  result  from  the  fusion  of  'Mis- 
similar  "  images,  with  the  aid  of  words  ; 

c')  Those  which  are  reduced  to  words,  to  language, 
accompanied  with  a  vaguely  represented  outline,  or 
even  without  any  concomitant  representation  whatso- 
ever. 

I  shall  disregard  the  regulative  concepts  (those  of 
time,  space,  and  cause),  the  investigation  of  which 
would  carry  us  too  far  from  our  path.  And  we  may 
now  examine,  whether  each  of  these  three  categories 
includes  motor  elements,  upon  which  attention  may  act. 

a)  The  first  category  comprises  general  ideas  of 
the  rudest  sort,  those  which  are  met  with  in  higher 
animals,  children,  and  deaf-mutes,  before  the  use  of 
analytical  language.  The  operation  of  the  mind  is 
limited  to  grasping  very  striking  resemblances,  and  so 
to  framing  generic  images —  a  term  that  really  would 
be  more  correct  than  general  ideas.  The  operation  in 
question  seems  closely  analogous  to  the  process  by  which 
Galton,  through  superposing  several  photographs, 
obtains  the  composite  portrait  of  a  family,  or  an  accu- 
mulation of  resemblances  with  elimination  of  minor 
differences.  But  to  maintain,  as  it  has  been  main- 
tained, that  this  process  explains  the  formation  of 
general  ideas,  is  an  untenable  position.  It  explains 
only  the  very  lowest  grades  ;  being  an  operation  that 
can  deal  only  with  gross  resemblances.  Now,  do  these 
generic  images  include  a  motor  element?  It  is  very 
difficult  to  say,  and,  in  any  case,  it  is  to  no  purpose  ; 
for  it  is  not  at  this  stadium  of  mental  life  that  voluntary 
reflection  enters. 

b^  The  second  category  comprises  the  majority  of 
the  general  ideas  that  serve  the  current  purposes  of 
thought.      In   a  more  complete   study  of  the   present 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  5 1 

subject,  we  would  have  occasion  to  establish  an  as- 
cending gradation  of  groups,  rising  from  the  less  gen- 
eral to  the  more  general — a  gradation  indicating  the 
power  of  discerning  ever  fainter  resemblances  and 
fewer  and  fewer  analogies.  All  the  degrees  of  this 
ascending  progression  are  met  with  in  the  history 
of  humanity.  Thus  it  is  that  the  Fuegians  possess  no 
abstract  terms.  The  American  Indians  have  words  to 
designate  the  white  oak,  and  the  black  oak  ;  but  they 
have  no  word  for  oak  in  general.  The  Tasmanians 
have  a  term  for  each  species  of  trees,  but  none  for  tree 
in  general  ;  and  more  naturally  so,  none  for  plant, 
animal,  color,  etc.*  Not  to  dwell  upon  these  different 
phases  however,  what  is  there  in  our  mind  when  we 
think  these  general  ideas  ?  In  the  first  place,  a  word, 
which  is  the  fixed  element  ;  along  with  it  an  image. , 
less  and  less  complex,  less  and  less  clear,  in  propor- 
tion as  we  ascend  in  generalization.  This  image  is 
an  ''  ^jctract,"  an  <3;^stract.  It  is  formed  by  a  process 
that  the  mind  employs  even  to  represent  to  itself  an 
individual  image.  Thus,  it  is  observed,  that  the 
representation  I  have  of  Peter,  of  Paul,  of  my  dog,  or 
of  any  concrete  being  or  object  well  known  to  me,  can 
only  be  an  extract,  an  abstract,  of  the  multiple  per- 
ceptions that  I  have  already  had  of  it  and  which  have 
revealed  the  object  to  me  under  its  different  aspects.  In 
the  representation  of  an  individual  image  there  is  a 
struggle  among  the  former  images  of  the  same  object 
for  supremacy  in  consciousness.  In  the  conception  of  a 
general  idea,  there  is  also  a  struggle  among  different 
generic  images,  for  supremacy  in  consciousness.  An 
abstract  of  the  second  or  third   degree    is   produced. 

♦Lubbock,    "The   Origin   of   Civilization,"  Ch.  IX.       Tylorj  "Primitive 
Culture,"  Vol.  I,  Ch.  VII. 


52  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A TTENTIOX. 

There  is  thus  formed  a  common  nucleus,  around 
which  oscillate  vague  and  obscure  elements.  My 
general  conception  of  man  or  dog,  if  it  persist 
ever  so  short  a  time  in  consciousness,  tends  to 
take  a  concrete  form  ;  it  becomes  a  white  man  or  a 
black  man,  a  spaniel  or  a  bulldog.  The  motor  ele- 
ment is  especially  represented  by  the  word;  we 
shall  revert  to  this  subject  again.  As  to  the  images 
or  abstracts  of  images  annexed  to  the  word,  it  would 
be  difficult  to  tell  what  remains  in  them  of  the  move- 
ments included  in  the  original  perceptions. 

c)  In  the  preceding  category,  in  proportion  as  ideas 
grow  more  general,  the  part  played  by  images  gradu- 
ally vanishes,  the  word  more  and  more  preponderates, 
up  to  the  moment  when  it  alone  remains.  We  have, 
accordingly,  the  following  progression,  viz.  :  generic 
images  without  words,  generic  images  with  words, 
words  without  images.  At  this  last  stage  we  find 
purely  scientific  concepts.  But,  does  the  word  exist 
alone  in  the  mind  at  this  supreme  point  of  abstraction? 
I  maintain,  unhesitatingly,  that  it  does.  I  cannot  enter 
into  details,  which  would  carry  me  too  far  from  my 
subject.  I  shall  limit  myself  to  observing,  that  if 
in  fact  there  is  nothing  beneath  the  word,  there  is, 
there  must  be,  a  potential  knowledge,  the  possibility 
of  a  cognition.  "In  actual  thought,"  says  Leibnitz, 
"we  are  accustomed  to  neglect  the  explanation  of 
signs  b}^  means  of  what  they  signify,  knowing  or  be- 
lieving that  we  have  this  explanation  at  our  command  ; 
in  fact,  we  do  not  deem  this  application  or  explica- 
tion of  the  words  to  be  actually  necessary.  This 
method  of  reasoning  I  designate  blind  or  symbolical. 
We  employ  it  in  algebra,  in  arithmetic,  in  fact,  uni- 
versally."    Learning  how  to  count  in  the  case  of  chil- 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  5  3 

dren,  and,  better  still,  in  the  case  of  savages,  clearly 
shows,  how  the  word,  at  first  firmly  clinging  to  ob- 
jects, then  to  images,  progressively  detaches  itself 
from  them,  to  live  an  independent  life  of  its  own. 
Finally,  the  word  much  resembles  paper-money  (bank- 
notes, cheques,  etc.),  having  the  same  usefulness  and 
the  same  dangers.  In  the  instance  we  are  now  con- 
sidering, the  motor  element  can  be  found  only  in  the 
v^ord.  Recent  researches,  to  which  we  have  already 
referred,  show  that  words  do  not  exist  in  the  same 
form  in  all  individuals.  To  some  it  consists  chiefly 
in  articulative  conditions.  Strieker,  in  his  book  upon 
"Word  and  Music,"  has  described  from  his  own  ex- 
perience a  perfect  type  of  this  :  such  are  emphatically 
motor  in  nature.  To  others,  words  mainly  consist  in 
auditory  images  ;  this  is  the  inward  word,  as  it  has 
been  admirably  described  by  V.  Egger.  Still  others, 
far  less  frequently  met  with,  think  by  the  help  of 
words  read  or  written.  *     The  latter  are  visual. 

Now,  in  the  majority  of  men,  these  different  ele- 
ments act  in  unequal  proportions.  But  everywhere 
and  always,  the  word  pronounced  aloud,  the  purely 
internal  sign,  rests  upon  some,  original  form  of  per- 
ception, and  consequently  contains  motor  elements.  It 
is  unquestionably  true,  that  the  motor  elements  con- 
tained in  general  ideas  of  whatever  category,  are 
often  very  weak.  This  accords,  moreover,  with  the 
fact  of  daily  experience,  that  abstract  reflection  is  im- 
possible to  many  persons,  and  difficult  and  fatiguing 
to  almost  everybody. 

We  have  dwelt  at  length  upon  this  division  of  our 


*  There  has  been  published  a  curious  instance  of  the  latter  in  the  Revue 
Philosophique,  January,  1885,  p.  119.  Al&o  see  Ballet,  in  the  work  cited  above, 
Chap.  III. 


54 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTIOS 


subject,  because  it  is  the  least  investigated,  the  most 
difficult,  and  most  exposed  to  criticism.*  But  the 
reader  will  say  :  ''  We  admit  that  there  are  motor  ele- 
ments in  perceptions,  images,  and,  in  a  less  degree, 
in  concepts.  Still,  that  does  not  establish  the  fact, 
that  attention  acts  upon  them,  and  through  them,  and 
that  it  is  a  motor  mechanism."  True,  upon  this 
point  we  can  cite  no  observation  or  experiment  that 
would  be  decisive.      The  crucial  test  would  consist  in 

*  The  study  of  a  large  number  of  normal  and  morbid  cases  has  led  to 
the  knowledge  of  several  types  :  motor,  auditory,  and  visual,  according  to  the 
group  of  images  predominating  in  each  individual  ;  not  to  mention  the  ordi- 
nary or  indifferent  type.  The  person  who  thinks  his  words  by  articulating 
them,  without  hearing  them  (Strieker)  ;  and  the  person  who  thinks  his  words 
by  hearing  them,  without  articulation  (V.  Egger)  ;  the  person  who  thinks  his 
words  by  seeing  them  written,  without  either  hearing  or  articulating  them  : 
all  these  represent  irreducible  types.  This  precludes  all  discussion.  Each 
person  is  right,  in  so  far  as  he  himself,  and  people  like  him  are  concerned  ; 
but  he  will  be  wrong,  if  he  generalizes  without  restriction. 

It  is  much  to  be  desired,  that  the  work  accomplished  in  the  study  of  images 
and  different  forms  of  language,  were  likewise  attempted  for  general  ideas. 
It  is  probable,  that  here  also  we  should  find  irreducible  types.  Thus  Berke- 
ley seems  to  me  to  think  general  ideas  in  the  visual  form.  Any  one  who  at- 
tentively reads  certain  passages  (too  long  to  transcribe  here)  of  the  famous 
Introduction  to  the  "Treatise  of  Human  Nature,"  any  one  who  studies  it,  not 
as  a  theory  of  general  ideas,  but  as  an  instrument  of  psychological  evidence, 
a  kind  of  psychological  confession,  will  conclude,  that  to  Berkeley  the  gen- 
eral idea  was  a  vision.  "  The  idea  of  man,  that  I  am  able  to  form  for  myself," 
says  he,  "  must  be  that  of  a  white,  black,  or  sunburnt  man,  straight  or  bent, 
tall,  small,  or  of  medium  size.  I  am  unable  by  any  effort  of  thought  to  con- 
ceive the  abstract  idea  before  described  "  [namely,  of  color  that  is  neither  red, 
blue,  green,  nor  etc.,  and  which  would  still  be  a  color].  On  the  other  hand, 
the  nominalists  seem  to  me  to  think  general  ideas  under  the  purely  auditory 
form.  The  famous  theory  which  makes  of  universals  mere  ''Jïatzis  vocis," 
(Roscelin,  Hobbes,  etc.,)  appears,  in  my  opinion,  to  admit  of  two  interpreta- 
tions. Taken  literally,  the  theory  is  nonsense.  The  -gnxe  ''Jlatus  vocis'' is 
a  word  in  a  language  wholly  unknown — a  word  not  associated  with  any  idea, 
and  consequently  a  mere  sound,  a  noise.  It  is  hardly  probable  that  sensible 
thinkers  have  ever  maintained  this  theory  in  the  form  usually  attributed  to 
them.  Their  position,  I  think,  may  be  explained  by  the  fact,  that  the  nominalists 
are  of  a  hard,  algebraic  turn  of  mind,  to  whom  the  word  is  sufficient,  without 
the  awakening  of  any  image  ;  in  them  there  is  no  other  representation  than 
that  of  the  sound.     We  are  here  very  far  from  Berkeley. 

Strieker,  who  is  purely  motor  in  this  regard,  who  is  unable  to  think  a 
word  without  articulating  it,  who  depends  as  little  upon  hearing,  as  is  possible, 
expresses  himself  as  follows  :  "  I  have  to  attach  some  sort  of  an  object  to  every 


VOL  UNTAR  Y  A  TTENTION. 


JD 


discovering  whether  a  man,  deprived  of  all  external 
and  internal  motility — and  of  that  alone — would  be 
still  capable  of  attention.  But  that  experiment  is  not 
practicable.  Even  in  the  morbid  cases  that  we  shall 
study  later  on,  there  is  nothing  that  approaches  it. 
Let  us  incidentally  remark,  however,  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  reflect  when  running  at  full  speed,  even  when 
we  run  without  any  other  motive  than  the  sake  of  run- 
ning; or  while  climbing  up  a  steep  ascent,  even  where 
there  is  no  danger  and  when  we  are  not  looking  at  the 
landscape.  A  multitude  of  instances  prove,  that  there 
is  an  antagonism  between  great  expenditure  of  move- 
ment and  the  state  of  attention.  It  is  true,  people  re- 
flect while  striding  about,  and  while  fiercely  gesticulat- 
ing; yet  here  the  object  in  view  is  rather  one  of  inven- 
tion than  of  concentration,  and  excess  of  nervous  force 
is  being  discharged  through  various  exits.  Definitively, 
then,  it  is  plain,  that  attention  is  an  inhibition  ;  and 
this  inhibition  cannot  be  produced  save  through  a 
physiological  mechanism  which,  in  sensorial  attention, 
prevents  the  expenditure  of  actual  movements,  and  in 
reflection,  the  expenditure  of  movements  in  a  nascent 
state  :  for  the  production  of  movement  is  restitution 
in  the  outward  direction,  a  vanishing  of  the  state  of  con- 
word  I  possess,  so  that  it  will  not  appear  to  me  like  a  dead  term— like  a  word 
in  a  language  that  is  unknown  to  me.  When  words  occur  to  my  mind  such  as 
'immortality,'  'virtue,'  and  the  like,  I  usually  explain  the  same  to  «nyself 
not  through  words,  but  through  visual  images.  At  the  word  '  virtue,'  for  ex- 
ample, I  think  of  a  female  form;  at  the  word  'bravery'  of  an  armed  man, 
etc.,"  (Op.  cit.,  pp.  80,  81).  This  conception  of  abstract  and  general  ideas 
might  be  called  the  antipode  of  nominalism.  In  medicine,  it  is  said,  that 
there  are  no  diseases,  but  only  patients  ;  in  the  same  manner  there  are  no  gen- 
eral ideas,  but  only  minds  that  think  them  in  a  different  manner.  Instead  of 
proceeding  philosophically,  that  is,  seeking  to  reduce  everything  to  unity,  it 
were  high  time,  it  seems,  to  proceed  psychologically,  that  is,  to  determine  the 
principal  types.  A  great  many  discussions  in  this  manner  would  doubtlesF 
die  a  natural  death.  At  all  events,  this  task  appears  to  me  worthy  of  the 
trouble  of  being  attempted. 


56  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 

sciousness — the  nerve-force  that  produces  it  having 
transformed  itself  into  motor  impulsion.  "  Thought," 
says  Setchenoff,  "is  a  reflex  action  reduced  to  its  two 
first  thirds  "  ;  or  as  Bain  more  elegantly  expresses  it  : 
"To  think  is  to  refrain  from  speaking  or  acting." 

To  conclude,  let  us  see  what  must  be  understood 
by  the  current  expression  "voluntarily  to  direct  one's 
attention  to  any  given  object,"  and  what  takes  place 
in  such  a  case. 

"What  is  accomplished  in  such  cases,"  says 
Maudsley  very  aptly,*  "is  the  excitation  of  certain 
nervous  currents  of  ideas,  and  their  maintenance  in 
action  until  they  have  called  into  consciousness,  by 
radiation  of  energy,  all  their  related  ideas,  or  as  many 
of  them  as  it  may  be  possible,  in  the  then  condition  of 
the  brain,  to  stimulate  into  action.  It  would  appear, 
then,  that  the  force  that  we  mean  by  attention  is  rather 
a  vis  a  froiite  attracting  consciousness,  than  a  vis  a 
tergo  driving  it.  Consciousness  is  the  result,  not  the 
cause,  of  the  excitation.  The  psychological  mode  of 
expression  puts  the  cart  before  the  horse  ;  the  problem 
in  reflection  is  not,  as  it  is  said,  to  direct  consciousness 
or  to  direct  the  attention  to  an  idea,  but  to  arouse  con- 
sciousness of  it  by  stirring  it  up  to  a  certain  pitch  of 
activit}'.  " 

However,  a  doubtful  point  still  remains.  If  we 
admit  that  the  general  mechanism  of  attention  is 
motor  and,  in  the  particular  case  of  voluntary  atten- 
tion, that  it  chiefly  consists  of  an  action  of  inhibition, 
we  are  still  induced  to  ask,  how  is  this  inhibition  ef- 
fected, and  upon  what  does  it  act.  This  is  a  question 
fraught  with  so  much  obscurity,  that  we  can  do  no 
more  than  limit  ourselves  to   its   simple  enunciation; 

*  "  ^"^ysiology  of  Mind,"  pp.  317,  318,  321. 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  57 

and  yet  it  will  be  better  to  attempt  an  answer,  even 
though  purely  conjectural,  than  to  appear  to  elude 
the  difficulty. 

It  would  perhaps  not  be  altogether  unprofitable  to 
search  for  light  in  an  analogous  but  more  simple  order 
of  phenomena. 

Reflex  movements,  whether  reflex  actions  proper, 
natural  and  innate,  or  reflex  actions  that  are  acquired, 
secondary,  and  fixed  by  repetition  and  by  habit,  are 
produced  without  volition,  hesitation,  or  effort,  and 
may  continue  a  long  time  without  fatigue.  They  call 
into  action,  in  the  organism,  only  those  elements  ne- 
cessary to  their  effectuation,  while  their  adaptation  to 
ends  is  perfect.  In  the  strictly  motor  order  of  things, 
they  are  the  equivalent  of  spontaneous  attention,  which, 
similarly,  is  an  intellectual  reflex  action  that  presup- 
poses neither  choice  nor  hesitation  nor  effort,  and 
may  likewise  continue  a  long  time  without  fatigue. 

But  there  are  other  classes  of  movements  that  are 
more  complex  and  artificial  ;  as,  for  instance,  writing, 
dancing,  fencing,  all  bodily  exercises  and  all  mechan- 
ical handicrafts.  In  these  instances,  adaptation  is  no 
longer  natural,  but  laboriously  acquired.  It  demands 
the  exercise  of  choice,  repeated  endeavor,  effort,  and 
at  the  outset  is  accompanied  by  fatigue.  Daily  obser- 
vation shows,  that  at  first  a  great  number  of  useless 
movements  are  produced  :  thus  a  child  learning  to 
write,  moves  arms,  eyes,  head,  and  sometimes  a  part  of 
its  body.  The  end  to  be  sought  here  is  to  prevent 
this  diffusion,  and  by  appropriate  associations  and  dis- 
associations  to  produce  the  maximum  of  useful  work 
with  the  minimum  of  effort.  The  reason  of  the  fact 
observed  is,  that  isolated  movements  do  not  exist  and 
that  a  miuscle   in  contracting   acts   upon  the  adjacent 


58  PS:i XHOL OGY  OF  A  7 TEXTION. 

muscles  and  often  upon  many  others.  Success  is  at- 
tained by  some  lucky  hit,  after  repeated  efforts  :  with 
apt  people  quickly  ;  with  awkward  persons  slowly,  or 
perhaps  never  at  all.  The  mechanism,  however,  re- 
mains alwa3's  the  same  ;  it  consists  in  firmly  strength- 
ening certain  movements,  in  coordinating  them  into 
simultaneous  groups  or  into  series,  and  in  suppressing, 
in  i7ihibiti7ig  all  others. 

Voluntary  or  artificial  attention  proceeds  in  the 
same  manner.  When  one  prepares  to  enter  into  this 
laborious  state,  one  sees  states  of  consciousness  arising 
by  groups  or  by  series — for  isolated  states  of  consci- 
ousness no  more  exist  than  isolated  movements.  Among 
them  there  are  many  that  do  not  serve  the  principal 
aim,  or  deviate  from  it.  Here,  also,  there  are  useless 
or  detrimental  states  of  consciousness  that,  if  possible, 
must  be  suppressed.  A  considerable  portion  of  our 
task  consists  just  in  this  negative  work,  whereby  the 
mtrusive  elements  are  expelled  from  consciousness,  or 
reduced  to  their  least  intensity.  But  how  is  this  ac- 
complished ?  Either  we  must  abandon  all  explana- 
tion, or  admit  an  action  of  inhibition  exerted  upon  the 
motor  elements  of  the  states  of  consciousness  involved. 
In  such  cases  we  have  a  very  distinct  feeling  of  sus- 
tained effort.  And  whence  could  that  feeling  come, 
if  not  from  the  energy  expended  to  accomplish  the 
acts  of  inhibition  ?  For,  indeed,  the  ordinary  course  of 
thought,  left  to  itself,  is  exempt  from  any  such  sensa- 
tion. If  it  be  objected  that  from  this  view-point  the 
fundamental  mechanism  of  voluntary  attention  remains 
hidden,  it  may  be  replied  that  indeed  the  fundamental 
mechanism  of  all  volition  remains  hidden.  In  con- 
sciousness the  two  extremest  termini  alone  enter,, 
namely,  the  beginning  and   the   end  ;   everything  else 


VOL  UNTAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  59 

takes  place  in  the  physiological  domain,  whether  it  be 
a  question  of  doing  or  preventing,  of  producing  a 
movement  or  effecting  an  inhibition. 

Attention  is  a  momentary,  provisional  state  of  the 
mind  ;  it  is  not  a  permanent  endowment,  like  sensibility 
or  memory.  It  is  a  form  (the  tendency  to  monoideism) 
imposed  upon  a  subject-matter  (the  ordinary  course 
of  states  of  consciousness)  ;  its  point  of  departure  lies 
in  the  chance  of  circumstances  (spontaneous  atten- 
tion) or  in  the  fixing  in  advance  of  a  determinate  aim 
(voluntary  attention).  In  both  cases,  emotional  states, 
tendencies,  must  be  awakened.  In  this  we  have  the 
primitive  directiofi  of  attention.  These  lacking,  all 
else  miscarries;  if  they  vacillate,  attention  will  be  un- 
stable ;  if  they  do  not  continue,  attention  will  vanish. 
A  state  of  consciousness  having  thus  once  become 
preponderant,  the  mechanism  of  association  enters  into 
play  in  its  multiple  forms.  The  work  of  ''  direction  " 
consists  in  choosing  the  appropriate  states,  and  in 
maintaining  them  (by  inhibition)  within  our  conscious- 
ness, in  order  that  in  their  turn  they  may  fructify, 
and  so  onward  through  a  series  of  selections,  inhibi- 
tions, and  consolidations.  Attention  can  accomplish 
nothing  more  than  this  ;  in  itself  it  creates  nothing, 
and  if  the  brain  be  sterile,  if  the  associations  are  poor, 
it  will  act  its  part  in  vain.  Voluntarily  to  direct  one's 
attention,  is  for  many  people  an  impossible  task  ;  con- 
tingent, for  all. 


III. 


Every  one  knows  by  experience  that  voluntary  at- 
tention is  always  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  effort, 
which  bears  a  direct  proportion  to  the  duration  of  the 


6o  I^S } THOL OGY  OF  A  TTENTION. 

state  and  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  it.  Whence 
does  this  feeling  of  effort  come,  and  what  does  it 
mean  ? 

Effort  from  attention  is  a  particular  instance  of 
effort  in  general,  the  most  common  and  best  known 
manifestation  of  which  is  the  effort  that  accompanies 
muscular  work.  Three  opinions  have  been  propounded 
to  account  for  the  origin  of  this  feeling  : 

First,  that  it  is  of  central  origin — anterior  to  move- 
ment, or  at  least  simultaneous  therewith  ;  that  it  passes 
from  within  to  without  ;  that  it  is  centrifugal — efferent  ; 
the  feeling  of  energy  being  displayed  ;  not  resulting,  as 
in  sensation  proper,  from  an  external  influence  trans- 
mitted by  the  centripetal  nerves  (Bain). 

Secondly,  that  it  is  of  peripheral  origin — posterior 
to  the  movements  produced;  that  it  passes  from  with- 
out to  within  ;  that  it  is  afferent  ;  the  feeling  of  energy 
that  has  been  displayed  ;  that,  like  every  other  sensa- 
tion, it  is  transmitted  through  centripetal  nerves  from 
the  periphery  of  the  body  to  the  brain  (Charlton, 
Bastian,  Ferrier,  W.  James,  etc.). 

And,  thirdly,  that  it  is  both  central  and  peripheral  : 
a  feeling  of  force  exerted,  or  feeling  of  innervation, 
and  also  a  feeling  of  movement  accomplished  ;  that 
first  it  is  centrifugal,  and  then  centripetal  (Wundt). 
This  composite  theory  also  seems  to  be  that  accepted 
by  J.  Millier,  one  of  the  first  who  studied  this  question. 

The  second  thesis,  which  is  the  most  recent,  ap- 
pears the  most  tenable  one.  It  has  been  very  care- 
fully expounded  by  Mr.  W.  James  in  his  monograph 
"■  The  Feeling  of  Effort;'  (1880),  in  which  the  thesis  of 
the  feeling  of  energy  developed  prior  to  movement, 
has  been  criticized  with  great  acumen.  The  author, 
in    discussing    the     facis    successively    involved,     has 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  6 1 

pointed  out,  that  if  in  cases  of  paralysis  of  a  part  of  the 
body  or  of  an  eye,  although  the  member  remains  mo- 
tionless, the  patient  have  the  feeling  of  energy  devel- 
oped (which  seems  to  justify  the  thesis  of  a  feeling  of 
a  central  innervation  anterior  to  movement),  it  is  be- 
cause a  movement  is  really  produced  in  the  other  part 
of  the  body,  in  the  corresponding  limb,  or  in  the  eye 
which  has  not  been  paralyzed.  He  concludes  thence, 
that  this  feeling  is  a  complex  afferent  state  resulting 
from  the  contraction  of  muscles,  the  extension  of  the 
tendons,  the  ligaments,  and  the  skin,  from  compressed 
articulations,  from  an  immovable  chest,  closed  glottis, 
knit  eyebrows,  set  jaws,  etc.;  in  a  word,  that,  hke  all 
sensations,  it  is  of  peripheral  origin.  Even  for  those 
who  can  not  accept  this  thesis  as  definitive,  it  is  cer- 
tain, that  it  explains  the  facts  far  more  satisfactorily 
and  far  more  in  conformity  to  the  general  laws  of 
physiology  than  the  hypothesis  which  connects  this 
feeling  with  the  motor  nervous  discharge — the  motor 
apparatus  being  insensible  in  the  centripetal  direction. 

Let  us  examine,  now,  the  particular  case  of  effort 
accompanying  attention.  The  earlier  psychologists 
limited  themselves  to  establishing  its  existence,  but 
they  do  not  explain  it.  They  speak  of  it  only  in  vague, 
mysterious  terms,  as  of  a  ''state  of  the  soul,'''  and  of  a 
hyperorganic  manifestation.  They  see  in  it  ''  an  action 
of  the  soul  upon  the  brain,  designed  to  set  the  latter 
into  activity. "  Fechner,  I  believe,  is  the  first  (i860) 
who  attempted  a  precise  localization  of  the  different 
forms  of  attention,  by  referring  them  to  definite  parts 
of  the  organism.  The  following  passages  of  his  I  have 
deemed  worthy  of  citation  as  an  attempt  at  explana- 
tion : 

'*  The  feeHng  of  the  effort  of  attention  in  the  various 


62  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  TTENTION. 

organs  of  sense  seems  to  me  to  be  but  a  muscular 
feeling  {Muskelgefiihl)  produced  upon  the  setting  into 
motion,  by  a  kind  of  reflex  action,  the  muscles  that  are 
connected  with  the  different  sensory  organs.  The 
question  then  arises  :  With  what  muscular  contraction 
can  the  feeling  of  effort  in  attention  be  connected  when 
we  strive  to  remember  something  ?  My  internal  sense 
gives  me  a  definite  answer  to  this  question.  I  expe- 
rience a  very  marked  sensation  of  tension,  not  in  the 
interior  of  the  cranium,  but  a  tension  and  a  contrac- 
tion as  if  of  the  skin  of  the  head,  and  a  pressure  from 
without  inward  over  the  whole  cranium,  evidently 
caused  by  a  contraction  of  the  muscles  of  the  skin  of 
the  head — circumstances  which  perfectly  agree  with 
such  expressions  as  ''to  rack  one's  brains,  one's  head  " 
{sichdenKopfzerbreche7i)y  "to  collect  one's  thoughts" 
(^den  Kopf  zusani7nenneh?ne?t).  During  an  illness  from 
which  I  once  suffered,  I  was  utterly  unable  to  endure 
the  slightest  effort  of  continuous  thought  (and  at  the 
time  in  question  I  had  not  adopted  any  particular 
theory);  during  this  illness  the  muscles  of  the  skin,  and 
particularly  those  of  the  occiput,  got  into  a  very 
marked  degree  of  morbid  sensibility,  every  time  I  at- 
tempted to  reflect." 

In  the  following  passage  Fechner  describes  this 
feeling  of  effort,  first  in  sensorial  attention  and  then  in 
reflection  : 

"  If  we  transfer  our  attention  from  the  domain  of 
one  sense  to  that  of  another,  we  at  once  experience  a 
definite  feeling  of  change  of  direction — a  feeling  diffi- 
cult to  describe,  but  which  any  one  can  reproduce  by 
experiment.  We  designate  this  change  as  a  tension 
differently  localized. 

"  We  feel  a  tension  directed  forward  in  the  eyes, 


VOL  UN  TAR  ]  '  A  TTENTION.  63 

directed  sidewise  in  the  ears,  and  varying  with  the  de- 
gree of  attention,  according  as  we  look  attentively  at, 
or  listen  attentively  to  anything.  This  is  why  we 
speak  of  the  effort  of  attention.  We  very  clearly  feel 
the  difference  when  we  rapidly  change  the  direction 
of  attention  from  the  eye  to  the  ear.  In  the  same 
manner  the  feeling  is  differently  localized  according 
as  we  wish  to  smell,  taste,  or  to  touch  anything  care- 
fully. 

''Whenever  I  wish  to  represent  to  myself  as  clearly 
as  possible  any  recollection  or  image,  I  experience  a 
feeling  of  tension  very  much  like  that  of  attentive  vision 
or  attentive  audition.  But  this  quite  similar  feeling 
is  localized  in  a  manner  totally  different.  While,  in 
the  attentive  vision  of  real  objects  as  well  as  of  suc- 
cessive images,  the  tension  is  felt  in  front,  and  while 
in  bringing  attention  to  bear  upon  the  other  sensorial 
regions,  it  is  only  the  direction  toward  the  external 
organs  that  changes,  the  rest  of  the  head  not  giving 
any  feeling  of  tension — on  the  contrary,  in  the  case  of 
recollection  and  of  images,  I  become  conscious  that 
the  tension  withdraws  completely  from  the  external 
organs  of  the  senses  and  seems  rather  to  occupy  the 
part  of  the  head  which  the  brain  fills.  If  I  wish,  for 
example,  vividly  to  represent  to  myself  an  object  or  a 
person,  such  object  or  person  seem  to  be  brought  to 
me  all  the  more  vividly  in  proportion  as  I  strain  my 
attention  not  forward,  but,  as  it  were,  backward."  * 

Since  the  time  at  which  Fechner's  work  appeared, 
the  researches,  already  mentioned,  of  Duchenne,  of 
Darwin,  and  of  the  various  authors  that  have  studied 
the  movements  of  expression,  have  imparted  much 
greater  precision  and  clearness  to  this  subject.      The 

*  Elejnente  der  Psychophysik,  Vol.  II,  pp.  490  and  475. 


64  I'S YCHOL OGY  OF  A  TTENTION, 

part  sustained  by  the  respiratory  movements,  of  which 
Fechner  does  not  speak,  is  also  to  be  noted.  The 
movements  of  respiration  are  of  such  great  importance, 
that  in  certain  cases  they  engender  of  themselves  the 
feeling  of  effort.  Ferrier  has  shown  this  by  a  very 
simple  experiment.  If  one  stretches  out  one's  arm, 
and  holds  the  index-finger  in  the  position  required  to 
fire  a  shot  from  a  pistol,  one  can  experience  even  with- 
out actually  moving  his  finger  the  feeling  of  energy 
developed.  Here,  then,  is  a  clear  case  of  the  feeling 
of  energy  developed,  without  real  contraction  of  the 
muscles  of  the  hand,  and  without  perceptible  physical 
effort  (which  is  Bain's  thesis).  ''But,  if  the  reader 
repeat  the  experiment  and  carefully  give  heed  to 
the  state  of  his  respiration,  he  will  observe,  that  his 
consciousness  of  effort  coincides  with  a  fixation  of  the 
muscles  of  the  chest  and  that  he  closes  his  glottis  and 
actively  contracts  his  respirator}^  muscles  in  propor- 
tion to  the  sum  of  energy  felt  to  be  exerted  by  him. 
Let  him  place  his  finger  as  before  and  continue  to 
breathe  the  whole  time,  and  he  will  find,  that  however 
much  he  directs  his  attention  towards  his  finger,  he 
will  not  feel  the  slightest  trace  of  consciousness  of  ef- 
fort until  the  finger  itself  has  been  actually  moved, 
and  then  it  will  be  locally  connected  with  the  muscles 
that  act.  Only  when  this  essential,  ever  present,  re- 
spiratory factor  has  been  set  aside,  as  in  the  latter  in- 
stance has  been  done,  can  consciousness  of  effort  ac- 
quire any  degree  of  plausibility  in  being  attributed 
to  the  centrifugal  current." 

To  sum  up,  muscular  contractions  are  found  every- 
where and  at  all  times.  Even  in  cases  in  which  we 
remain  motionless,  we  will  find,  if  we  carefully  ob- 
serve, that  intense  reflection  is  accompanied  by  an  in- 


VOL  UN  TAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  65 

cipient  word,  motions  of  the  larynx,  the  tongue,  and 
the  lips.  In  people  that  do  not  belong  to  the  motor 
type — such,  consequently,  as  are  most  unfavorable  to 
our  thesis — there  is  a  state  of  ideal  audition,  or  of 
ideal  vision  :  the  eye,  although  closed,  is  fixed  upon 
imaginary  objects.  Czermak,  and  after  him  Strieker, 
have  pointed  out,  that  if  after  having  inwardly  con- 
templated the  image  of  an  object  supposed  very  near, 
we  abruptly  pass  to  the  mental  vision  of  a  very  distant 
object,  we  will  feel  a  marked  change  in  the  state  of 
innervation  of  the  eyes.  In  real  vision,  in  such  a  case 
as  this,  one  must  pass  from  the  state  of  convergence 
to  the  state  of  parallelism  of  the  visual  axes,  that  is, 
one  must  innerve  the  motor  muscles  of  the  eye  in  a 
different  manner.  The  same  operation,  though  weaker 
and  in  a  nascent  stage,  takes  place  in  that  internal 
vision  which  accompanies  reflection.  Finally,  with 
all  persons  and  in  all  cases,  there  are  modifications  in 
the  rhythm  of  respiration.* 

We  can  now  answer  the  question  above  put,  namely, 
What  is  the  origin  of  the  feeling  of  effort  in  attention, 
and  what  does  it  mean  ? 

It  has  its  origin  in  the  physical  states  now  so  often 
enumerated — the  necessary  conditions  of  attention.  It 

*  M.  Guge  (of  Amsterdam)  has  recently  given  the  name  ot  aproseky  (from 
à,  not,  and  Tvpoaex^ii',  to  give  attention)  to  the  incapacity  of  fixing  one's  at- 
tention on  a  certain  object  by  reason  of  a  diminution  of  the  nasal  respiration 
due  to  certain  circumstances,  such  as  adenoid  tumors  in  the  pharyngo-nasal 
cavity,  polyps  of  the  nose,  etc. — A  child,  seven  years  old,  had  succeeded  in 
learning,  during  a  whole  year,  only  the  three  first  letters  of  the  alphabet.  Hav- 
ing been  operated  upon  for  its  adenoid  tumor,  the  same  child  in  a  single  week 
learned  the  entire  alphabet.  A  number  of  college  students,  suffering  from  the 
same  affection,  were  unable  to  learn  anything.  Their  sensation  was  headache 
and  vertigo  every  time  they  endeavored  to  fix  their  attention.  They  were  able 
without  fatigue  to  read  a  phrase  six  or  ten  times,  but  without  understanding 
what  they  had  read,  though  not  thinking  of  anything  else.  This  circum- 
stance distinguishes  this  state  from  ordinary  distraction.  [Biologisches  Cen- 
tralblatt,  January  i,  1888.) 


66  I^S  YCHOL  O  G  Y  OF  A  TTENTION. 

is  simply  their  reverberation  in  consciousness.  It  de- 
pends on  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  muscular 
contractions,  of  organic  modifications,  etc.  Its  start- 
ing point  is  peripheral,  like  that  of  every  other  sensa- 
tion. 

This  means,  that  attention  is  an  abnormal,  a  tran- 
sient  state,  producing  a  rapid  exhaustion  of  the  organ- 
ism ;  for  after  effort  there  is  fatigue,  and  after  fatigue 
there  is  functional  inactivity. 

One  obscure  point  remains.  When  we  pass  from 
the  ordinary'  state  to  the  state  of  sensorial  attention  or 
reflection,  an  augmentation  of  work  is  produced.  A 
man  worn  out  by  a  long  walk,  by  great  mental  exer- 
tion, or  who  succumbs  to  sleep  at  the  end  of  the  day's 
task  ;  a  person  recovering  from  a  serious  illness  ;  in  a 
v/ord,  all  debilitated  individuals,  are  incapable  of  at- 
tention, because  like  every  other  form  of  work,  it  re- 
quires a  reserve  capital  that  may  be  expended.  In 
passing  from  the  state  of  distraction  to  the  state  of  at- 
tention there  is,  accordingly,  transformation  of  a  con- 
dition of  stress  into  vis  viva  ;  of  potential  energy  into 
kinetic  energy.  Now  this  forms  an  initial  moment 
that  is  very  different  from  the  moment  of  effort  felt, 
which  is  an  effect.  This  observation  is  incidentally 
made  ;  I  do  not  insist  upon  it.  But  the  investigation 
of  this  question  cannot  be  profitably  attempted  be- 
fore we  have  surveyed  our  subject  in  its  totality. 


IV. 


Experimental  researches  upon  voluntary  attention 
have  confirmed,  and  imparted  greater  precision  to,  cer- 
tain  conclusions,  which  nevertheless  follow  naturally 


VOL  UN  TA  RY  A  TTENTION.  67 

from  a  correct  understanding  of  the  subject.  These 
researches  are  either  direct  or  indirect,  according  as 
they  investigate  attention  in  itself,  in  its  individual  va- 
riations, in  its  normal  and  morbid  states,  or  according 
as  they  study  it  as  the  means  and  instrument  of  other 
researches  upon  the  duration  of  perceptions,  associa- 
tions, judgment,  choice,  etc.  Attention  is,  in  fact, 
the  fundamental  psychical  condition  of  almost  all  psy- 
chometrical  researches.* 

Obersteiner,  to  whom  attention  is  essentially  a  fact 
of  inhibition,  found  that  attention  generally  requires 
more  time  in  ignorant  individuals  than  in  people  of 
culture  ;  in  women  than  in  men,  which  latter,  by  their 
particular  mode  of  life,  have  developed  the  power  of 
inhibition  ;  in  old  people,  than  in  adults  and  young 
people,  which  doubtless  must  depend  on  a  less  rapid 
functional  activity. 

A  series  of  experiments,  performed  upon  the  same 
person,  has  given  as  the  average  time  in  the  normal 
state,  iss^t;  in  case  of  headache,  lyiO";  in  the  state 
of  fatigue  and  of  somnolence,  1830'.  In  a  patient  at 
the  beginning  of  general  paralysis  the  average  time 
was  166(5";  at  the  second  period  of  this  malady  when 
the  condition  of  the  patient  just  about  allowed  experi- 
mental investigation,  2810"  has  been  attained,  and 
even  7550".  On  the  other  hand,  Stanley  Hall,  who 
was  fortunate  enough  to  discover  a  subject  that  had 
the  power  of  correctly  reacting  in  the  hypnotic  state, 
has  established  a  very  considerable  diminution  of  the 

*  Consult  for  details  and  arrangement  of  experiments  :  Obersteiner,  "  Ex- 
perimental Researches  on  Attention,"  in  Brain,  Jan  ,  1879;  Wundt,  "  Physio- 
logical'Psychology,"  Vol.  II,  Chap.  XVI;  Exner  in  Hermann's  '' Handbuch 
dcr  Physiologie,''  Vol.  II,  part  II,  p.  283,  et  seqq  ;  Stanley  Hall,  "Reaction 
Time  and  Attention  in  the  Hypnotic  State,"  in  Mind,  April,  1883. 

t  Gy  the  unit  in  all  the  figures  given,  is  equal  to  one  one-thousandth  of  a 
second. 


68  /"S YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

time  of  reaction,  which  passes  from  an  average  of  328(? 
(normal  state)  to  1930"  (hypnotic  state) — a  result  thai 
might  have  been  foreseen,  by  reason  of  the  monoide- 
ism  peculiar  to  the  state  of  hypnosis. 

Wundt  and  Exner  have  made  other  experiments 
upon  persons  in  the  normal  condition.  First,  the  sub- 
ject is  taken  in  the  state  of  distraction  ;  the  impression 
against  which  he  is  to  react,  coming  upon  him  sud- 
denly, and  without  having  been  described  in  advance. 
Then,  the  impression  to  be  received  by  him  is  described 
as  to  its  nature  and  its  force,  but  not  as  to  the  time 
at  which  it  is  to  be  produced.  Finally,  the  impression 
is  accurately  and  completely  set  forth  (both  as  to 
nature  and  time),  a  definite  signal  notifying  the  sub- 
ject when  the  impression  is  to  follow.  In  this  upward 
progression  from  uncertainty  toward  certainty,  the  time 
of  reaction  constantly  diminishes,  as  might  have  been 
anticipated.  Thus,  while  in  the  case  of  distraction  it 
may  rise  to  the  enormous  figure  of  500(5",  it  falls  in 
the  second  case  to  2530",  and  with  the  signal  to  76(?. 

These  experiments  present  to  us  in  the  simplest 
form  the  state  called  expectarit  attentiofi  or/r^-attention. 
They  further  necessitate  a  few  remarks,  with  a  view  to 
corroborating  what  has  been  previously  stated. 

If,  in  expectant  attention,  the  intellectual  aspect 
be  considered,  it  will  be  seen  that  it  is  a  preparatory 
stage  in  the  course  of  which  the  image  of  an  event 
foreseen  or  presumed,  is  evoked.  The  state  of  mono- 
ideism  is  formed  \  with  the  result  that  the  real  event 
is  but  the  reinforcement  of  the  representation  already 
existing.  In  some  experiments  two,  almost  simul- 
taneous, impressions  have  been  produced,  and  the 
question  is  to  determine  which  is  anterior  in  time. 
If  they  are  of  a  different  nature,  the  one  auditive  (the 


VOL  UNTAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  69 

stroke  of  a  bell),  the  other  visual  (an  electric  spark), 
there  is  a  tendency  to  consider  as  anterior,  first,  either 
the  stronger  of  the  two  impressions,  or,  secondly,  that 
toward  which  our  attention  during  the  experiment  was 
directed.  While  engaged  in  researches  of  this  kind, 
Wundt  was  able,  at  will,  and  according  to  the  direc- 
tion given  to  his  attention,  to  perceive  first  now  the 
one  and  now  the  other.  When  the  two  excitations  are 
of  the  same  nature,  only  the  first  is  distinctly  noticed  ; 
the  second  passes  by  unperceived. 

If  the  motor  aspect  of  expectant  attention  be  con- 
sidered, it  will  be  found  that  this  state  induces  a  pre- 
paratory innervation  of  the  nervous  centres  and  the 
muscles,  which  is  liable,  at  the  least  shock,  to  be  con- 
verted into  a  real  impulsion.  Representation  alone, 
in  this  manner,  can  produce  a  reaction,  without  ex- 
ternal cause. 

This  explosive  state  is  especially  produced  in  cases 
in  which  the  expected  impression  is  not  beforehand 
determined  ;  which  might  be  called  cases  of  expectant 
attention  in  general.  The  motor  innervation  is  distri- 
buted throughout  all  the  sensorial  regions.  There  is 
produced  a  feeling  of  disquietude  and  discomfort;  of 
tension,  such  that  a  falling  body  or  an  accident  attend- 
ing the  experiment  will  bring  about  an  automatic  re- 
action. 

When  the  expected  impression  is  determined  be- 
forehand, the  path  of  motor  innervation  will  be  traced 
out  in  advance  ;  instead  of  being  diffused,  the  tension 
is  localized.  The  time  of  reaction  can  become  zero 
and  even  attain  a  negative  value. 

When  the  reaction  is  to  be  effected  through  differ- 
ent processes,  or  as  the  result  of  different  excitations, 
it  is  necessary  that  a  change  be  produced  in  the  cen- 


70  J^S} ^CHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

très  that  shall  produce  a  change  in  the  direction  of  the 
nervous  paths — a  very  fatiguing  state.  If  one  persists 
in  reacting,  the  time  will  increase  enormously,  and 
reach,  according  to  Exner,  as  high  as  a  second. 

We  must  also  mention  the  experimental  researches 
of  N.  Lange  upon  the  oscillations  of  sensorial  atten- 
tion. In  the  silence  of  the  night,  the  ticking  of  a 
watch,  placed  at  a  certain  distance,  is  at  one  moment 
not  heard  and  in  the  next  it  is  distinctly  reinforced. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  sound  of  a  waterfall  ;  and  sim- 
ilar oscillations  have  been  observed  with  optic  and 
tactile  sensations.  These  variations  are  not  objective  ; 
they  can  only  be  subjective.  Must  we — as  is  usually 
done — ascribe  them  to  fatigue  of  the  sensory  organs  ? 
Our  author  does  not  think  so.  In  his  opinion  they 
come  from  a  central  cause,  and  are  due  to  oscillations 
of  attention.  When  one  is  attentive  to  two  simulta- 
neous excitations,  one  optic  and  the  other  acoustic,  the 
oscillations,  if  they  are  of  peripheral  origin,  ought  to 
be  independent  of  each  other.  Yet  such  is  not  the 
case  ;  the  two  kinds  of  oscillations  never  coincide  ; 
they  are  always  separated  by  a  clearly  defined  interval. 
What  is  the  cause  of  this  periodicity  of  the  oscilla- 
tions ?  According  to  Lange  it  is  to  be  sought  in  the 
oscillation  of  the  images  that  accompany  sensorial 
perception.  The  reinforcement  that  in  this  way  ex- 
ists in  attention,  is  here  owing  to  the  fact,  that  to  the 
present  impression  is  added  the  image  of  an  anterior 
impression.  Sensorial  attention  would  seem  to  be  an 
assimilation  of  the  real  impression  that  remains  un- 
changed before  us,  with  the  anterior  image,  which  un- 
dergoes oscillations.* 

*  Lange,  Beîtrûge  zur  Théorie  der  Sinnlichen  Aufmerksatnkeit  tind  dey 
Active7i  Apperception,"  in  the  Philosophische  Studien,  1887.    Vol.  IV,  Part  III. 


VOL  UNTAR  Y  A  TTENTION.  7 1 

It  will  be  seen,  in  fine,  that  attention  in  no  respect 
resembles  an  independent  activity  ;  that  it  is  bound 
up  with  perfectly  determined  physical  conditions,  that 
it  acts  only  through  the  latter,  and  is  dependen  ■  on  the 
same. 


CHAPTER  III, 
THE  MORBID  STATES   OF  ATTENTION. 

To  COMPLETE  the  study  of  attention,  an  examination 
of  the  morbid  cases  still  remains.  I  do  not  propose 
here  to  construct  a  pathology  of  attention  :  such  a 
pretension  were  too  ambitious,  and  the  undertaking 
premature.  But  there  are  certain  tacts,  neglected 
by  psychology,  which,  although  somewhat  common- 
place, still  demand  review.  Their  importance  for  the 
better  understanding  of  the  mechanism  of  normal  at- 
tention, will  not  escape  the  reader's  notice. 

Our  daily  speech  usually  contrasts  with  attention 
the  state  called  ''  distraction";  but  this  state  in  our 
language  (the  French)  has  an  equivocal  sense.  It  de- 
signates certain  states  of  the  mind,  apparently,  very 
similar,  yet  at  bottom  totally  contrary.  We  call  ''  dis- 
tracted "  people  whose  intelligence  is  unable  to  fix  it- 
self with  any  degree  of  persistence,  and  who  pass  in- 
cessantly from  one  idea  to  another,  at  the  mercy  of 
their  most  transient  whims,  or  of  any  trifling  events  in 
their  surroundings.  It  is  a  perpetual  state  of  mobil- 
ity and  dispersion,  which  is  the  very  reverse  of  atten- 
tion. It  is  frequently  met  with  in  children  and  in 
women.  But  the  term  "distraction  "  is  also  applied  to 
cases  entirely  different  from  this.  Thus  there  are 
people  who,  wholly  absorbed  by  some  idea,  are  also 
really    "distracted"    in   regard    to    what  takes  place 


MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTENTION.        73 

around  them  ;  they  afford  no  hold  to  external  events, 
and  allow  the  latter  to  flit  by  without  penetrating 
their  minds.  Such  people  appear  incapable  of  atten- 
tion for  the  very  reason  that  they  are  very  attentive. 
Many  scholars  have  been  noted  for  their  '*  distraction," 
and  so  well  known  are  the  instances  that  it  is  useless 
to  cite  them.  While  those  whose  distraction  amounts 
to  dispersion  are  characterized  by  the  incessant  transi- 
tion from  one  idea  to  another,  those  whose  distraction 
amounts  to  absorption  are  distinguished  precisely  by 
the  impossibility  or  the  great  difficulty  of  a  transfer 
of  this  kind.  They  are  riveted  to  their  idea,  are  will- 
ing prisoners  without  any  desire  to  escape.  Their 
condition,  in  fact,  is  a  mitigated  form  of  that  morbid 
state  which  we  shall  study  later  on  under  the  name  of 
the  *' fixed  idea." 

Yet  such  manifestations,  daily  occurring,  in  fact  all 
the  different  forms  of  "distraction,"  are,  upon  the 
whole,  but  little  instructive,  and  we  shall  derive  greater 
profit  from  dwelling  upon  forms  that  are  clearly  patho- 
logical. Without  pretending  to  anything  like  a  sys- 
tematic classification  of  the  latter,  we  shall  endeavor 
to  group  them  according  to  some  rational  order.  To 
accomplish  this  purpose,  normal  attention  must  serve 
as  our  starting-point,  and  it  devolves  upon  us  only  to 
note  the  variations  of  its  nature  and  its  deviations. 

Certain  authors,  in  studying  the  disorders  of  at- 
tention, have  referred  them  to  various,  generally  ad- 
mitted types  of  mental  disease,  such  as  hypochondria, 
melancholy,  mania,  demency,  etc.  This  method,  be- 
sides entailing  perpetual  reiterations,  has  the  still 
greater  inconvenience  of  not  placing  the  fact  of  atten- 
tion in  the  proper  fullness  of  light.  Attention,  in  such 
cases,  is  studied,  not  for  its  own  sake,  but  merely  as  a 


74  ^S YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

symptom.  With  us,  on  the  contrary,  it  has  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  fact  of  the  foremost  order,  while  all  the 
rest  is  but  accessory.  It  is  requisite  that  the  morbid 
forms  be  attached  to  the  common  trunk — the  normal 
state  ;  it  is  requisite,  that  at  all  times  we  should  clearly 
discern  its  proper  relations.  On  this  condition  alone 
can  pathology  instruct  us. 

If,  as  we  have  formerly  done,  we  now  define  atten- 
tion as  the  temporary  predominance  of  an  intellectual 
state,  or  of  a  group  of  states,  accompanied  by  natural 
or  artificial  adaptation  of  the  individual  ; — if  this  be 
taken  as  its  normal  type,  we  shall  be  able  clearly  to 
note  the  following  deviations  : 

1.  Absolute  predominance  of  one  state,  or  one 
group  of  states,  that  becomes  stable,  fixed,  and  that 
cannot  be  dislodged  from  our  consciousness.  It  is  no 
longer  a  simple  antagonist  of  spontaneous  association, 
limiting  its  activity  to  direction  of  the  latter  ;  no,  it  is 
a  destructive,  tyrannical  power,  enslaving  everything, 
not  allowing  of  the  prolification  of  ideas  save  in  one 
direction,  imprisoning  the  current  of  consciousness 
within  a  narrow  bed,  from  which  it  cannot  escape,  and 
more  or  less  sterilizing  all  that  which  is  extraneous  to 
its  own  predominance.  Hypochondria,  and,  better  still, 
fixed  ideas  and  ecstasy,  are  cases  of  this  class.  They 
form  the  first  morbid  group,  which  I  shall  designate 
hypertrophy  of  attention. 

2.  In  the  second  group  I  shall  comprise  cases  in 
which  attention  cannot  be  maintained,  or  in  which 
often,  indeed,  attention  cannot  form.  This  incapacity 
is  produced  under  two  main  conditions.  At  times 
the  current  of  ideas  is  so  rapid  and  exuberant,  that  the 
mind  becomes  a  prey  to  an  unbridled  automatism.  In 
this  disorderly  flux  no  particular  state  either  lasts  or 


MORBID  STA  TES  OF  A  TTENTION.        75 

predominates  ;  no  centre  of  attraction  is  formed,  even 
for  a  moment.  Here  the  mechanism  of  association 
retahates  ;  it  alone  acts  with  all  its  power,  and  with- 
out opposition.  Such  are  certain  forms  of  delirium, 
and  above  all  acute  mania.  At  other  times,  when  the 
mechanism  of  association  does  not  pass  beyond  the 
average  intensity,  there  is  absence  or  diminution  of 
the  power  of  inhibition.  Subjectively,  this  state  mani- 
fests itself  through,  the  impossibility  or  extreme  diffi- 
culty of  effort.  Convergence  is  impossible,  either  spon- 
taneous or  artificial  ;  all  is  unsteady,  undecided,  and 
dispersed.  Numerous  instances  of  this  are  met  with 
in  hysterical  patients,  in  persons  suffering  from  irri- 
table weakness,  in  convalescents,  in  apathetic  and  in- 
sensible individuals,  in  intoxication,  in  extreme  states 
of  bodily  and  mental  fatigue,  etc.  This  impotency 
coincides,  in  short,  with  all  forms  of  exhaustion.  By 
way  of  contrast  to  the  former,  we  shall  designate  this 
group  atrophy  of  attention. 

Incidentally  we  may  remark  that  the  first  group  of 
morbid  states  is  allied  rather  to  spontaneous  atten- 
tion, and  the  second  to  voluntary  attention.  The  one 
marks  an  exaggerated  force,  the  other  an  exaggerated 
weakness,  of  the  power  of  concentration.  The  one  is 
an  evolution,  and  tends  toward  increase  ;  the  other  is 
a  dissolution,  tending  towards  decrease.  Already, 
pathology  verifies  what  has  previously  been  stated. 
Voluntary  attention,  like  all  artificial  products,  is  pre- 
carious, vacillating  ;  disease  does  not  transform  it, 
but  causes  it  to  collapse.  Spontaneous  attention,  on 
the  contrary,  like  all  natural  forces,  may  extend  and 
amplify  to  the  very  verge  of  extravagance,  but  it  can 
only  be  transformed  ;  at  bottom,  its  nature  does  not 


76  PS YCH OLOGY  OF  A TTEXTION. 

alter  :  it  is  like  a  light  breeze  at  first,  that  afterwards 
becomes  a  tempest. 

3.  The  third  group  embraces,  not  the  morbid  forms 
of  attention,  but  cases  of  congenital  infirmity.  Such 
are  instances  in  which  spontaneous  attention,  and  all 
the  more  so,  voluntary  attention,  do  not  form,  or,  at 
least,  only  appear  intermittently.  This,  in  different 
degrees,  is  met  with  in  idiots,  in  imbeciles,  in  the  weak- 
minded,  and  in  the  demented. 

After  this  hasty  classification,  let  us  pass  to  details. 


It  is  well,  in  the  first  place,  to  observe,  that  there  is 
an  almost  insensible  transition  from  the  normal  state 
to  the  most  extravagant  forms  of  the  fixed  idea.  Every- 
body must  have  experienced  what  it  is  to  be  haunted 
by  a  musical  air,  or  some  insignificant  saying,  that 
obstinately  keeps  coming  back  without  any  visible 
reason.  This  is  the  fixed  idea  in  its  lightest  form.  The 
state  of  preoccupation  so  called,  takes  us  one  degree 
higher  :  anxiety  about  a  sick  person,  or  that  attending 
the  preparation  for  an  examination,  a  long  journey  to 
be  undertaken,  and  a  hundred  other  facts  of  this  kind, 
which  without  constituting  an  actual  beleaguerment 
of  consciousness,  do  yet  all  act  by  way  of  repetition. 
Notwithstanding  its  intermittence,  the  idea  remains 
vivid,  suddenly  starting  up  from  the  depths  of  uncon- 
sciousness. It  has  more  stability  than  any  other,  and 
its  momentary  eclipses  do  not  prevent  it  from  playing 
the  principal  part.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  every 
sound  human  being,  there  is  always  a  dominant  idea 
that  regulates  his  conduct  ;   such  as  pleasure,  money, 


MORBID  STA  TES  OF  A  TTENTION.       77 

ambition,  or  the  soul's  salvation.  This  fixed  idea, 
which  lasts  throughout  life — except  in  cases  where 
another  is  substituted  for  it — becomes  finally  resolved 
into  a  fixed  passion  ;  which  once  more  proves  that 
attention  and  all  its  forms  of  appearance  depend  on 
emotional  states.  The  metamorphosis  of  attention  into 
a  fixed  idea  is  much  more  clearly  seen  in  great  men. 
'^What  is  a  great  life?"  asks  Alfred  de  Vigny;  ''A 
thought  of  our  youth,  realized  in  mature  age."  In 
many  famous  men  this  ''thought"  has  frequently  been 
so  absorbing  and  tyrannical,  that  one  can  hardly  dis- 
pute its  morbid  character. 

This  transformation  of  spontaneous  attention  into 
a  fixed  idea,  a  phase  decidedly  pathological,  is  very 
pronounced  in  hypochondriacs.  Here,  we  are  able  to 
follow  its  evolution,  and  to  note  all  its  degrees;  for 
this  disease  embraces  a  great  many  stages  from  the 
slightest  preoccupation  to  the  most  complete  obses- 
sion. Although  it  cannot  germinate  and  grow  but  in 
a  favorable  soil,  and  although  consequently  it  presup- 
poses certain  physical  and  mental  conditions,  yet  it 
does  not,  in  its  origin,  rise  beyond  the  average  level 
of  spontaneous  attention  ;  the  augmentation  is  effected 
slowly,  by  degrees.  And  it  makes  no  difference,  in 
fact,  whether  the  sufferings  of  the  patient  be  real  or 
imaginary  :  from  the  subjective,  psychological  point  of 
view  this  is  all  one.  We  know,  indeed,  that  the  mere 
fact  of  fixing  our  attention  upon  any  part  of  our  body, 
the  heart,  the  stomach,  the  intestines,  etc.,  produces 
in  consciousness  strange  sensations — an  instance  of 
the  general  law,  that  every  state  of  vivid  consciousness 
tends  to  actualize  itself.  Some  people  have,  in  this 
respect,  peculiar  gifts.  Sir  J.  Brodie  said,  that  he 
could  feel  pain  in  any  region  of  his  body  whatever,  by 


78  I'S } 'CHOL OGY  OF  A TTEXTION. 

strongly  fixing  upon  it  his  attention.  Now,  to  fix  our 
attention  simply  means,  to  allow  a  certain  state  to 
persist  and  to  predominate.  This  predominance,  at 
first  harmless,  increases  through  the  very  effects  it 
produces.  A  centre  of  attraction  is  established,  which 
little  by  little  obtains  supreme  control  of  consciousness. 
It  then  grows  to  be  a  perpetual  preoccupation,  an  in- 
cessant inspection  of  the  state  of  each  organ  and  the 
products  of  each  function;  in  short,  the  state  of  com- 
plete hypochondria  makes  its  appearance  as  its  picture 
so  often  has  been  portrayed. 

But  there  are  fixed  ideas  more  extraordinary  and 
more  infrequent,  which  by  virtue  of  their  purely  intel- 
lectual nature  are,  so  to  speak,  the  caricature  of  re- 
flection. These  are  fixed  ideas  properly  so  called. 
Various  contemporary  authors  have  studied  them  with 
much  care.*  Unfortunately,  the  dissertations  and  col- 
lected results  of  observations  upon  this  subject  have 
not  passed  out  of  the  domain  of  psychiatry,  and  hith- 
erto psychology  has  profited  little  by  them — at  least 
as  far  as  regards  attention. 

However,  it  seems  almost  universally  agreed  that 
fixed  ideas  may  be  classed  into  three  great  categories  : 

I.  Simple  fixed  ideas  of  a  purely  intellectual  na- 
ture, which  are  most  frequently  pent  up  in  conscious- 
ness, or  are  not  manifested  outwardly  save  through 
certain  insignificant  acts  ; 

*  Westphal,  "  Ueber  Zwangsvorstellungen  "  {Archiv  fiir  Psychiatrie, 
1878)  ;  Berger,  "  Grûbelsucht  und  Zwangsvorstellungen"  [Ibid.,  Vol.  VIII)  ; 
Krafft-Ebing,  "  Lehrbuch  der  Psychiatrie,"  and  "Ueber  Geistesstorungen 
durch  Zwangsvorstellungen  '  {Zeitschrift  fiir  Psychiatrie,  Vol.  XXXV)  ;  Grie- 
singer,  "Ueber  einen  wenig  bekannten  psychopathischen  Zustand  "  {Archiv 
fiir  Psych.,  Vol.1);  Meschede,  "Ueber  krankhafte  Fragesucht  "  [Zeit.fiir 
Psych  .  Vol.  XXVII)  ;  Buccola,  Le  idee  fisse  e  le  loro  condizioni  fisiopatologiche 
(iSSoy  :  Tamburini,  Sulla  pazzia  del  diibbio  e  sidle  idee  fisse  ed  impulsive  (1883)  ; 
Luys,  Des  Obsessions  pathologiques  (Encéphale,  1883)  ;  Charcot  &  Magnan, 
De  V onomatomanie  (in  the  Archives  de  Neurologie,  1885). 


MORBID  STA  TES  OF  A  TTENTION.       79 

2.  Fixed  ideas  accompanied  by  emotions,  such  as 
terror  and  agony,  agoraphobia,  the  insanity  of  doubt, 
etc.; 

3.  Fixed  ideas  of  an  impulsive  form,  known  by 
the  name  of  irresistible  tendencies,  that  manifest  them- 
selves in  violent  or  criminal  acts  (theft,  homicide,  sui- 
cide). 

Although  there  is  no  clear  line  of  demarcation  be- 
tween the  three  classes,  still,  we  may  say,  that  the 
specific  character  of  the  first  is  a  perturbation  of  the 
intelligence,  that  the  second  belongs  rather  to  the 
emotional  order,  and  that  the  third  depends  upon  an 
enfeeblement  of  the  will.  The  latter  two  will  be  rigor- 
ously excluded  from  our  investigations,  because  they 
are  parcel  of  the  pathology  of  feelings  and  the  will. 
It  is  by  far  preferable  to  keep  strictly  to  cases  that  are 
free  from  all  alloy — to  cases  strictly  comparable  with 
that  state  of  relative  monoideism  which  is  called  atten- 
tion. 

But  even  in  restricting  ourselves  to  this  group,  ex- 
amples of  fixed  ideas  will  not  be  lacking.  They  have 
received  different  names  according  to  their  predomi- 
nant character.  With  some  the  fixed  idea  assumes  a 
mathematical  form  (arithmomania).  Why  are  people 
of  such  and  such  a  size  ?  Why  are  houses  of  such 
and  such  dimensions  ?  Why  are  trees  of  such  or  such 
a  height?  And  so  on  with  every  other  object.  Still 
more  frequently,  it  consists  in  an  endless  necessity  to 
count,  to  add,  and  to  multiply.  ''  A  certain  woman, 
affected  with  numerous  symptoms  of  hysteria  could 
not  see  a  street  without  beginning  at  once,  and  against 
her  will,  to  count  the  number  of  paving-stones  ;  then 
would  follow  an  enumeration  of  all  the  streets  of  the 
town,  then  of  all  the  towns  of   Italy,  and  finally  of 


8o  I^S YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

Italy's  streams  and  rivers.  If  she  beheld  a  bag  of 
corn,  there  immediately  began  in  her  brain  the  work 
of  enumerating  thenumber  of  grains  of  corn  in  the  city, 

in  the  province,  and  in  the  whole  country She 

confessed,  that  not  only  did  she  feel  impelled  by  an 
irresistible  force  to  make  these  odd  computations,  but 
that  moreover  these  fixed  ideas  of  hers  were  so  well 
organized,  that  if  during  her  laborious  task  she  chanced 
to  be  interrupted  by  the  sheer  impossibility  of  pro- 
ceeding, or  by  any  other  cause,  she  would  suffer  from 
a  feeling  of  agony  accompanied  by  indescribable 
physical  tortures."*  I  have  myself  been  told  of  a  cer- 
tain young  man  who  spends  the  greater  part  of  his 
time  in  calculating  the  hours  of  departure  and  arrival, 
for  each  station,  of  all  the  railway-trains  on  the  entire 
surface  of  the  globe.  He  generously  bestows  railroads 
upon  countries  that  have  none,  and  regulates  at  will 
this  imaginary  traffic.  He  compiles  very  elaborate 
time-tables,  covering  enormous  sheets  of  paper,  draws 
curves,  and  establishes  connections  at  the  various 
junctions.  He  is,  moreover,  a  very  intelligent  young 
man. 

Another  form  of  fixed  idea  consists  in  asking  end- 
less questions  upon  some  abstract  problem,  which  the 
patients  themselves  regard  as  insoluble.  The  Germans 
call  it  ^'-  Griibelsucht,''  the  English  "metaphysical 
mania."  The  interrogatory  form  peculiar  to  it  has 
moreover  procured  it  the  name  of  Fragetrieb.  A  certain 
man,  in  a  case  reported  by  Griesinger,  no  sooner  heard 
the  word  "  beautiful  "  uttered,  than  he  began,  in  spite 
of  every  effort,  to  put  to  himself  an  inextricable  and 
indefinite  series  of  questions  upon  the  most  abstruse 
problems  of  aesthetics.     The  word   '*to  be"   precipi- 

*  Roncati  in  Buccola,  work  cited. 


MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTENTION.       8i 

tated  him  into  an  endless  metaphysical  investigation. 
This  patient,  a  highly  cultivated  man,  tells  us  in  his 
confession  :  "\  am  ruining  my  health  by  incessantly 
thinking  of  problems  that  reason  will  never  be  able  to 
solve,  and  which  despite  my  most  energetic  efforts  of 
will,  wear  out,  without  a  moment's  respite,  my  strength. 

The    procession    of   these    ideas   is  incessant 

This  metaphysical  reflection   is  too  continuous  to  be 

natural Every  time  that  these  ideas  return  I  try 

to  drive  them  away,  and  I  seek  to  persuade  myself  to 
follow  the  natural  course  of  thought,  not  to  confuse 
my  brain  with  such  very  obscure  problems,  and  not  to 
abandon  myself  to  the  meditation  of  things  abstract 
and  insoluble.  And  yet  I  am  unable  to  escape  from 
the  continuous  impulsion  that  keeps  hammering  at  my 
mind,  or  from  the  unchanged,  fixed  tendency  that 
pursues  me,  and  does  not  leave  me  one  moment  of 
rest."* 

I  shall  give  a  final  instance  of  the  fixed  idea,  as  re- 
ported by  Tamburini,  on  account  of  its  purely  intellec- 
tual character  :  '  'A  young  law-student,  the  son  of  neuro- 
pathic parents,  was  completely  taken  up  with  the  idea 
of  knowing  the  origin,  the  why  and  the  how  of  the  forced 

circulation  of  bank-notes This  thought  kept  his 

attention  continually  strained,  prevented  him  from 
doing  anything  else,  placed  a  bar  between  the  external 
world  and  himself,  and  whatever  efforts  he  might  make 
to  rid  himself  of  it,  he  was  utterly  unable  to  accom- 
plish that  purpose.  Finally  concluding  that  notwith- 
standing his  long  reflections  and  profound  researches 
toward  the  solution  of  this  vexed  problem,  he  was  in- 


♦Griesinger,  Op.  cit.  To  understand  the  true  significance  of  this  case,  it 
is  to  be  observed  that  the  question  here  is  that  of  a  metaphysician  in  spite  of 
himself. 


82  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

capable  of  any  other  mental  work,  he  fell  into  such 
a  state  of  despondency  and  apathy  that  he  desired  to 

discontinue  his  course  of  studies His  sleep  was 

insufficient  and  broken  ;  frequently  he  lay  awake  whole 
nights,  ever  absorbed  by  his  dominant  idea.  In  this 
case  a  very  singular  phenomenon  must  be  noted  ; 
namely,  that  in  consequence  of  the  continuous  tension 
of  his  mind  upon  the  problem  of  bank-notes  and  their 
forced  circulation,  he  at  last  retained  permanently  be- 
fore his  eyes  the  image  and  picture  of  the  bank-notes 
themselves,  in  all  their  varieties  of  form,  size,  and 
color.  The  idea,  with  its  incessant  repetitions  and 
intensity,  came  to  assume  a  force  of  projection  that 
made  it  equivalent  to  reality.  Yet  he  himself  had  ever 
the  full  consciousness  that  the  images  floating  before 
his  eyes  were  merely  a  freak  of  his  imagination."  A 
careful  medical  treatment,  and  some  very  clear  expla- 
nations imparted  by  a  professor,  finally  helped  to  im- 
prove his  condition.  *'The  veil  that  enveloped  his 
mind,  though  rent  asunder  so  far  as  regards  bank- 
notes of  large  denominations,  still  persisted  in  regard 
to  those  of  smaller  value,  the  images  of  fifty- centime 
notes,  still  continuing  to  appear  to  him."  At  last  all 
his  troubles  disappeared. 

Sometimes  the  fixed  idea  consists  in  an  inroad  of 
names  that  must  be  found  again — names  of  indifferent 
people  or  unknown  persons  (onomatomania)  ; — but  the 
feeling  of  intense  anxiety  by  which  it  is  usually  accom- 
panied, relegates  it  by  preference  to  our  second  cat- 
egory. 

It  will  perhaps  be  said  :  "  These  people  and  their 
like  are  simply  insane."  They  certainly  are  not  of 
sound  mind  ;  but  the  epithet  insane  is  undeserved. 
They  are  debilitated,  unbalanced.    Their  frail,  unstable 


MORBID  ST  A  TES  OF  A  TTENTION.        83 

mental  coordination  yields  to  the  slightest  shock;  but 
it  is  a  loss  of  equilibrium,  not  a  fall.  The  authors  that 
have  investigated  the  determining  causes  of  fixed 
ideas,  all  reach  the  same  conclusion  ;  they  find  it, 
namely,  to  be  a  symptom  of  degeneration.  One  might 
even  maintain,  that  not  everybody  who  may  wish 
it  can  have  fixed  ideas.  A  primordial  condition — the 
neuropathic  constitution — is  requisite.  The  latter  may 
be  inherited,  or  it  may  be  acquired.  Persons  of  the 
one  class  are  the  offspring  of  parents  to  whom  they  are 
indebted  for  the  sad  legacy  of  degenerate  organisms. 
These  are  by  far  the  most  numerous.  The  others  have 
been  exhausted  by  circumstances  and  mode  of  life  : 
physical  or  intellectual  fatigue,  emotions,  strong  pas- 
sions, sexual  or  other  excesses,  anaemia,  debilitating 
diseases,  etc.*  Finally,  by  both  roads  the  same  result 
is  reached.  And  so  the  fixed  idea,  even  in  its  simplest 
form — that  which  now  concerns  us  and  which  appears 
entirely  theoretical  and  as  if  confined  to  the  field  of 
purely  intellectual  operations — is  nevertheless  not  a 
purely  internal  phenomenon,  without  physical  concom- 
itants. Quite  the  contrary.  The  organic  symptoms 
by  which  it  is  accompanied  indicate  neurasthenia  : 
symptoms  such  as  headaches,  neuralgia,  feeling  of 
oppression,  perturbation  of  motility,  of  the  vaso-mo- 
tors,  or  the  sexual  functions,  insomnia,  etc.  The  psy- 
chic phenomenon  of  the  fixed  idea  is  but  the  effect, 
among  many,  of  one  and  the  same  cause.  Still,  it  is 
to  be  observed,  that  if  to  the  physician  it  suffices  to 
refer  all  these  multiple  manifestations  to  one  single 
source,  viz.,  degeneration,  to  the  psychologist,  how- 
ever, there  remains  a  much  more  difficult  task.      Be- 

*Fora  detailed  exposition  of  the  causes  conf.,  particularly,  Tamburini, 
Op.  cit.,  p.  27. 


84  J'S YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

sides  the  general  cause  he  should  discover  the  par- 
ticular causes  of  each  case.  Why,  for  example,  does 
such  and  such  a  form  prevail  with  such  and  such  an  in- 
dividual ?  Why  does  this  exclusive  preoccupation  take 
the  form  of  calculation  in  one,  of  names  in  another, 
and  of  bank-notes  in  still  another?  What  are  the 
secondary  causes  that  here  have  given  the  malady 
such  and  such  a  direction  ?  Each  case  should  be 
studied  separately.  Upon  the  supposition  that  the 
investigation  might  accomplish  the  purpose  set,  it 
were  the  best  course  to  begin  with  the  worst  and  most 
serious  cases — the  very  ones  that  we  have  decided  not 
to  consider.  These,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  are  the  sim- 
pler, and  some  of  them  being  connected  with  a  known 
organic  apparatus  (as,  for  instance,  the  fixed  idea  of 
certain  erotomaniacs)  we  would  thus  have  a  point  to 
start  from  and  would  find  ourselves  in  the  possession 
of  a  clue.  But  we  should  court  certain  failure  if  at 
the  very  outset  we  were  to  apply  psychological  analysis 
to  the  intellectual  forms  of  the  fixed  idea.  However, 
it  is  not  incumbent  upon  us  here  to  attempt  this 
work.  Our  sole  purpose,  at  present,  is,  to  examine 
more  closely  the  mechanism  of  the  fixed. idea,  to  dis- 
cover in  what  respect  it  resembles  the  mechanism  of  at- 
tention and  in  what  respect  it  differs  from  it. 

And  to  this  proposition  we  may  at  once  answer, 
that  between  the  two  there  is  no  difference  of  kind 
but  only  a  difference  of  degree.  The  fixed  idea  has 
greater  intensity,  and,  above  all,  a  longer  duration. 
Take  a  given  state  of  spontaneous  attention  ;  suppose 
that  through  artificial  means  we  are  able  to  strengthen 
and,  particularly,  are  able  to  render  it  permanent. 
The  metamorphosis  into  a  fixed  idea  would  then  be 
complete  ;    the  whole  array  of  irrational  conceptions 


MORBID  STA  TES  OF  A  TTENTION.        85 

that  form  its  retinue  and  present  a  fictitious  appear- 
ance of  insanity  being  of  necessity  added  to  it  as  the 
mere  result  of  the  logical  mechanism  of  the  mind. 
The  term  ''fixed  idea  "  designates  the  principal  part 
of  the  complete  psychological  state  ;  yet  only  a  part — 
the  centre,  namely,  whence  all  departs,  and  whither 
everything  reverts.  The  permanence  of  a  single 
image,  a  single  idea,  and  nothing  more,  would  con- 
flict with  the  conditions  of  the  existence  of  conscious- 
ness, which  requires  change.  Absolute  monoideism, 
if  such  there  exist,  is,  at  the  utmost,  met  with  in  the 
extremest  forms  of  ecstasy,  as  will  be  explained  further 
on.  The  mechanism  of  the  fixed  idea  consists  in  as- 
sociations of  states  of  consciousness  in  a  single  direc- 
tion— associations  that  at  times  are  loose  and  of  little 
coherency,  yet  more  frequently  held  together  by  a 
compact,  logical  bond  which  expresses  itself  in  in- 
cessant interrogations. 

Certain  authors,  Westphal  particularly,  in  noting 
the  differences  between  fixed  ideas  and  mental  dis- 
orders designated  as  insanity,  have  made  the  impor- 
tant remark,  that  "the  fixed  idea  is  a  formal  altera- 
tion of  the  process  of  ideation,  but  not  of  its  content  "; 
in  other  words,  there  is  alteration,  not  in  the  nature, 
the  quality  of  the  idea,  which  is  normal,  but  in  its 
quantity,  intensity,  degree.  To  reflect  upon  the  origin 
of  things,  or  upon  the  usefulness  of  bank-notes,  in  it- 
self is  a  perfectly  rational  act,  and  this  state  is  in  no 
wise  comparable  with  that  of  a  beggar  who  believes 
himself  a  millionaire,  or  of  a  man  who  thinks  himself 
to  be  a  woman.  The  ''  formal  "  perturbation  consists 
in  the  inexorable  necessity  that  compels  the  associ- 
ation always  to  follow  one  and  the  sarrie  path.  Since 
intermissions  and  momentary  changes  of  direction  oc- 


86  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 

cur,  these  patients,  who  are  gifted  with  a  high  degree 
of  intelligence,  and  more  than  ordinary  culture,  possess 
a  full  consciousness  of  the  absurdity  of  their  condition  : 
the  fixed  idea  appears  to  them  as  a  foreign  body  that 
has  taken  up  its  abode  in  their  system  and  which  they 
are  unable  to  dislodge  ;  yet,  withal,  it  is  not  able  to 
take  entire  possession  of  them  ;  it  remains  ''a  miscar- 
ried, delirious  idea." 

This  for?7ial  character  of  the  fixed  idea  well  shows 
its  close  relationship  to  attention.  The  latter,  as  we 
have  often  said,  is  but  a  mental  attitude.  Percep- 
tions, images,  ideas,  and  emotions  are  its  content- 
matter  ;  attention  does  not  create  them,  it  simply  iso- 
lates, strengthens,  and  illuminates  them  ;  it  is  a  mode 
merely  of  their  appearance.  Even  current  speech  it- 
self establishes  a  distinction  between  the  ordinary  form 
and  the  attentive  form  of  the  states  of  the  mind. 

I  am,  accordingly,  fully  inclined  to  hold,  with  Buc- 
cola,  ''that  the  fixed  idea  is  attention  at  its  highest 
degree — the  extreme  limit  of  its  power  of  inhibition." 
There  is  no  boundary-line,  even  of  fluctuation,  between 
the  two  ;  and  to  recapitulate,  if  we  compare  them  with 
each  other,  the  following  is  what  we  obtain  : 

1 .  In  both  cases  we  find  predominance  and  intensity 
of  a  state  of  consciousness,  but  greatly  superior  in  the 
case  of  the  fixed  idea.  The  latter,  in  consequence  of 
organic  conditions,  is  permanent,  it  lasts  :  it  has  the 
disposal  of  a  psychical  factor  of  great  importance — time. 

2.  In  both  cases  the  mechanism  of  association  is 
limited.  In  attention  this  exceptional  state  does  not 
last  long  ;  consciousness  reverts  spontaneously  to  its 
normal  condition,  which  is  the  struggle  for  existence 
between  heterogenous  states.  The  fixed  idea  prevents 
all  diffusion. 


MORBID  STA  TES  OF  A  TTENTION.       87 

3.  The  fixed  idea  presupposes — and  this  is  one  of 
the  ordinary  effects  of  degeneration — a  considerable 
weakening  of  the  will,  that  is,  of  the  power  to  react. 
There  is  no  antagonistic  state  that  is  able  to  over- 
throw it.  Effort  is  impossible  or  vain.  And  hence 
the  state  of  agony  of  the  patient,  who  is  conscious  of 
his  own  impotency. 

Physiologically  regarded,  the  condition  attending 
the  fixed  idea  may  probably  be  represented  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner.  In  its  normal  state  the  entire  brain 
works  :  diffused  activity  is  the  rule.  Discharges  take 
place  from  one  group  of  cells  into  another,  which  is 
the  objective  equivalent  of  the  perpetual  alterations  of 
consciousness.  In  the  morbid  state  only  a  few  nervous 
elements  are  active,  or,  at  least,  their  state  of  tension 
is  not  transmitted  to  other  groups.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary, let  it  be  remarked,  that  the  nervous  elements  in 
question  should  occupy  a  single  point  or  limited  re- 
gion of  the  brain  ;  they  may  be  sprinkled  here  and 
there,  provided  they  be  closely  joined  and  associated 
together  for  the  common  work.  But  whatever  may 
be  their  position  in  the  cerebral  organ,  they  are  as  a 
matter  of  fact  isolated  ;  all  disposable  energy  has  been 
accumulated  in  them,  and  they  do  not  communicate  it 
to  other  groups  ;  whence  their  supreme  dominance  and 
exaggerated  activity.  There  is  a  lack  of  physiological 
equilibrium,  due  probably  to  the  state  of  nutrition  of 
the  cerebral  centres. 

Esquirol  called  the  fixed  idea  a  catalepsy  of  the  in- 
telligence. It  might  also  be  compared  to  a  phenom- 
enon of  the  motor  order — contracture.  Contracture  is 
a  prolonged  constriction  of  the  muscles  ;  it  results 
from  an  excess  of  irritability  of  the  nervous  centres 
and  the   will  has  not  the  power  to   destroy  it.     The 


88  J'S YCHOL OGY  OF  A  TTENTION. 

fixed  idea  has  a  similar  cause  ;  it  consists  in  an  exces- 
sive tension,  and  the  will  has  no  power  over  it. 


The  fixed  idea  might  be  termed  the  chronic  form 
of  hypertrophy  of  attention  ;  ecstasy  being  its  acute 
form.  It  is  not  our  purpose  here  to  investigate  ex- 
haustively this  extraordinary  state  of  the  mind.  We 
have  treated  it  elsewhere,*  in  its  negative  aspect,  as 
annihilation  of  will.  At  present  we  are  to  consider  it 
from  its  positive  side,  as  exaltation  of  intellect. 

The  comparison  of  attention  and  ecstasy  is  not 
novel  ;  the  analogy  between  the  two  states  being  so 
great  that  various  authors  have  actually  employed  at- 
tention to  define  ecstasy.  ''It  is,"  says  Bérard,  ''a 
vivid  exaltation  of  certain  ideas,  which  so  absorb  atten- 
tion, that  sensations  are  suspended,  voluntary  motions 
arrested,  and  vital  action  itself  frequently  slackened." 
Michéa  defines  it  as  "a  deep  contemplation  with  abo- 
lition of  sensibility  and  suspension  of  the  locomotive 
faculty."  A.  Maury  expresses  himself  even  more  ex- 
plicitly, saying  :  ''A  simple  difference  of  degree  sepa- 
rates ecstasy  from  the  action  of  forcibly  fixing 'an  idea 
in  the,  mind.  Contemplation  implies  exercise  of  will, 
and  the  power  of  interrupting  the  extreme  tension  of 
the  mind..  In  ecstasy,  which  is  contemplation  carried 
to  its  highest  pitch,  the  will,  although  in  the  strictest 
sense  able  to  provoke  the  state,  is  nevertheless  unable 
to  suspend  it.  "f 

As  in  the  fixed   idea,  so  between  the  normal  state 

*  "The  Diseases  of  the  Will,"  Chap.  V.     Chicago;  1894. 
t  Maury,  Le  Sommeil  et  les  Rêves,  p.  235. 


MORBID  STA  TES  OF  A  TTENTION.        89 

and  ecstasy,  intermediate  degrees  are  distinguishable. 
Men  endowed  with  great  power  of  attention,  can  iso- 
late themselves  at  will  from  the  external  world.  In- 
accessible to  sensations  and  even  to  pain,  they  tempo- 
rarily live  in  that  particular  state  which  has  been  called 
co7itemplatio7i.  The  oft-quoted  story  of  Archimedes  at 
the  capture  of  Syracuse,  whether  true  or  not  as  fact, 
is  certainly  psychologically  true.  The  biographies  of 
Newton,  Pascal,  Walter  Scott,  Gauss,  and  many 
others,  have  furnished  numerous  examples  of  this  in- 
tellectual rapture. 

''Before  the  invention  of  chloroform,  patients  would 
sometimes  endure  painful  operations  without  betray- 
ing any  symptom  of  pain,  and  afterwards  would  de- 
clare, that  they  had  felt  nothing,  having  by  a  power- 
ful effort  of  attention  concentrated  their  thoughts  upon 
some  subject,  by  which  they  had  been  completely  en- 
tranced. 

''Many  martyrs  have  endured  torture  with  perfect 
serenity,  which,  according  to  their  own  confession, 
they  experienced  no  difficulty  in  maintaining  up  to  the 
last.  Their  entranced  attention  was  to  such  a  degree 
absorbed  by  the  beatific  visions  that  were  presented  to 
their  enraptured  eyes  that  bodily  tortures  did  not  give 
them  any  pain."* 

Political  fanaticism  has  more  than  once  produced 
the  same  effects.  But  everywhere  and  always  some 
great  passion  has  served  as  the  basis  of  support;  still 
further  proving,  that  vivid  and  stable  forms  of  atten- 
tion depend  on  emotional  life  and  on  that  only. 

Passing  by  the  intermediate  degrees,  in  order  to 
come  to  ecstasy  proper,  and  neglecting  all  the  other 
physical  and  psychical  manifestations  that  accompany 

*  Carpenter,  "Mental  Physiology,"  Chap.  III. 


90  J^S } XHOL OGY  OF  A TTEXTIOiV. 

this  extraordinary  state,  let  us  consider  exclusively  a 
single  fact,  namely,  extreme  intellectual  activity  ac- 
companied by  intense  concentration  upon  a  single 
idea.  This  is  a  state  of  intense  and  circumscribed 
ideation  ;  all  life  is  gathered  up,  as  it  were,  in  the 
thinkmg  brain,  in  which  a  single  representation  ab-^ 
sorbs  everything  else.  Still,  the  state  of  ecstasy,  al- 
though in  every  individual  it  may  exalt  the  intelligence 
to  its  highest  degree  of  power,  is  nevertheless  unable 
to  transform  it.  It  cannot  act  in  the  same  manner 
upon  a  narrow  and  ignorant  mind  as  upon  a  broad 
and  highly-cultivated  one.  From  the  view-point  of 
our  present  subject  we  may,  accordingly,  distinguish 
two  categories  of  mystics.  With  the  first  class  the  in- 
ternal event  consists  of  the  apparition  of  some  dominant 
image,  around  which  all  else  revolves  (as  the  Passion, 
the  Nativity,  the  Virgin,  etc.),  and  which  is  expressed 
by  a  regular  series  of  movements  and  speeches,  as 
those  of  Marie  de  Mserl,  Louise  Lateau,  and  the  en- 
trancements  of  Voray.  In  the  second  category — the 
grand  mystics — the  mind,  after  having  traversed  the 
region  of  images,  reaches  the  domain  of  pure  ideas, 
and  there  remains  fixed.  Further  on,  I  shall  attempt 
to  show  that  this  higher  form  of  ecstasy  may  at  times 
reach  the  state  of  complete,  absolute  monoideism,  that 
is,  the  state  of  perfect  unity  of  consciousness,  which 
consists  in  a  single  state  without  any  change  whatever. 
In  order  to  trace  this  aF,cending  progression  toward 
absolute  unity  of  consciousness,  of  which  even  the 
most  concentrated  attention  is  but  a  very  faint  out- 
line, we  need  not  have  recourse  to  probable  hypoth- 
eses, nor  need  we  proceed  theoretically  and  a  priori. 
I  find  \n  the  ^^  Castillo  interior''  of  Saint  Theresa  a 
description,  step   by  step,  of  this  progressive  concen- 


MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTEi\TIOJV.       91 

tration  of  consciousness,  which  starting  from  the  ordi- 
nary state  of  diffusion,  assumes  the  form  of  attention, 
passes  beyond  the  latter,  and  by  degrees,  in  a  few  rare 
cases,  attains  to  perfect  unity  of  intuition.  The  illustra- 
tion in  question  is  exceptional  and  single,  but  in  the 
present  matter  one  good  observation  is  better  than  a 
hundred  second-rate  ones.*  The  observation  de- 
serves, moreover,  our  fullest  confidence.  It  is  a  con- 
fession made  at  the  behest  of  the  spiritual  power,  the 
work  of  a  very  delicate  mind,  and  a  very  able  observer 
that  well  knew  how  to  wield  language  to  express  the 
finest  shades  of  thought.  Furthermore,  I  must  request 
the  reader,  not  to  allow  himself  to  be  led  astray  by  the 
mystic  phraseology  in  which  the  observation  is  couched, 
and  not  to  forget,  that  here,  a  Spanish  woman  of  the 
sixteenth  century  analyzes  her  mind  in  the  language 
and  ideas  of  her  time  ;  we  shall  be  able,  however,  to 
translate  the  same  into  the  language  of  contempora- 
neous psychology.  This  task  I  shall  now  attempt, 
endeavoring  at  the  same  time  to  point  out  the  ever  in- 
creasing concentration  and  incessant  narrowing  of  con- 
sciousness that  we  have  noted,  as  they  are  described 
from  her  own  personal  experience.' 

There  exists,  says  she,  a  castle  built  of  a  solitary 
diamond  of  matchless  beauty  and  incomparable  purity; 
to  enter  and  to  dwell  in  that  castle  is  the  supreme  aim 
of  the  mystic.  This  castle  is  within  us,  within  our  soul  ; 
we  have  not  to  step  out  of  ourselves,  to  penetrate  its 
recesses;  though,  nevertheless,  the  road  thereto  is  long 
and  difficult.  To  reach  it,  we  have  to  pass  through 
seven  stations  :  we  enter  the  castle  through  the  seven 

*It  is  highly  probable,  that  one  would  find  more  of  the  same  kind,  by  ex- 
amining the  mystic  literature  of  different  countries.  The  passages  here 
quoted  are  from  the  "Interior  Castle,"  and  a  few  from  the  "Autobiog- 
raphy." 


92  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A TTENTION 

degrees  of  ''prayer."  In  the  preparatory  stage  we  are 
still  immersed  in  bewildering  varieties  of  impressions 
and  images — occupied  with  ''the  life  of  the  world"; 
or,  as  I  should  prefer  to  translate  it,  consciousness 
still  follows  its  usual  and  normal  course. 

The  first  objective  point,  or  stage,  is  reached 
through  "oral  prayer."  Which,  interpreted,  means, 
that  praying  aloud,  articulate  speech  in  other  words, 
produces  the  first  degree  of  concentration,  leading  the 
dispersed  consciousness  into  a  single,  confined  channel. 

The  second  stage  is  that  of  '  '  mental  prayer,  "  which 
means,  that  the  inwardness  of  thought  increases  ;  in- 
ternal language  is  substituted  for  external  language. 
The  work  of  concentration  becomes  easier  :  conscious- 
ness, to  prevent  aberration,  no  longer  requires  the  ma- 
terial support  of  articulate  or  audible  words  ;  con- 
sciousness is  now  satisfied  with  a  series  of  uncertain 
images  unfolding  before  it. 

The  "prayer  of  recollection  "  {oraiso?i  de  recueille- 
??ient)  marks  the  third  stage.  What  this  means,  I 
must  confess,  slightly  puzzles  me.  In  this  state  I 
can  only  perceive  a  still  higher  form  of  the  second  pe- 
riod, separated  from  it  by  a  very  subtle  shade,  and 
appreciable  only  to  the  mystic  consciousness. 

Up  to  this  point  there  has  been  activity,  movement, 
and  effort.  All  our  faculties  are  still  in  play  ;  now, 
however,  it  becomes  necessary  "no  longer  to  think 
much,  but  to  love  much."  In  other  words,  conscious- 
ness is  about  to  pass  from  the  discursive  form  to  the 
intuitive  form,  from  plurality  to  unity  ;  it  tends  no 
longer  toward  being  a  radiation  around  a  fixed  point, 
but  a  single  state  of  enormous  intensity.  And  this 
transition  is  not  the  effect  of  a  capricious,  arbitrary 
will,  nor  of  the  mere  movement  of  thought  left  to  it- 


MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTENTION.        93 

self  ;  it  needs  the  impulsion  of  a  powerful  love,  the 
''touch  of  divine  grace,"  that  is,  the  unconscious  co- 
operation of  the  whole  being. 

The  ''  prayer  of  quietude  "  brings  us  to  the  fourth 
station  ;  there  ''  the  soul  no  longer  produces,  but  re- 
ceives "  ;  this  is  a  state  of  high  contemplation,  not  ex- 
clusively known  to  religious  mystics  alone.  It  is  truth 
appearing  suddenly  in  its  totality,  imposing  itself  as 
such,  without  the  long,  slow  process  of  logical  demon- 
stration. 

The  fifth  station,  or  "  prayer  of  union,"  is  the  be- 
ginning of  ecstasy  ;  but  it  is  unstable.  It  is  "  the 
meeting  with  the  divine  betrothed,"  but  without  last- 
ing possession.  "  The  flowers  have  but  half-opened 
their  calyxes,  they  have  only  shed  their  first  perfumes.  " 
The  fixity  of  consciousness  is  not  as  yet  complete,  it 
is  still  liable  to  oscillations  and  deviations  ;  as  yet  it 
is  unable  to  maintain  itself  in  this  extraordinary,  un- 
natural state. 

Finally  it  attains  to  ecstasy  in  the  sixth  degree, 
through  ''the  prayer  of  rapture."  "  The  body  grows 
cold  ;  speech  and  respiration  are  suspended,  the  eyes 
close  ;  the  slightest  motion  ma}^  cause  the  greatest 
efforts The  senses  and  faculties  remain  with- 
out       Although    usually  one    does  not    lose  all 

feeling  (consciousness),  still  //  has  happejied  to  i7ie  to 
be  entirely  deprived  of  it  ;  this  has  seldom  come  to 
pass,  and  has  lasted  but  for  a  short  time.  Most  fre- 
quentl}^  feeling  is  preserved,  but  one  experiences  an 
indefinable  sort  of  agitation,  and  although  one  ceases 
to  act  outwardly,  one  does  not  fail  to  hear.  It  is  like 
some  confused  sound,  coming  from  afar.  Still,  even 
this  jnanner  of  hearing  ceases  when  the  entrancement  is 
at  its  highest  point.  " 


94  -PS i THOL OGY  OF  A  TTENTION. 

What,  then,  is  the  seventh  and  last  station  that  is 
reached  by  "  the  flight  of  the  spirit  "  ?  What  is  there 
beyond  ecstasy  ?  Union  with  God.  This  is  accom- 
plished ''suddenly  and  violently  ....  but  with  such 
force  that  we  should  strive  in  vain  to  resist  the  impet- 
uous onset."  God  has  now  descended  into  the  sub- 
stance of  the  soul,  and  becomes  one  with  it.  This 
distinction  of  the  two  degrees  of  ecstasy,  is  not,  in  my 
opinion,  without  reason.  At  its  highest  degree,  the 
very  abolition  of  consciousness  is  attained  by  its  ex- 
cess of  unity.  This  interpretation  will  appear  well- 
grounded,  upon  reference  to  the  two  passages  above 
italicized,  viz.:  "  It  has  happened  to  me  to  be  entirely 
deprived  of  feeling",  and  "this  manner  of  hearing 
ceases  when  the  entrancement  is  at  its  highest  point." 
We  might  cite  other  passages  to  this  effect  from  the 
same  author.  It  is  remarkable,  that  in  one  of  her 
"great  raptures"  the  Divinity  appeared  to  her  en- 
tirely without  form,  as  a  perfectly  empty  abstraction. 
Such,  at  least,  appears  to  be  the  gist  of  her  own  words  : 
"And  so  I  say,  that  the  Divinity  is  like  a  transparent 
diamond,  supremely  limpid,  and  much  larger  than  the 
world."*  In  this  I  can  discern  nothing  else  than  a 
simple  rhetorical  comparison,  a  literary  metaphor.  It 
is,  indeed,  the  expression  of  complete  unity  of  intui- 
tion. 

This  piece  of  psychological  evidence  has  enabled 
us,  as  we  have  seen,  to  follow  consciousness,  step  by 
step,  to  its  furthermost  degree  of  concentration,  to  ^z^- 
solute  monoideism.  It  enables  us,  moreover,  to  answer 
a  question,  frequently  raised,  yet  which  has  only  theo- 
retically been  settled  ;  namely.  Can  a  state  of  uniform 
consciousness  subsist  ?  The  testimony  of  certain  mys- 

*  Autobiography,  p   '•>i'^ 


MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTENTION,        95 

tics  apparently  justifies  an  answer  in  the  affirmative. 
To  be  sure,  it  is  a  settled  and  common  truism,  that 
consciousness  only  exists  through  change  ;  at  least  it 
has  been  admitted  since  the  time  of  Hobbes  :  ^^ Idem 
sentire  semper,  et  non  setitire,  ad  idem  recidunt.'"  But 
this  law  has  been  infringed  in  the  case  of  a  few  excep- 
tional individuals,  in  very  rare  instances  and  during 
very  short  spaces  of  time.  In  ordinary  ecstasy  con- 
sciousness attains  to  its  maximum  of  constriction  and 
intensity,  but  it  still  preserves  the  discursive  form  : 
it  differs  only  in  degree  from  very  strong  attention. 
The  greatest  mystics  alone  have  attained,  by  a  still 
stronger  effort,  to  absolute  monoideism.  They  all,  in 
every  country,  in  all  times,  and  without  knowledge  of 
each  other,  have  regarded  perfect  unity  of  conscious- 
ness, the  évGDGi?,  as  the  supreme  and  rarely  attained 
consummation  of  ecstasy.  Only  four  times  in  his  life 
did  Plotinus  obtain  this  favor,  according  to  Porphyrins, 
who  himself  obtained  it  but  once,  at  the  age  of  sixty- 
six  years.*  Consciousness,  at  this  extreme  point,  can- 
not long  endure — they  declare.  But  this  instability, 
which  they  explain  in  their  own  way  as  due  to  their 
unworthiness  of  such  beatitude  and  the  impossibility 
of  a  finite  mortal  becoming  infinite,  is  in  reality  ex- 
plainable from  psychological  and  physiological  causes. 
Consciousness  is  placed  without  its  necessary  condi- 
tions of  existence,  and  the  nervous  elements  that  are 
the  supports  and  agents  of  this  prodigious  activity 
cannot  long  bear  the  intense  strain.  The  individual 
then  falls  back  to  earth  again,  and  again  becomes  ''the 
little   donkey      browsing   away  his   mortal  existence." 

♦Porphyrins,  "  Life  of  Plotinus,"  Chap.  XII. 


96  PS YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 


The  debilitation  of  attention  is  extreme  in  mania, 
which,  as  is  known,  consists  of  a  general  and  perma- 
nent over-excitation  of  the  pS3xhic  life.  The  diffusion 
is  not  internal  only;  it  is  also  being  incessantly  trans- 
ferred outwards,  and  is  being  expended  at  each  instant. 
A  constant  agitation  is  manifested,  a  continual  need  to 
speak,  to  shout,  and  to  act  violently.  The  state  of  con- 
sciousness is  immediately  projected  outwards.  '' Ma- 
niacs," says  Griesinger,  ''are  often  able,  for  a  consid- 
erable length  of  time,  to  keep  up  an  expenditure  of 
muscular  force  to  which  the  strength  of  a  sane  indi- 
vidual would  not  be  adequate.  They  are  seen  to  spend 
weeks,  or  whole  months  almost,  without  sleep,  a  prey 
to  violent  fury,  and  the  onl}'  explanation  of  this  enor- 
mous muscular  expenditure  seems  to  be,  that  through 
an  anomalous  condition  of  the  sensibility  of  the  muscles 
these  patients  are  destitute  of  the  feeling  of  fatigue." 
At  the  same  time,  sensations,  images,  ideas,  feelings 
follow  each  other  with  such  astonishing  rapidity  that 
they  scarcety  attain  to  the  condition  of  complete  con- 
sciousness, and  so  that  frequently  the  bond  of  associa- 
tion uniting  them  is  totally  undiscoverable  to  the  spec- 
tator. Or  in  the  very  words  of  one  of  these  maniacs, 
''It  is  reall}^  frightful  to  think  of  the  extreme  rapidity 
with  which  ideas  succeed  one  another  in  the  mind." 
To  recapitulate,  we  find  here,  in  the  mental  order  of 
things,  a  disordered  flow  of  images  and  ideas  ;  in  the 
motor  order,  a  flux  of  words,  shouts,  gesticulations, 
and  impetuous  movements. 

We  need  not  further  pursue  this  subject  and  show 
that  in  mania  all  conditions  that  are  contrary  to  the  state 


MORBID  S  TA  TES  OF  A  TTENTION.       97 

of  attention  are  combined.  Neither  concentration  nor 
adaptation  nor  duration  are  at  all  possible.  It  is  the 
triumph  supreme  of  cerebral  automatism,  left  entirely 
to  itself,  and  free  from  all  control.  With  maniacs, 
moreover,  there  prevails  at  times  an  extreme  exaltation 
of  memory  ;  they  are  able  to  recite  long  poems,  for- 
gotten years  before. 

In  this  intellectual  chaos  no  particular  state  can 
last  any  length  of  time.  ''But  let  us  bring  some 
powerful  action  to  bear  upon  the  mind  of  a  maniac,  or 
let  some  unforeseen  event  arrest  his  attention,  and  all 
of  a  sudden  you  will  find  him  rational,  and  his  reason 
will  last  as  long  as  the  impression  has  sufficient  power 
to  retain  his  attention."*  Here  again  we  have  an 
instance  that  teaches  us  upon  what  causes  spontaneous 
attention  depends. 

Under  the  general  head  of  exhaustion  we  include  a 
very  numerous  group  of  states,  in  which  attention  can- 
not pass  beyond  a  very  weak  stage.  Here  it  has  not 
to  struggle,  as  in  mania,  against  an  excessive  automa- 
tism ;  its  weakness  is  its  own.  Examples  are  found  in 
h^^sterical  persons,  in  persons  afflicted  with  melancholy, 
in  the  first  stages  of  intoxication,  at  the  approach  of 
sleep,  and  in  extreme  physical  or  mental  fatigue. 
Children  affected  with  St.  Vitus's  dance  are  also  but 
little  capable  of  attention. 

These  morbid  or  semi-morbid  states  confirm  the 
position  we  took  in  our  investigation  of  the  normal 
state,  viz.,  that  the  mechanism  of  attention  is  essen- 
tially motor.  In  exhaustion  it  is  impossible,  or  ex- 
tremely difficult  to  fix  the  attention  ;  and  this — to  re- 
peat a  former  statement — implies,  that  here  an  intel- 
lectual  state   cannot   predominate,  nor  last,  nor  pro- 

*Esquirol,  Maladies  Mentales,  Vol.  II,  p.  47. 


98  FS YCHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

duce  an  adequate  adaptation.  This  cerebral  exhaus- 
tion, which  results  from  some  defect  or  other  of  nutri- 
tion, manifests  itself  in  two  ways  :  in  the  first  place,  by 
a  state  of  consciousness  without  intensity  and  without 
duration,  and  in  the  second  place  by  an  insufficiency 
of  motor  nervous  influx.  Now,  if  the  movements 
which,  as  it  is  termed,  '' accompany  "  attention,  move- 
ments of  respiration,  of  circulation,  of  the  head,  the 
limbs,  etc.,  are  weak  and  without  vigor  ;  if  these  motor 
phenomena,  as  we  maintain,  are  not  concomitants,  but 
elements,  integral  parts,  of  attention,  that  impart  to 
the  intellectual  state  a  delimitation,  a  support,  and,  as 
it  were,  a  body  ;  and  finally,  if  in  the  normal  state 
their  effect  is  to  strengthen  the  sensation,  the  image, 
or  idea  through  an  action  of  resilience  :  in  such  case  it 
is  clear,  that  all  these  conditions  are  here  absent  or 
defective,  and  that  in  exhaustion  there  can  only  be 
produced  attempts  at  attention,  feeble  and  without 
duration.      This,  in  fact,  is  what  occurs. 

Let  us  take  the  case  of  intoxication,  the  simplest 
and  the  most  commonplace  of  all,  and  which  more- 
over presents  this  advantage,  that  here  the  dissolution 
of  the  movements  can  be  followed  to  the  end.  It  is  a 
well-known  biological  law,  that  dissolution  follows  the 
inverse  order  of  evolution  ;  that  its  work  of  destruction 
proceeds  from  the  complex  to  the  simple,  from  the 
less  automatic  to  the  more  automatic.  This  law  is 
verified  in  the  case  of  intoxication.  At  first  our  most 
delicate  movements  become  unsettled,  the  movements 
of  utterance,  which  grow  embarrassed,  the  movements 
of  the  fingers,  which  lose  their  precision  ;  later,  the 
semi-automatic  movements,  that  constitute  walking  : 
the  body  reels  ;  still  later  the  intoxicated  person  is  un- 
able even  to  keep  his  seat,  he  falls  to  the  ground  ;  fin- 


MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTENTION.        99 

ally  follows  the  total  loss  of  reflex  motions,  the  man  is 
''dead  "-drunk  ;  in  extreme  cases,  loss  even  of  respi- 
ratory movements.  We  shall  disregard  the  last  phases 
of  the  dissolution  of  movements,  which  are  purely 
physiological  ;  and  reverting  to  the  beginning,  let  us  see 
what  takes  place  in  consciousness.  Is  a  man  after 
drinking  really  capable  of  attention,  and  above  all,  of 
reflection?  The  state  of  exaltation,  whicli  is  then 
produced  in  some  men,  is  the  very  reverse  of  the  state 
of  concentration.  The  power  of  inhibition  weakens  ; 
men  abandon  themselves  totally  to  the  verification  of 
the  dictum,  '^  In  vino  Veritas.''  Then,  little  by  little, 
consciousness  becomes  obscured  ;  the  states  it  assumes 
float  indistinctly  about,  without  clear  outlines,  phan- 
tom-like. The  debilitation  of  attention  and  that  of 
movements,  accordingly,  go  hand  in  hand  ;  they  are 
but  two  aspects  of  what  at  bottom  is  really  a  single 
phenomenon. 

However,  there  now  arises  another  question  ;  we 
do  not  wish  to  treat  it  by  way  of  episode,  and  shall, 
accordingly,  merely  point  it  out  to  the  reader.  If  the 
state  of  nervous  exhaustion  prevents  attention,  we  are 
brought  through  this  fact  to  the  source  of  attention. 
The  healthy  man  is  capable  of  attention,  effort,  and 
work  in  the  widest  sense  ;  the  man  whose  strength  is 
debilitated,  is  incapable  of  attention,  effort,  or  work. 
But  work  performed  is  not  the  result  of  nothing  ;  it 
does  not  fall  from  the  skies  ;  it  can  only  be  the  trans- 
formation of  pre-existing  energy — the  change  of  stored, 
potential,  energy  into  actual,  kinetic,  energy.  This 
potential  energy  stored  in  the  nervous  substance,  is 
itself  the  effect  of  chemical  actions  taking  place  within 
it.     Such,  accordingly,  would  be  the  ultimate  condi- 


loo         PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 

tion  of  attention.  For  the  present,  I  shall  confine 
myself  to  this  simple  observation.* 

According  to  the  theory  generally  accepted,  sleep 
also  is  the  consequence  of  exhaustion,  and  perhaps  of 
a  kind  of  intoxication.  The  few  authors  who  have 
studied  attention  during  sleep,  start  from  the  implicit 
or  explicit  hypothesis,  that  attention  is  a  power,  a 
faculty,  and  they  have  put  to  themselves  the  question 
whether  during  sleep  that  faculty  is  suspended.  From 
our  point  of  view,  the  problem  is  differently  presented. 
We  proceed  to  inquire  whether  the  state  of  relative 
monoideism,  which  we  denominate  attention,  is  or  is 
not  constituted  during  dream-activity. 

It  is  certain,  that  often  a  sensation  or  an  image  be- 
comes predominant  in  the  series  of  states  of  conscious- 
ness that  during  dreams  flit  through  the  mind  in  rapid 
and  disorderly  succession.  An  instant  of  inhibition 
then  occurs  ;  we  have  the  feeling  even  of  adaptation, 
of  adjustment — at  least  partially  and  temporarily  so  \ 
and  finally,  this  predominant  state  is  always  accom- 
panied by  some  strong  affection  or  emotion  (fear, 
anger,  love,  curiosity,  etc.) — with  the  result  that  we 
find  therein  all  the  essential  characteristics  of  spon- 
taneous attention. 

But  are  the  equivalent  elements  of  voluntary,  ot 
artificial,  attention  discoverable  in  that  state  ?  In 
the  first  place,  we  have  to  discard  entirely  a  certain 
class  of  cases  that  naturally  we  would  feel  tempted  to 
cite  as  affirmative  instances.  Such  cases  are  the  solu- 
tions of  problems,  scientific  discoveries,  artistic  or 
mechanical  inventions,  clever  combinations,  that  have 
been  revealed  in  dreams.  Tartini,  Condorcet,  Voltaire, 
Franklin,  Burdach,  Coleridge,  and  many  others,  have 

*See  Conclusion,  §  a. 


MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTENTION.      loi 

reported  personal  observations  so  well  known  that 
mere  reference  thereto  is  here  sufficient.  All  these 
phenomena  are  the  product  of  cerebral  automatism,  a 
species  of  activity  that  is  directly  antagonistic  to  vol- 
untary attention.  In  dreams,  people  only  discover, 
invent,  and  find  solutions,  in  strict  accordance  with 
their  habits  and  cast  of  mind.  Coleridge  composes  a 
poem,  but  he  does  not  solve  algebraical  problems  ; 
Tartini  completes  his  sonata,  but  he  does  not  evolve 
a  financial  combination.  These  results  are  the  long 
work  of  antecedent  incubation,  at  times  conscious, 
but  oftener  unconscious  (that  is,  purely  cerebral), 
which  all  of  a  sudden  attains  its  ultimate  state  of  ma- 
turity. The  condition  of  the  mind  during  dreams  is 
thus  as  unfavorable  as  can  be  to  the  formation  of 
voluntary  attention  :  on  the  one  hand  we  find  rapidity 
and  incoherence  of  associations  ;  on  the  other  disap- 
pearance or  extreme  impairment  of  all  coordination. 
The  highest,  most  delicate,  and  most  complex  forms 
are  the  first  to  disappear.  And  yet  the  will-power  is 
not  always  suspended,  for  sometimes  we  strive  to 
maintain  ourselves  in  a  state  that  pleases  us,  or  en- 
deavor to  escape  from  an  unpleasant  situation.  Cases 
also  occur  that  present  an  outline  at  least  of  voluntary 
attention  ;  which  is  natural  enough  with  those  who 
have  contracted  the  habit.  At  times,  the  absurdity  of 
our  dreams  is  revolting,  and  we  endeavor  to  make 
clear  to  ourselves  their  contradictions.  At  times,  we 
make  computations,  the  inexactitude  of  which  is  mor- 
tifying, and  we  try  hard  to  discover  the  causes  of 
error.*  But  these  are  exceptions.  If  sleep  were  not 
the  suspension  of  effort  in  one  of  its  most  laborious 
forms,  it  would  not  fulfill  its  office  of  reparation. 

*  See  several  instances  in  Sully,  "  Illusions,"  Chap.  VII. 


I02         PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

As  regards  natural  somnambulism,  and  still  more 
so  as  regards  hypnotism,  the  question  is  still  far  from 
having  been  cleared  up.  Braid,  who  was  the  first  to 
divest  provoked  somnambulism  of  the  vesture  of  the 
marvelous  in  which  it  was  enveloped,  reduced  the 
whole  psychology  of  this  phenomenon  to  a  ''  concen- 
tration of  attention  "  :  a  view,  which  with  only  slight 
modifications  has  been  maintained  by  Carpenter, 
Heidenhain,  Schneider,  and  especially  by  Beard  (of 
New  York).  The  last  psychologist  takes  it  to  be 
^'  a  functional  perturbation  of  the  nervous  system, 
the  activity  of  which  is  concentrated  within  a  limited 
region  of  the  brain,  the  rest  remaining  inactive  and 
thus  producing  loss  of  volition."  According  to  his 
favorite  comparison,  the  cortex  of  the  brain  resembles 
a  chandelier  with  numerous  gas-burners.  When  all 
the  jets  are  lighted,  we  have  the  waking  state  ;  when 
all  are  turned  down  low,  almost  to  the  point  of  extin- 
guishment, we  have  sleep  ;  when  all  have  been  extin- 
guished with  the  exception  of  a  single  one,  still 
brightly  burning  and  consuming  all  the  gas,  we  have 
hypnosis  in  its  different  stages.  This  theory  of  ''con- 
centrated attention  "  has  been  subjected  to  much  crit- 
icism* and  hardly  seems  applicable  to  all  cases.  Could 
hypnotism  as  produced  in  chickens  and  crabs  by  Kirch- 
ner,  Czermak,  and  Preyer,  possibly  be  attributed  to 
an  abnormal  concentration  of  attention  ?  It  is  certain, 
indeed,  that  the  hypnotized  individual  is  well  prepared 
for  the  state  of  monoideism  ;  but  is  this  state,  artificially 
produced  by  suggestion,  really  comparable  to  attention 
proper  ?     Does  it  not  rather  resemble  the  fixed  idea  ? 

*  Conf.  Stanley  Hall  in  Mi7id,  April,  1885,  and  Gurney,  Ibid.,  Oct.,  1884. 


MORBID  STATES  OF  ATTENTION.      103 


IV. 

Idiocy  has  various  degrees,  from  complete  nullity 
of  intelligence  to  simple  weak-mindedness,  according 
to  the  point  at  which  arrest  of  development  has  taken 
place.  Some  imbeciles  even  have  a  particular  talent 
for  the  mechanical  arts,  for  drawing,  for  music,  or 
arithmetic,  which  is  all  the  more  salient  from  its  being 
surrounded  by  complete  vacuity.  These  isolated  facul- 
ties have  been  compared  to  the  instincts  of  animals. 

Here  the  most  elementary  conditions  of  attention 
are  lacking,  or  only  appear  by  intermittent  flashes. 
The  defective  senses  deliver  only  dull  impressions, 
and  the  higher  centres  are  unfit  to  elaborate  them  and 
bring  them  together.  The  condition  of  the  motor 
faculty,  that  essential  factor  of  attention,  also  deserves 
to  be  noticed.  It  is  continually  presenting  anomalies 
— paralysis,  convulsions,  contractures,  epilepsy  ;  or  a 
kind  of  restricted  automatism,  which  incessantly  re- 
peats the  same  movements,  such  as  continually  sway- 
ing the  body  to  the  accompaniment  of  a  monotonous 
chant,  beating  the  walls,  opening  and  shutting  with- 
out end  the  same  piece  of  furniture,  etc.  In  all  this 
there  is  no  power  of  coordination  or  of  control.  ''  Im- 
beciles and  idiots,"  says  Esquirol,  "  are  bereft  of  the 
faculty  of  attention,  which  renders  them  incapable  of 
education, — a  fact  that  has  repeatedly  been  the  subject 
of  my  personal  observation.  Wishing  to  obtain  plaster- 
casts  of  a  large  number  of  insane  individuals,  I  was 
successful  with  maniacs,  even  the  most  furious  of 
them,  and  with  patients  affected  with  melancholy  ;  but 
I  could  not  get  the  imbeciles  to  keep  their  eyes 
closed  long  enough  for  the   plaster  to  take  form,  no 


1 04         T'S} 'CHOL OGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

matter  how  willing  they  had  been  to  have  the  opera- 
tion performed.  I  have  even  seen  them  cry  because 
the  cast  could  not  be  successfully  taken,  and  repeat- 
edly endeavor  to  maintain  the  position  in  which  they 
had  been  placed,  but  always  in  vain  ;  they  were  un- 
able to  keep  their  eyes  closed  for  more  than  one  or 
two  minutes."*  The  lowest  grades  of  idiots  and  im- 
beciles do  not  even  possess  the  spontaneous  attention 
that  animals  enjoy  with  a  view  to  the  preservation  of 
life.  The  less  refractory  specimens  are,  to  a  slight 
degree,  amenable  to  education.  Séguin  and  others 
have,  by  patient  training,  obtained  some  favorable 
results.  Without  inquiring  whether  the  great  efforts 
made  with  this  end  in  view  since  half  a  century  have 
had  any  value  whatever  for  society,  or  whether  the 
same  amount  of  labor  might  not  have  been  more  use- 
fully expended,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  several 
different  systems  of  modern  education  uniformly  at- 
tempt to  construct  certain  predominant,  regulative 
states,  in  other  words,  to  create  a  species  of  attention. 
They  begin  with  extremely  simple  acts.  Thus,  in 
certain  asylums  in  the  United  States,  in  order  to 
arouse  the  attention  of  idiots,  they  are  taught  to  put 
plugs  into  a  hole,  to  repeat  an  air,  or  to  associate  a 
given  word  with  certain  figures,  etc.f 

* 

Attention — to  recapitulate — is  an  attitude  of  the 
mind  \  I  would  say  a.  forma/ sta.te,  if  this  term  were  not 
generally  misemployed.  Graphically,  we  might  rep- 
resent the  totality  of  its  normal  and  morbid  manifesta- 
tions by  a  straight  line,  dividing  at  its  two  extremities 

*  Esquirol,  Maladies  Mentales,  Vol.  I,  p.  ii. 

t  Séguin,  Traité  de  Véducation  des  idiots,  Paris,  1846  ;  Ireland,  "  Mental 
Idiocy." 


CONCLUSION.  105 

into  two  branches.  At  the  centre,  let  us  put  ordinary 
spontaneous  attention.  Following  our  imaginary  line 
to  the  right,  in  the  direction  of  increasing  attention, 
we  find  strong  spontaneous  attention,  then  pre-occu- 
pation,  then  the  weak  fixed  idea  ;  the  line  thereupon 
branches  in  the  two  directions  to  represent  the  two 
extreme  degrees — the  confirmed  fixed  idea  and  ecstasy. 
Reverting  to  our  starting  point,  we  now  turn  to  the 
left,  in  the  direction  of  decreasing  intensity.  Here 
we  have  voluntary  attention,  at  first  in  the  form  of  an 
organized  habit,  then  in  its  general  ordinary  form, 
then  vacillating,  and  finally  we  come  to  the  division 
into  branches  corresponding  to  the  two  extremes  of 
temporary  failure  and  utter  impossibility  of  attention. 
Between  each  form  and  its  adjacent  ones,  there  occur 
shades  which  I  omit  to  notice  ;  but  we  are  able  by 
this  manner  of  representation  to  comprehend  the  com- 
mon origin  of  all  these  states  and  their  unity  of  com- 
position. 


CONCLUSION. 


We  have  endeavored  to  establish,  in  the  present 
work,  the  thesis,  that  the  immediate  and  necessary 
condition  of  attention  in  all  its  forms  is  interest — that 
is,  natural  or  artificial  emotional  states — and  that, 
further,  its  mechanism  is  motor.  Attention  is  not  a 
faculty,  a  special  power,  but  a  predominant /;2/^//<?^///^/ 
state,  resulting  from  complex  causes  that  induce  a 
shorter  or  longer  adaptation.  We  have  dwelt  suffi- 
ciently upon  the  part  sustained  by  movements  and  we 
need  not  here   revert  to  the  subject  ;  but  it  will  be  to 


io6         PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

advantage  to  make  a  short  study  of  the  emotional 
states  that  awaken  and  sustain  attention.  Up  to  this 
point  we  have  hmited  ourselves  to  the  statement  of 
their  functions,  and  have  said  nothing  of  their  nature. 

We  do  not  intend,  here,  to  present  to  the  reader, 
incidentally  and  by  way  of  digression,  a  ps3^chology  of 
the  feelings.  I  merely  propose  to  show,  that  from  the 
simple  fact  that  attention  always  depends  upon  emo- 
tional states,  it  in  radice  comprises  motor  elements. 
And  our  principal  thesis,  in  this  new  manner,  will  be 
once  more  justified. 

In  the  first  place  we  must  discard  the  generally 
accredited  opinion  which  takes  the  basis  of  our  emo- 
tional life  to  be  constituted  of  pleasure  and  pain.  Pleas- 
ure and  pain  are  nothing  more  than  effects,  results, 
indications,  signs,  which  show  that  certain  appetites, 
inclinations,  and  tendencies  are  either  satisfied  or 
thwarted.  They  represent  merely  the  superficial,  final 
part  of  the  phenomenon — the  onty  part  that  enters 
consciousness.  They  are  the  hands  of  the  clock,  not 
its  works.  The  true  causes  of  emotional  life  must  be 
sought  lower  down — in  the  innermost  and  deepest  re- 
cesses of  the  organism.  Feelings,  emotions,  and  pas- 
sions havetheir  primordial  source  in  the  organic,  vege- 
tative activity.  Whatever  comes  from  the  heart,  the 
various  vessels,  the  digestive,  the  respiratory,  the 
sexual  organs,  in  a  word,  from  the  viscera,  constitutes 
the  primal  subject-matter  of  sensibility  ;  just  as  every- 
thing that  comes  from  the  external  senses,  constitutes 
the  primal  subject-matter  of  intelligence  :  and  just  as, 
physiologically,  vegetative  life  precedes  animal  life, 
which  rests  upon  it,  so  also^  psychologically,  emotional 
life  precedes  intellectual  life,  which  rests  upon  it.  The 
states   designated   as    needs,    appetites,    inclinations, 


CONCLUSION.  107 

tendencies,  and  desires,  are  the  direct  and  immediate 
results  of  every  animal  organization.  They  constitute 
the   true   basis  of  emotional   life.      With    Spinoza  we 

say:    "Appetite   is   the   very   essence  of  man 

Desire  is  appetite  with  consciousness  of  self 

From  this  it  results,  that  the  foundation  of  effort,  voli- 
tion, appetite,  and  desire,  is  not  the  fact  that  a  person 
has  adjudged  a  thing  to  be  good  ;  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, a  person  deems  a  thing  good  because  he  tends 
toward  it  from  effort,  will,  appetite,  and  desire."  At 
bottom,  pleasure  is  not  sought  for  its  own  sake,  or 
pain  for  its  own  sake  avoided  ;  for  it  is  clear,  that  we 
cannot  seek  or  avoid  what  we  do  not  know.  Only  the 
animal,  capable  of  experience,  that  is,  of  memory  and 
reflection,  is  able  to  seek  or  avoid,  for  their  own  sakes, 
agreeable  and  disagreeable  states  already  experienced. 
The  many  psychologists,  accordingly,  who  define  sen- 
sibility as  ''the  faculty  of  experiencing  pleasure  and 
pain,"  who  consequently  regard  these  two  phenomena 
as  essential  characteristics,  do  not  descend  to  the  true 
origin  of  emotional  life.  To  give  a  definition  that  con- 
templates the  cause  and  not  the  effects,  we  ought  to  say, 
''It  is  the  faculty  of  desiring,  and  consequently  of  ex- 
periencing pleasure  and  pain."*  And  further,  these 
cravings,  appetites,  desires(for  brevity  we  shall  hence- 
forth designate  them  simply  "tendencies")  are  them- 
selves effects  of  organization  :  they  are  the  immediate 
expression  of  its  permanent  or  transitory  modes  of 
being. 

It  would  be  useless  to  adduce  a  mass  of  data  and 
arguments  to  establish  the  fact  that  pleasure  and 
pain  depend  upon  tendencies,  which  in  turn  depend 
upon  the  organism.      To  proceed  rapidly  and  convin- 

*  Incidentally  I  use  their  terminology,  yet  without  accepting  it. 


I  o8         rS  YCHOL  O  G  Y  OF  A  TTENTION. 

cingly,  it  will  suffice  to  make  a  brief  excursion  into  the 
pathology  of  the  emotional  states.  We  shall  see  the 
agreeable  and  the  disagreeable  vary  exactly  as  tend- 
encies do.  Where  the  normal  man  with  normal  inclina- 
tions will  find  pleasure,  the  abnormal  man  with  ab- 
normal inclinations  will  encounter  pain,  and  vice  versa. 
Pleasure  and  pain  follow  tendency,  as  the  shadow  fol- 
lows the  body. 

Let  us  begin  with  the  tendencies  connected  with 
the  fundamental  function  of  nutrition.  Everybody 
knows  of  the  ''  cravings  "  of  pregnancy.  As  the  con- 
sequence of  poor  nutrition  in  the  first  months,  there 
are  produced  digestive,  circulatory,  and  secretory 
perturbations,  which  reveal  themselves  in  the  form  of 
strange  appetites  and  depraved  tastes.  The  afflicted 
persons  will  eat  clay,  straw,  tobacco,  soot,  etc.  The 
same  tendencies  are  met  with  in  certain  hysterical, 
chlorotic,  and  neuropathic  subjects.  The  beginning 
of  insanity  is  sometimes  marked  by  an  eccentric  and 
disorderly  alimentary  course.  There  have  been  in- 
stances of  people  who  had  a  pronounced  taste  for 
spiders,  toads,  and  worms.  Still  lower  are  found 
cases  of  ''coprophagy  "  and  ''scatophagy."  It  was 
found  necessary,  in  the  ward  of  a  hospital,  to  watch  a 
certain  patient,  in  order  to  prevent  him  from  swallow- 
ing the  contents  of  the  spittoons.*  »  The  same  perver- 
sion occurs  in  respect  of  the  sense  of  smell.  Certain 
neuropathic  subjects  find  the  smell  of  roses  disagree- 
able, but  relish  the  odor  of  valerian  or  asafœtida. 

Is  it  necessary  to  dwell  at  length  upon  the  devia- 
tions and  perversions  of  the  sexual  instincts  ?  Here 
instances  abound.  Even  after  making  ample  allow- 
ance for  imitation,  for  willful  debauchery,  and  for  that 

*  Campbell,  in  Journal  of  Mental  Science ,  July,  1886. 


CONCL  US  I  ON.  1 09 

which  comes  rather  from  the  head  (from  the  imagina- 
tion) than  from  the  senses,  there  still  remains  an 
abundant  harvest.  The  same  conclusion  always  as- 
serts itself  :  change  the  organization,  and  you  will 
change  the  tendencies,  and,  moreover,  you  will  change 
the  position  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  :  the  latter,  accord- 
ingly, are  but  phenomena  of  indication,  or  signs  to  the 
effect  that  the  necessities  of  the  organisms,  whatsoever 
they  be,  are  satisfied  or  thwarted. 

If  it  be  thought  that  the  inclinations  I  have  just 
enumerated  are  of  too  physiological  a  nature,  I  may 
cite  the  great  group  of  irresistible  impulsions  which  in- 
cludes the  ungovernable  craving  for  drink,  the  uncon- 
querable impulse  to  steal,  to  practice  incendiarism,  to 
kill,  to  commit  suicide.  To  the  consciousness  of  the  in- 
dividual, these  impulsions  are  without  cause,  without 
reasonable  motives,  and  that  is  so  because  their  true 
cause,  the  conditions  of  their  genesis  are  beneath  con- 
sciousness ;  it  knows  only  the  results  of  this  uncon- 
scious work.  These  irresistible  impulses  are  manifested 
in  very  dissimilar  forms.  The  most  trifling  examples 
are  as  instructive  to  psychology  as  the  most  truculent. 
Thus,  ''onomatomania"  is  a  species  of  aberration  very 
inoffensive  to  human  society  ;  the  finding  out  of  the 
name  of  some  stranger,  read  by  chance  in  a  newspaper, 
torments  the  patient,  and  brings  with  it  insomnia  and 
anxiety.  How  many  names  do  we  not  all  forget,  and 
yet  we  never  concern  ourselves  further  about  it.  But 
here  an  abnormal,  absurd  impulsion  arises.  Until  the 
patient  accomplishes  his  purpose,  the  impulse  causes 
him  pain.  When  he  has  done  so  there  is  pleasure. 
Let  us  also  remark,  that  whenever  an  irresistible  im- 
pulsion of  any  kind  (to  theft,   murder,   etc.)  has  been 


no         rS^^'C ^HOLOGY  OF  A TTENTION. 

realized,  there  comes  a  moment  of  relaxation,  of  sat- 
isfaction. 

These  various  morbid  manifestations  have  been 
accurately  studied  in  recent  times.  They  are  regarded 
as  symptoms  of  one  and  the  same  cause,  namely,  de- 
generation. And  the  result  is  that  we  ever  find  the 
same  interconnection  :  anomaly  in  organization,  anom- 
aly in  the  tendencies  that  express  it,  and  anomaly  in 
the  position  of  pleasure  and  of  pain. 

This  being  admitted — that  the  foundation  of  emo- 
tional life  rests  in  tendencies,  whether  conscious  or 
not  (consciousness  in  all  this  playing  but  a  secondary 
part) — how  are  we  to  represent  to  ourselves  these 
tendencies  ?  The  only  positive  idea  that  we  can  get 
of  them  is  to  consider  them  as  movements  (or  as  in- 
hibitions of  movements),  be  they  real  or  nascent.  They 
enter,  thus,  into  the  order  of  motor  phenomena  ;  in 
other  words,  a  craving,  an  inclination,  a  desire  always 
imply  motor  innervation  in  some  degree  or  other. 

The  beast  that  has  seized  his  prey  and  is  rending 
it  with  teeth  and  claws,  has  attained  his  purpose  and 
satisfied  his  tendencies  by  the  aid  of  considerable  ex- 
penditure of  movement.  Suppose  that  he  does  not 
yet  possess  his  victim,  but  keeps  it  in  sight,  and  is 
lying  in  wait  for  it  ;  then  his  whole  organism  will  be 
in  the  state  of  extreme  tension,  ready  to  act  :  the 
movements  are  not  yet  carried  out,  but  the  slightest 
impulsion  will  cause  them  to  pass  into  action.  A  weaker 
degree  is  where  the  animal  prowls  about,  seeking  by 
sight  and  scent  some  capture,  which  the  hazard  of  the 
chase  will  throw  in  its  path  ;  this  is  a  state  of  half- 
tension,  the  motor  innervation  being  less  strong,  and 
vaguely  adapted.  Finally,  a  still  weaker  degree,  the 
animal  is  at  rest  in  his  den.    The  vague  image  of  prey, 


CONCLUSION,  III 

that  is,  the  memory  of  victims  that  have  been  devoured, 
traverses  his  mind  ;  the  motor  element  assumes  only 
a  nascent,  a  very  sHght,  degree  of  intensity,  and  does 
not  manifest  itself  through  any  visible  movement.  It 
is  certain,  that  between  these  four  degrees  there  is 
continuity,  and  that  there  is  always  in  play  a  motor 
element,  with  a  simple  difference  of  degree  of  intensity. 

The  example  last  chosen  is  intentionally  roughly 
drawn,  to  make  things  clear.  We  might  just  as  well 
have  taken  love,  aversion,  or  fear,  setting  out  from 
their  most  tumultuous  motor  manifestations,  and 
through  successive  weakenings,  which  actually  are 
met  with  in  real  life,  finally  reducing  them  to  a  purely 
internal  state  that  is  only  an  extremely  feeble  motor 
innervation,  or  movement  in  the  nascent  condition. 

The  tendency,  thus,  is  bound  up  in  a  physiolog- 
ical phenomenon,  which  imparts  to  it  a  body.  It  is 
no  longer  ''  a  state  of  the  soul,"  of  a  mysterious  and 
transcendent  character.  Proclivities,  inclinations, 
desires — all  these  words  and  their  synonyms  signify 
a  nascent  or  miscarried  movement,  according  as  it  is 
capable  of  being  evolved  to  its  extreme  limit,  or  is 
obliged  to  undergo  arrest  of  development.  The  state 
of  concomitant  consciousness  may  indifferently  appear 
or  disappear  ;  the  tendency  may  be  conscious  or  un- 
conscious ;  yet  the  motor  innervation  none  the  less  re- 
mains as  the  fundamental  element. 

We  arrive,  accordingly,  at  the  following  conclusion: 
attention  depends  upon  emotional  states  ;  emotional 
states  are  reducible  to  tendencies  ;  tendencies  are  fun- 
damentally movements  (or  arrested  movements)  and 
may  be  conscious  or  unconscious.  Attention,  both 
spontaneous  and  voluntary,  is  accordingly,  from  its 
origin  on,  bound  up  in  motor  conditions. 


112         PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 


II. 

It  now  remains  for  us  to  offer  a  few  remarks  on  the 
most  general  physical  conditions  of  attention.  If  we 
closely  observe  men  as  they  are,  taken  as  a  whole,  and 
not  the  drilled  and  cultured  minds — as  psychologists 
almost  always  do — we  shall  surely  find  that  spontane- 
ous attention,  and  above  all  voluntary  attention,  are 
exceptional  states.  Eliminate  first  the  general  routine 
of  life — that  enormous  mass  of  habits  that  move  us 
like  automatons,  with  vague  and  intermittent  states  of 
consciousness.  Eliminate  the  periods  of  our  mental  life 
in  which  we  are  purely  passive  simply  because  the 
order  and  succession  of  our  states  of  consciousness  are 
given  to  us  from  without,  and  because  their  serial  con- 
nection is  imposed  upon  us  :  as  when  we  read  a  book 
of  average  interest,  work  at  a  manual  occupation,  or 
at  anything  involving  a  succession  of  acts  in  a  fixed 
order.  Eliminate  that  state  of  relative  intellectual  re- 
pose in  which  people  ''think  of  nothing,"  that  is, 
wherein  the  states  of  consciousness  have  neither  in- 
tensity nor  clear  determination  :  intellectual  7ionchal- 
ance,  reverie  in  all  its  degrees.  Eliminate  finally  all 
states  of  passion  and  violent  agitation,  with  their  dis- 
orderly flux  and  diffusion  of  movements.  And  having 
made  these  eliminations,  with  perhaps  a  few  others, 
we  may  then  credit  to  the  general  account  of  attention 
that  which  remains.  In  this  general  account,  the 
cases  of  spontaneous  attention  make  up  by  far  the 
greater  number  ;  the  clear  and  indisputable  cases  of 
voluntary  attention  constitute  the  minority  ;  in  many 
men  and  women  they  amount  almost  to  nothing.  The 
psychological   reasons   of   this   difference  we  have  at- 


CONCLUSION.  113 

tempted  to  give.  But  we  have  also  incidentally  noted 
the  fact  of  common  experience  that  in  the  state  of 
fatigue,  the  state  of  exhaustion,  attention  is  very  diffi- 
cult, often  impossible,  and  always  without  duration. 
And  the  reason  is,  that  attention,  by  its  very  nature, 
more  than  any  other  intellectual  state  requires  a  great 
expenditure  of  physical  force,  which  has  to  be  pro- 
duced under  particular  conditions. 

Let  us  once  more  recall  to  mind,  that  it  exists  only 
through  a  limitation  of  the  field  of  consciousness, 
which  is  equivalent  to  saying,  that  physically  it  pre- 
supposes the  putting  into  activity  of  a  limited  part  of 
the  brain.  It  matters  not  whether  we  conceive  this 
part  as  a  localized  region,  or — which  is  more  probable 
— as  formed  of  different  elements,  spread  throughout 
the  mass  of  the  encephalon,  and  working  in  harmony 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  others.  The  normal  state  of 
consciousness  supposes  diffusion,  with  the  work  of  the 
brain  diffused.  Attention  supposes  concentration,  with 
the  work  of  the  brain  localized.  When  the  brain  passes 
from  the  normal  state  to  the  state  of  deep  attention, 
this  transition  is  the  analogue  of  what  happens  when 
instead  of  carrying  a  weight  on  our  shoulders  we  are 
compelled  to  support  it  with  one  of  our  fingers.  This 
work,  falling  wholly  upon  one  portion  of  the  organ, 
can  only  take  place  through  a  rapid  transformation  of 
potential  or  reserve  energy  into  actual,  kinetic  energy. 
All  physiological  work  is  the  product  of  chemical 
action,  performed  in  the  organism,  which  in  turn 
owes  its  origin  to  food  and  oxygen.  This  production 
of  work,  resulting  from  nutrition,  is  far  from  being  con- 
stant. It  is  unavoidable  that  in  debilitated  persons 
ihe  work  of  reserve  gives  way,  and  that  consequently 
exhaustion  soon  sets  in.     Even  among  persons  unusu- 


114         PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 

ally  gifted,  the  accumulated  capital  is  quickly  ex- 
pended, if  attention  be  deep  and  long-continued.  It 
seems,  accordingly,  that  the  last  physical  condition 
exacted  by  attention,  consists  in  what  physiologists 
calldynamogeny,  that  is,  according  toBrown-Séquard's 
definition,  "  the  power  which  certain  parts  of  the  nerv- 
ous system  possess  of  suddenly  evoking  an  augmenta- 
tion of  activity,  through  a  purely  dynamic  influence." 
This  author*  reports  the  observation  of  a  young  girl, 
who  every  Sunday  at  the  sound  of  a  bell  was  thrown 
into  ecstasy,  and  who  for  twelve  successive  hours 
would  stand  upright  on  the  polished  edge  of  her  bed, 
supporting  herself  only  by  her  toes  and  a  small  part  of 
the  soles  of  her  feet,  and  could  not  be  disturbed  from 
her  immobility  by  three  violent  electro-magnetic 
shocks.  She  spent  the  rest  of  the  week  in  bed,  ex- 
hausted, almost  incapable  of  movement.  To  accom- 
plish this  difficult  feat  for  half  a  day,  without  interrup- 
tion, would  demand  a  prodigious  power  of  action  in 
the  motor  apparatus.  Is  it  not  probable,  that  cases 
of  extraordinary  and  prolonged  attention  require  with- 
in certain  parts  of  the  nervous  system  a  like  ex- 
cessive activity,  which  is  likewise  followed  by  a  period 
of  fatigue  and  impotency?  Dynamogeny,  however, 
is  a  physiological  state  the  causes  of  which  are  as  yet 
so  little  known  that  it  would  prove  idle  to  dwell  upon 
the  question,  and  to  draw  hence  any  psychological 
deductions. 

It  is  further  necessary  to  observe  that  the  preceding 
remarks  only  rigorously  apply  to  the  physical  condi- 
tio .-.s  of  attention.  The  terms  ''work"  and  ''trans- 
formation of   energy  "   have  a  value   and  significance 

*  "  Dictionajre  encyclopéd.  des  Sciences  médicales,  Art.  Dynamogenie,"  and 
"  Gazette  Hebdomadaire.''     Jan.  2oth,   1852. 


CONCLUSION.  lis 

only  in  the  order  of  physical  phenomena.  The  state 
of  consciousness,  the  internal  occurrence  (whatever 
idea  we  may  form  of  it)  is  not  commensurable  with  the 
former.  The  ''psychic  force,"  of  which  certain  au- 
thors speak,  is  but  a  metaphor,  unless  by  it  are  under- 
stood the  physical  conditions  of  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness— and  these  only.  To  maintain  that  a  powerful 
attention  depends  upon  the  possibility  of  a  transforma- 
tion of  potential  energy  into  actual  energy,  is  simpl}^ 
to  indicate  one  of  its  fundamental,  material  condi- 
tions, and  nothing  more. 

*  * 

In  concluding  this  study  of  attention,  there  are 
numerous  practical  consequences  that  might  well  be 
pointed  out.  That  task  I  decline.  My  sole  aim  has 
been,  to  analyze  its  mechanism.  The  subject,  in  my 
estimation,  has  nowhere  been  treated  as  its  importance 
demands.  This  it  has  been  my  endeavor  to  do,  and,  in 
agreement  with  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  to  show  that 
voluntary  attention  is  nothing  else  than  a  higher  and 
extreme  form — the  result  of  lower  forms  rising  from 
half-conscious  and  half-unconscious  processes. 


INDEX. 


Abstraction,  51. 

Acquired  attention,  34, 

Adaptation,  5,  39. 

Affective  life,  108  et  seq.  See  Emo- 
tio7tal. 

Agoraphobia,  79. 

Appetite,  107. 

Aproseky,  65. 

Archimedes,  89. 

Arithmomania,  79. 

Atavism,  38. 

Atrophy  of  attention,  75,  96. 

Attention,  its  characteristics,  i  ;  vol- 
untary and  spotaneous,  contrasted, 
2;  its  mechanism  motor,  2;  de- 
fined as  monoideism,  4;  defined 
generally,  3,  5,  6,  59.74- 104-105,  115; 
oscillations  and  intermission  of,  9- 
II,  70;  physical  manifestations  of, 
11-23;  theories  of  the  nature  of,  22; 
its  lowest  form  in  animals,  27;  its 
unity  of  composition,  27;  a  fore- 
most factor  in  civilisation,  37;  as 
an  inhibition,  55;  in  psychometri- 
cal  researches,  67  et  seq.;  morbid 
states  of,  72-105;  debilitation  of,  in 
mania,  96;  in  idiocy,  103-104;  mo- 
tor elements  in,  106;  physical  con- 
ditions of,  112-115  ;  its  drain  on  the 
brain,  113. 

Auditory  images  and  types,  53  et  seq. 

Azyr,  Vicq  D',  10. 

Bain,  18,  47,  56,  60,  64. 
Ballet,  48,  53. 

Bank-notes,  a  student's  mania  con- 
cerning, 81. 
Bastian.  60. 


Beard,  102. 

Beatific  visions,  89. 

Beaunis,  43. 

Bell.  Ch.,  15. 

Bérard,  88. 

Berkeley,  54. 

Bernard,  Claude,  41. 

Binet,  48, 

Bordach,  100. 

Braid,  102. 

Brain,  its  action  in  attention,  zo  ei 

seq.;  its  functions,  41  et  seq. 
Brodie,  Sir  J.,  77. 
Brown-Séquard,  41,  114. 
Buccola,  78,  80,  86. 

Campbell,  108. 

Carpenter,  89,  102. 

Castillo  Interior,  go  et  seq. 

Chandelier,  with  numerous  gas-burn- 
ers, cortex  of  the  brain  compared 
to  a,  102. 

Change  in  consciousness,  46. 

Charcot,  48,  78. 

Charlton,  60. 

Chevreul,  49. 

Children,  attention  in,  28,  30  et  seq. 

Civilisation  and  attention,  36-39. 

Coleridge,  loo-ioi. 

Composite  photographs,  50. 

Concepts,  scientific,  52. 

Condillac,  8. 

Condorcet,  100. 

Consciousness  in  attention,  21-23,  56; 
the  struggle  of  ideas  in,  39  et  seq.; 
only  possible  through  change,  46; 
unity  of,  3. 

Contemplation,  89. 


1 1 8         rS YCHOL OGY  OF  A  TTENTJON. 


Coprophagy,  io8. 
Cravings  of  pregnancy;  io8. 
Criminology,  38. 
Czermak,  65,  102. 

Darwin,  16,  17,  25,  34.  37.  63- 
Descartes,  9,  24. 
Desire,  107. 
Dipsomaniac,  10. 
Direction  of  attention,  59. 
Distraction,  72 
Dogs,  attention  in,  28. 
Donkey,  like  a  browsing,  95. 
Doubt,  insanity  of,  79. 
Dreams,  loi. 
Duchenne,  15,  63. 
Duration,  in  attention,  1-2. 
Dynamogeny,  114. 

Ecstasy,  3,  88-95. 

Education,  33  et  seq. 

Effort,  the  feeling  of,  59  et  seq.;  of 

attention,  63. 
Egger,  v..  53,  54. 
Emotional  life,  reducible  to  needs, 

tendencies,  desires,  etc.,  conscious 

or  unconscious,  106  et  seq. 
Emotional  states   in   attention,  6  et 

seq. 
Emotions,  25,  106  et  seq.;  expression 

of,  16  et  seq.,  25. 
Esquirol,  87,  103. 
Exner,  67-68,  70. 
Expectant  attention,  68  et  seq. 

Fanaticism,  political,  89. 

Fechner,  61-64. 

Feeling  of  effort,  59  ec  seq. 

Féré,  18. 

Ferrier,  41,  42,  60,  64. 

Fixed  ideas,  3,  76-88. 

Flatus  V0C2S,  54. 

Force,  psychic,  115. 

Fourier,  8. 

Fragetrieb,  80. 

Franklin,  100. 

Fuegians,  51. 

Gall,  10, 

Galton,  18,  47,  48,  50. 


Gas-burners,  cortex  of  the  brain  com- 
pared to  a  chandelier  with,  102. 
Gauchos,  37. 
Gauss,  89. 

General  ideas,  49  et  seq.,  55. 
Generalisation,  51. 
Generic  images,  50. 
Gratiolet,  15. 
Griesinger,  78,  80,  96. 
Gtubelsucht,  60. 
Guge,  65. 
Gurney,  102. 

Hall,  Stanley,  9,  67,  102. 
Hartmann,  20. 
Heidenhain,  102. 
evcjGiç,  95. 
Hobbes,  54,  95. 
Homicidal  mania,  79. 
Hypertrophy  of  attention,  74. 

Ideas,   their   origin,    behavior,    etc. 

47-57- 
Idiocy,  attention  in,  103-104. 
Images,  their  origin,  behavior,  etc. 

47-57- 
Imbeciles,  103. 
Inhibition,  40  et  seq. 
Intensity,  in  attention,  1-2,  8. 
Interest,  30. 

Intoxication,  attention  in,  98. 
Irresistible  impulses,  109. 

James,  W.,  60. 

Kirchner,  102. 
Krafft-Ebing,  78. 

Lange,  N.,  70. 
Lateau,  Louise,  90. 
Leibnitz,  52. 
Lewes,  10,  14. 
Lubbock,  51, 
Luys,  78. 

Maerl,  Marie  De,  90. 

Magnan,  78, 

Malebranche,  9. 

Mania,  atrophy  of  attention  in,  96. 

Mantegazza,  17. 

Martyrs,  89. 


INDEX, 


1 1 


Maudsley,  2,  10,  14,  20,  21,  56. 
Maury,  A.,  88. 

Mechanism  of  attention,  11-23. 
Meschede,  78. 
Metaphysical  mania,  80. 
Michéa,  88. 

Monkeys,  attention  in,  34-35. 
Monoideism,  4,  25,  39,  94. 
Morbid  states  of  attention,  72-105. 
Mosso,  14. 

Motor  elements,  in  perception,  ideas, 
etc.,  46  et  seq.;   in  attention,   106, 

IIO-III. 

Motor  images  and  types,  53  et  seq. 
Movements,  rôle  of,  in  attention,  19. 
Miiller,  J.,  16,  60. 
Muscular  movements,  16  et  seq. 
Mystics,  90  et  seq. 

Nervous   system   and   activity,  40  et 

seq. 
Newton,  9,  89. 
Nominalism,  54. 
Nonchalance,  intellectual,  112. 
Nutrition,  108. 

Obersteiner,  67. 
Onomatomania,  82,  log. 
Oscillations  and  attention,  10,  70. 

Pascal,  89. 

Paving-stones,  a  woman's  mania  for 

counting,  79. 
Perceptions,  46. 
Perez,  B.,  32. 
Pfliiger,  41. 

Photographs,  images  not  mere,  48. 
Pleasure  and  pain,  8,  106  et  seq. 
Plotinus,  95 
Polyideism,  4,  25. 
Porphyrins,  95. 
Prayer,   degrees  of,  in  the  ecstasy 

of  St.  Theresa,  92  et  seq. 
Pre-attention,  68  et  seq. 
Preyer,  16,  31,  44,  102. 
Psychometry,  67  et  seq. 

Railways,  a  man's  mania  on,  80. 
Reflex  actions,  57. 
Reflexion,  intellectual,  47,  64. 
Residua,  perceptual,  in  the  brain,  48. 
Respiratory  sensations,  14,  64-65. 


Reverie,  112. 

Rhythm,  law  of,  in  attention,  9, 

Riccardi,  26. 

Roncati,  80. 

Roscelin,  54. 

Savages,  attention  in,  37. 

Scatophagy,  108. 

Schneider,  102. 

Scott,  Walter,  89. 

Séguin,  104. 

Setchenoff,  12,  41,  56. 

Signs,  52. 

Sikorski,  28,  31. 

Somnambulism,  102. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  38. 

Spinoza,  107. 

Spontaneous  attention,  5,  6-28  ;  re- 
veals a  person's  fundamental  char- 
acter, 7.  See  Attention  and  Voluu- 
tary  Attention. 

Stantevi  oportet  7nori,  39. 

Starr,  Alexander,  42. 

Strieker,  53,  54,  65. 

Struggle  of  ideas  in  consciousness, 

51- 
St.  Vitus's  dance,  97. 
Sully,  J.,  9,  loi. 
Surprise,  23  et  seq. 

Taine,  48. 

Tamburini,  78,  81,  83. 
Tartini,  loo-ioi. 
Tasmanians,  51. 
Tendencies,  107. 
Theresa  St.,  ecstasy  of,  90-94. 
Thinking  of  nothing,  112. 
Thought-reading,  49. 
Tuke,  Hack,  13. 
Tylor,  51. 

Unity  of  consciousness,  3. 
Useless  movements,  57. 

Vascular  sensations,  13. 
Vigny,  Alfred  De,  tj. 
Visions,  89. 

Visual  images  and  types,  53  et  seq 
Volition,  44  et  seq. 
Voltaire,  100. 

Voluntary  attention,  29-71;  contrasted 
with  spontaneous,  29  ;    its  forma- 


Î20 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION, 


tion,  30-39;  a  product  of  civilisa- 
tion, 36:  its  internal  mechanism, 
39-59;  as  a  feeling  of  effort,  59-66  ; 
its  duration,  66-71.  See  Attention 
and  Spontaneous  Attention, 
Voray,  90. 


Watchmaker,  47. 
Weber,  41. 
Westphal,  78,  85. 
Women,  attention  in,  38. 
Word,  inward,  53. 
Wundt,  21,  43,  60,  67-69. 


CATALOGUE  OF  PUBLICATIONS 

OF  THE 

OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  CO. 


COPE,  E.  D. 

THE  PRIMARY  FACTORS  OF  ORGANIC  EVOLUTION. 
121  cuts.     Pp.  xvi,  547.     Cloth,  f2.00  (lOS.). 

MÛLLER,   F.   MAX. 

THREE    INTRODUCTORY     LECTURES     ON     THE     SCIENCE     OF 
THOUGHT. 
128  pages.     Cloth,  75c  (3s.  6d.). 

THREE  LECTURES  ON  THE  SCIENCE  OF  LANGUAGE. 

112  pages.     2nd  Edition.     Cloth,  75c  (3s.  6d.). 

ROMANES,   GEORGE  JOHN. 

DARWIN  AND  AFTER  DARWIN. 

Three  Vols.,  $4.00.     Singly,  as  follows  : 

1.  The  Darwinian  Theory.    460  pages.    125  illustrations.  Cloth,  $2.00 

2.  Post-Darwinian  Questions.     Heredity  and  Utility.     Pp.338.    $1.50 

3.  Post-Darwinian  Questions.  Isolation  and  Physiological  Selection 
Pp.  181.     $1.00. 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  WEISMANNISM. 
236  pages.     Cloth,  $1.00. 

THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

Third  Edition,  Pages,  184.     Cloth,  gilt  top,  $1.25. 

SHUTE,  DR.  D.  KERFOOT. 

FIRST  BOOK  IN  ORGANIC  EVOLUTION. 

9  colored  plates,  39  cuts.     Pp.  xvi +  285.     Price,  $2.00  (7s.  6d.). 

MACH,   ERNST. 

THE  SCIENCE  OF  MECHANICS. 

Translated  by  T.  J.  McCormack.     250  cuts.     534  pages.     $2.50  (12s.  6d.) 

POPULAR  SCIENTIFIC  LECTURES. 

Third  Edition.    415  pages.    59  cuts.   Cloth,  gilt  top.   $1.50  (7s.  6d.). 

THE  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  SENSATIONS. 
Pp.  208.     37  cuts.     Cloth,  $1.25  (6s.  6d.). 

LAGRANGE,  JOSEPH  LOUIS. 

LECTURES  ON  ELEMENTARY  MATHEMATICS. 

With  portrait  of  the  author.     Pp.  172.     Price,  $1.00  (5s.). 

DE  MORGAN,  AUGUSTUS. 

ON  THE  STUDY  AND  DIFFICULTIES  OF  MATHEMATICS. 
New  Reprint  edition  with  notes.     Pp.  viii-f-288.     Cloth,  $1.25  (5s.). 

ELEMENTARY   ILLUSTRATIONS   OF  THE   DIFFERENTIAL  AND 
INTEGRAL  CALCULUS. 
New  reprint  edition.     Price,  $1.00  (5s.). 

FINK,  KARL. 

A  BRIEF  HISTORY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 

Trans,  by  W.  W.  Beman  and  D.  E.  Smith.     Pp.,  333-    Cloth,  $1.50  (5s.6d.) 

SCHUBERT,  HERMANN. 

MATHEMATICAL  ESSAYS  AND  RECREATIONS. 

Pp.  149.     Cuts,  37.     Cloth,  75c  (3s.  6d.). 

HUC  AND  GABET,  MM. 

TRAVELS  IN  TARTARY,  THIBET  AND  CHINA. 

100  engravings.    Pp   28 -f  660.    2  vols.    $2.00  (los.).   One  vol.,  $1.25  (5s.) 


CARUS.  PAUL. 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  DEVIL,  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  EVIL. 

311  Illustrations.     Pages,  500.     Price,  $6.00  {30s.;. 
EROS  AND  PSYCHE. 

Retold  after  Apuleius.    With  Illustrations  by  Paul  Thumann.  Pp.  la?,. 

Price,  Si. 50  (6s.], 
WHENCE  AND  WHITHER? 

An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of  the  Soul.    196  pages.   Cloth,  75c  (3s.  6d.) 
THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM. 

Second  edition,  revised  and  enlarged.  351  pages.  Cloth,  $1.25  {6s.  6d.) 
FUNDAMENTAL  PROBLEMS. 

Second  edition,  revised  and  enlarged.    372  pp.    CI.,  S1.50  (/s.  6d.). 
HOMILIES  OF  SCIENCE. 

317  pages.     Cloth,  Gilt  Top,  $1.50  (7s.  6d.y. 
THE  IDEA  OF  GOD. 

Fourth  edition.     32  pages.     Paper,  15c  (gd.). 
THE  SOUL  OF  MAN. 

2nd  ed.     182  cuts.    482  pages.     Cloth,  $1.50  (6s.). 
TRUTH  IN  FICTION.     Twelve  Tales  with  a  Moral. 

White  and  gold  binding,  gilt  edges.     Pp.  iii.     51.00(53.). 
THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE. 

Second,  extra  edition.     Pp.  103.     Price,  50c  (2s.  6d.). 
PRIMER  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

240  pages.     Second  Edition.     Cloth,  $1.00  {5s.). 
THE  GOSPEL  OF  BUDDHA.     According  to  Old  Records. 

Fifth  Edition.    Pp.  275.    Cloth,  $1.00  (5s.).    In  German,  $1.25  (6s.  6d.) 
BUDDHISM  AND  ITS  CHRISTIAN  CRITICS. 

Pages,  311.     Cloth,  Ç1.25  (6s.  6d.j. 
KARMA.     A  Story  of  Early  Buddhism. 

Illustrated  by  Japanese  artists.     Crêpe  paper,  75c  (3s.  6d.). 
NIRVANA:  A  Story  of  Buddhist  Psychology. 

Japanese  edition,  like  Karma,     gi.oo  (4s.  6d.). 
LAO-TZE'S  TAO-TEH-KING. 

Chinese-English.     Pp.  360.     Cloth,  $3.00  (15s.). 

CORNILL,  CARL  HEINRICH. 
THE  PROPHETS  OF  ISRAEL. 

Pp.,  200      Cloth,  Si. 00  (5s.). 
HISTORY  OF  THE  PEOPLE  OF  ISRAEL. 

Pp.  vi  +  325.     Cloth,  $1.50  (7s.  6d.). 

POWELL,   J.  W. 

TRUTH  AND  ERROR;  or,  the  Science  of  Intellection. 
Pp.  423.     Cloth,  $1.75  (7s.  6d.). 

RIBOT,  TH. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION. 
THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 
THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL. 

Cloth,  75  cents  each  (3s.  6d.).     Full  set,  cloth,  -$1.7 S  (QS.). 
EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

Pp.  231.     Cloth,  Si. 25  (5s.). 

WAGNER,  RICHARD. 

A  PILGRIMAGE  TO  BEETHOVEN. 

A  Story.    With  portrait  of  Beethoven.  Pp.40.  Boards,  50c  (2S.  6d.). 

HUTCHINSON,  WOODS. 

THE  GOSPEL  ACCORDING  TO  DARWIN. 
Pp.  xii  +  241.     Price,  Si. 50  (6s.). 

FREYTAG,    GUSTAV. 

THE  LOST  MANUSCRIPT.     A  Novel. 

2  vols.    953  pages.     Extra  cloth,  S4.00  (21s).     One  vol.,  cl.,  $1.00  (5s.) 
MARTIN  LUTHER. 

]llustrated.     Pp.130.     Cloth,  Si. 00  (5s.). 


AÇVAGHOSHA. 

DISCOURSE  ON  THE  AWAKENING  OF  FAITH  in  the  Mahâyâna. 
Translated    for   the  first  time  from   the  Chinese  version   by   Tietara 
Suzuki.     Pages,  176.     Price,  cloth,  $1.25  (5s.  6d.). 

TRUMBULL,  M.  M. 

THE  FREE  TRADE  STRUGGLE  IN  ENGLAND. 
Second  Edition.    296  pages.     Cloth,  75c  (3s.  6d.). 

WHEELBARROW:  Articles  and  Discussions  on  the  Labor  Question. 
With  portrait  of  the  author.     303  pages.     Cloth,  fi.oo  (5s.). 

GOETHE  AND  SCHILLER'S  XENIONS. 

Translated  by  Paul  Carus.     Album  form.     Pp.162.    CI.,  $1.00  (5s.), 

OLDENBERG,  H. 

ANCIENT  INDIA:    ITS  LANGUAGE  AND  RELIGIONS. 

Pp.  100.     Cloth,  50c  (2S.  6d.). 

CONWAY,   DR.   MONCURE  DANIEL. 

SOLOMON,  AND  SOLOMONIC  LITERATURE. 
Pp.  243.     Cloth,  $1.50  (6s.). 

GARBE,  RICHARD. 

THE  REDEMPTION  OF  THE  BRAHMAN.     A  Tale  of  H/ndu  Life. 
Laid  paper.     Gilt  top.     96  pages.     Price,  75c  (3s.  6d.). 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANCIENT  INDIA. 
Pp.  89.     Cloth,  50c  (2S.  6d.). 

HUEPPE,  FERDINAND. 

THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BACTERIOLOGY. 

28  Woodcuts.     Pp.  X  +467.     Price,  $1.75  (9s.). 

LÉVY-BRUHL,  PROF.  L. 

HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY  IN  FRANCE. 

23  Portraits.     Handsomely  bound.     Pp.  500.     Price,  $3.00  (12s.). 

TOPINARD,  DR.  PAUL. 

SCIENCE  AND  FAITH,  or  Man  as  an  Animal  and  Man  as  a  Member 
OF  Society. 
Pp.  374.     Cloth,  $1.50  (6s.  6d.). 

BINET,  ALFRED. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING. 
Pp.  193.     Cloth,  75c  (3s.  6d.). 

THE  PSYCHIC  LIFE  OF  MICRO-ORGANISMS. 
Pp.  135.     Cloth,  75  cents. 

ON  DOUBLE  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

See  No.  8,  Religion  of  Science  Library. 

THE  OPEN  COURT. 

A  Monthly  Magazine  Devoted  to  the  Science  of  Religion,  the  Religion  of 
Science,  and  the  Extension  of  the  Religious  Parliament  Idea. 

Terms  :  gi.oo  a  year;  5s.  6d.  to  foreign  countries  in  the  Postal  Union. 
Single  Copies,  10  cents  (6d.). 

THE  MONIST. 

A  Quarterly  Magazine  of  Philosophy  and  Science. 

Per  copy,  50  cents;  Yearly,  Ç2.00.     In  England  and  all  countries  in 
U.P.U.  per  copy,  2s.  6d.:  Yearly,  gs.  6d. 


CHICAGO: 

THE  OPEN   COURT  PUBLISHING  CO. 

Monon  Building,  324  Dearborn  St. 
LONDON  :   Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Triibner  &  Company,  Ltd. 


The  Religion  of  Science  Library. 

A  collection  of  bi-monthly  publications,  most  of  which  are  reprints  of 
books  published  by  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Company.  Yearly,  $1.50. 
Separate  copies  according  to  prices  quoted.  The  books  are  printed  upon 
good  paper,  from  large  type. 

The  Religion  of  Science  Library,  by  its  extraordinarily  reasonable  price 
will  place  a  large  number  of  valuable  books  within  the  reach  of  all  readers. 

The  following  have  already  appeared  in  the  series: 

No.  I.   The  Religion  of  Science.     By  Paul  Carus.     25c  (is.  6d.). 

2.  Three  Introductory  Lectures  on   the   Science  of  Thought.     By  F.  Max 

MûLLER.     25c  (IS.  6d.). 

3.  Three  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Language.  F.  Max  Muller.  25c  (is.ôd.) 

4.  The  Diseases  of  Personality.     By  Th.  RiBOT.     25c   (is.  6d.). 

5.  The  Psychology  of  Attention.     By  Th.  Ribot.     25c  (is.  6d.). 

6.  The  Psychic  Life  of  Micro- Organisms.     By  Alfred  BiNET.     25c  (is.  6d.) 

7.  The  Nature  of  the  State.     By  Paul  Carus.     15c  (gd.). 

8.  On  Double  Consciousness.     By  Alfred  Binet.     15c  (gd.). 

9.  Fundamental  Probleins.     By  Paul  Carus.     50c  (2s.  6d.). 

10.  The  Diseases  of  the  Will.     By  Th.  Ribot.     25c  (is.  6d.). 

11.  The  Origin  of  Language.     By  Ludwig  Noire.     15c  (gd.). 

12.  The  Free  Trade  Struggle  in  England.     M.  M.  Trumbull.     25c  (is.  6d.; 

13.  Wheelbarro'M  on  the  Labor  Question.     By  M.  M.  Trumbull.    35c  (2s.). 

14.  The  Gospel  of  Buddha.     By  Paul  Carus.     350(25.). 

15.  The  Printer  of  Philosophy.     By  Paul  Carus.     25c  (is.  6d.). 

16.  On  Memory,  and  The  Specific  Energies  of  the  Nervous  System.     By  Prof. 

Ewald  Hering.     15c  (gd.). 

17.  The  Redemption  of  the  Brahman.      Tale  of  Hindu  Life.      By  Richard 

Garbe.     25c(is.6d.>. 

18.  An  Examination  of  ]Veis7nannism.     By  G.  J.  Romanes.     35c  (2s.). 

19.  On  Germinal  Selection.     By  August  Weismann.     25c  (is.  6d.). 

20.  Lovers  Three  Thotisand  Years  Ago.     By  T.  A.  Goodwin.    (Out  of  print.) 

21.  Popular  Scientific  Lectures.     By  Ernst  Mach.     50c  (2s.  6d.). 

22.  Ancient  India  :  Its  Language  and  Religions.     By  H.  Oldenberg.     25c 

(IS.  éd.). 

23.  The  Prophets  of  Israel.     By  Prof.  C.  H.  Cornill.     25c  (i.  6d.). 
Zi,.  Homilies  of  Science.     By  Paul  Carus.     350(23.). 

25.  Thoughts  on  Religion.     By  G.  J,  Romanes.     50c  (2s.  6d.). 

26.  The  Philosophy  of  Ancient  India.  By  Prof.  Richard  Garbe.  25c  (is.6d.) 

27.  Martin  Luther.     By  Gustav  Freytag.     25c  (is.  6d.). 

28.  English  Secularism.     By  George  Jacob  Holyoake.     25c  (is.  6d.). 

29.  On  Orthogenesis.     By  Th.  Eimer.     25c  (is.  6d.). 
■ifl.   Chinese  Philosophy.     By  Paul  Carus.     25c  (is.  6d.). 

31,  The  Lost  Manuscript .     By  Gustav  Freytag.     6oc  (3s.). 

32.  A  Mechanico- Physiological  Theory  of  Organic  Evolution.     By  Carl  von 

Naegeli.     15c  (gd.). 
"il.  Chinese  Fiction.     By  Dr.  George  T.  Candlin.     15c  (gd.). 

34.  Mathematical  Essays  and  Recreations.     By  H.  Schubert.     25c  (is.  6d.) 

35.  The  Ethical  Problem.     By  Paul  Carus.     50c  (2S.  6d.). 

36.  Buddhism  and  Its  Christian  Critics.     By  Paul  Carus.     50c  (2s.  6d.). 

37.  Psychology  for  Beginners.     By  Hiram  M.  Stanley.     20c  (is.). 
■^%.  Discourse  071  Method.     By  Descartes.    25c  (is.  6d.). 

39.  The  Dawn  of  a  New  Era.     By  Paul  Carus.     15c  (gd.), 

40.  Kant  and  Spencer.     By  Paul  Carus.     20c  (is.). 

41.  The  Soul  of  Man.     By  Paul  Carus.    75c  (3s.  6d.). 

42.  World's  Congress  Addresses.     By  C.  C.  Bonney.     15c  (gd.). 

43.  The  Gospel  According  to  Darwin.   By  Woods  Hutchinson.   50c  (2s.  6d.) 

44.  Whence  and  Whither.     By  Paul  Carus.     25c(is.6d.). 

45.  Enquiry    Concerning  Human    Understanding.     By   David   Hume.     25c 

(is.  6d.). 
45.  Enquiry    Concerning  the  Principles  of  Morals.    By  D.a.vid  Hume. 
25c  (is.  bd.)  

THE  OPEN   COURT  PUBLISHING  CO., 

CHICAGO  :  324  Dearborn  Street. 
LONDON:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  &  Company,  Ltd 


BF 


/ 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


WOMÇ0  L,8. 

M/IR  I  8  1987 
Reco 


